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Abstract 
The thesis traces the retirement of sterling as a reserve currency amid the profound 
transformation in the international monetary system that occurred between the 1967 
devaluation and the 1977 Third Group Arrangement. Despite contemporary concern that 
sterling’s reserve role acted as a constraint on the domestic economy, paradoxically the 
period prior to the 1976 IMF crisis witnessed a renewed accumulation in sterling balances. 
The thesis explains this process using a constructivist approach to monetary relations, arguing 
the nature of the external constraint and strategies for resolving sterling’s reserve role were 
constituted by Britain’s normative commitments to the international monetary system. The 
sterling balances were of continued use to British policymakers in securing their traditional 
objectives of stability in external exchange and autonomy in domestic policy. Despite nominal 
commitments to retire sterling’s reserve role, this was expected to take place as part of wider 
international monetary reform. The external constraint was in a constant process of 
reconfiguration as Britain adjusted to the evolution of the monetary system, while 
international support helped negotiate the impact of policies that preserved the sterling 
balances. Only in 1976 in response to the culmination of the reform process and growing 
ideological divergence with the crucial American source of support did resolving sterling’s 
reserve role take priority in policy. The thesis reconstructs the process of policy formation and 
economic diplomacy to trace the strategy of retiring sterling via monetary reform. Between 
1967 and 1970, the external constraint was constituted by adherence to Bretton Woods, in 
which defence and reform of the system took priority over retiring sterling. Defending the 
post-devaluation rate required economic retrenchment, excessive borrowing and expensive 
inducements to sterling holders that facilitated a renewed build up in the balances. The 
greater flexibility of the system following the 1971 Nixon Shock allowed Britain to expand 
domestic autonomy, prioritising domestic growth over sterling stability and refusing any new 
obligations for sterling. A further accumulation in the balances followed the 1973 oil crisis as 
Britain prioritised maintaining output and employment. However by 1976 Britain’s traditional 
recourse of the IMF to provide liquidity amid a shift in market confidence was threatened by 
the neo-liberal prescriptions of the US Treasury and American frustration that Britain’s ability 
to defer adjustment through drawing on the sterling balances was undermining calls for a 
common front against the oil producers. Amid a conflict over the nature of the crisis and the 
role played by the balances, Labour finally prioritised resolving the reserve role, accepting 
agreement with the IMF as the price of securing American backing of a wider support package. 
The true significance of the IMF crisis is reinterpreted as the reduction of sterling held abroad 
to working balances.   
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The 1967 devaluation of sterling and the 1976 IMF bailout negotiations are two of the most 
intensively studied periods of Britain’s post-war economic history. Despite this level of interest 
however, these events are rarely linked in the historical narrative. Devaluation in 1967 is considered 
the end of the Labour government’s attempt to defend the rate after assuming power in 1964, while 
the subsequent struggle back to stability over the next two years has usually been taken as a post-
script of less importance.1 While the devaluation can thus be said to have had short historical 
consequences, the IMF bailout has short antecedents, with the analytical record generally looking no 
further back than the Barber Boom and 1973 oil crisis as an explanation for the predicament Britain 
found itself in by 1976. Debate has instead centred over the extent to which Labour’s economic 
retrenchment constituted a break with the post-war consensus and whether it was adopted 
internally or imposed on Britain by IMF conditionality.2
1 On devaluation see: Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 
1946 and 1967 second ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Tim Bale “Dynamics of a Non Decision: 
The ‘Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 1964 – 67.” Twentieth Century British History (1999) Vol. 10 (2); Scott 
Newton “The Two Sterling Crises of 1964 and the Decision Not to Devalue” The Economic History Review 
(2009) Vol. 62 (1); Michael J. Oliver “The Management of Sterling 1964 – 1967” The English Historical Review 
(2011) Vol. 126 (520)  
2 On the IMF crisis see: Kathleen Burk & Alec Cairncross Goodbye Great Britain: The 1976 IMF Crisis (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Mark D Harmon The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997) ; Douglas Wass Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-Economic 
Policy and the 1976 IMF Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Kevin Hickson The IMF Crisis of 1976 
and British Politics: Keynesian Social Democracy, Monetarism and Economic Liberalism: the 1970s Struggle in 
British Politics (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005); Richard Roberts, When Britain Went Bust: The 1976 
IMF Crisis (London: OMFIF, 2017) 
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As such the historical record has generally overlooked a continuous narrative running from sterling’s 
devaluation in 1967 through to the aftermath of the IMF crisis in 1977, in which a major source of 
concern for British policy was the overhang of short-term sterling liabilities to assets, the so-called 
sterling balances. Taking place at a time of fundamental revision to the world’s international 
monetary system (in short from a gold based, pegged-rate exchange standard to a dollar based fiat, 
floating one), British policymakers attempted to navigate the increasingly crisis prone global 
economy. The role of this thesis is therefore to fill a gap in the historical record by tracing the 
consequences of the 1967 devaluation, via the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system 
and a renewed accumulation of sterling balances held abroad, directly to the 1976 IMF crisis. In 
contrast to analyses focusing solely on the 1976 IMF negotiations, the thesis argues that these 
events can only be truly understood in the context of parallel negotiations initiated by Prime 
Minister Jim Callaghan aimed at resolving sterling’s reserve role, which drew on the experience of 
international reform since 1967. It therefore reappraises IMF conditionality as a quid pro quo to 
secure American backing for an additional support package in which the true significance of the crisis 
was the final resolution of the sterling overhang and the reduction of foreign holdings to working 
balances.   
Structural accounts of international monetary relations argue the growth in global capital flows and 
sterling’s continued international role combined to act as a constraint on domestic policy autonomy 
(particularly for left wing governments), requiring they prioritised measures that stabilised sterling 
and restored market confidence at the expense of commitments to faster economic growth.3 In 
contrast the thesis presents an constructivist interpretation of the impact of sterling’s international 
role, arguing it was constituted by British commitments to the principles of embedded liberalism 
which aimed to combine stability in external exchange with domestic policy autonomy. While 
adherence to the international monetary system’s provision of adjustment, liquidity and confidence 
3 David M. Andrews “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International 
Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly (1994) Vol 38 (2) pp.193 – 196. 
3 
could act as an external constraint on domestic policy, this proved amenable to negotiation through 
economic diplomacy aimed at securing beneficial reforms and tailored support packages for sterling. 
These commitments and sources of support meant sterling’s reserve role continued to be of use to 
British policymakers’ wider objectives of securing systemic stability and preserving autonomy into 
1975; prioritisation of reducing the sterling overhang was taken only following the culmination of 
wider reform process that failed to resolve sterling’s international role, combined with the growing 
ideological divergence with the crucial American relationship that resulted in more contentious 
negotiations with institutional sources of support.  
1.1: The Sterling Balance Constraint 
Throughout the post-war period, questions of economic decline were entwined with the persistence 
of Britain’s international role, including the continued use of sterling as a reserve currency. Although 
the vast expansion of the dollar’s use internationally meant sterling’s share of global foreign 
exchange reserves had declined from over 55% in 1950 to under 5% by 1976, for members of the 
Official Sterling Area [OSA] it continued to play an important role.4 Their commitment to hold 
sterling had depended initially on British imperial control, but had subsequently come to rely on the 
contribution made by Britain to mutual defence, coupled with concessions on trade and access to 
the City of London.5 Over time however, decolonisation, military retrenchment and Britain’s growing 
reorientation towards Europe had weakened the links between Britain and the OSA.6
By the time of the 1967 devaluation, sterling’s international role was perceived domestically as a 
constraint on growth.7 Throughout the 1960s, domestic expansion resulting in current account 
deficits had threatened diversification of the sterling balance holders which could potentially 
4 Catherine Schenk The Decline of Sterling. Managing The Retreat of an International Currency, 1945-1992 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp.22-23 
5 Catherine Schenk “The Sterling Area and Economic Disintegration” Geschichte und Gesellschaft (2013) Vol. 39 
(2) p. 181 
6 Susan Strange Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1971) p5 
7 Fred Hirsch The Pound Sterling: A Polemic (London: Gollancz, 1965) p14 
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overwhelm Britain’s correspondingly short-term assets. In response, the government would be 
forced to slow expansion in order to reduce the external deficit and restore confidence in the 
currency. This ‘stop-go’ cycle was compared unfavourably with the economic miracles occurring in 
continental Europe.8 (See Figure 1.1) 
Source: Office of National Statistics. Current Account Balance, Seasonally Adjusted [HBOP], Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted [YBHA], Gross Domestic Product Chained Volume Measures [ABMI]. Accessed Online 
Traditional accounts have explained sterling’s continued use abroad either by referring to the 
‘delusions of grandeur’ of statesmen seeking to prolong an international role long after Britain 
ceased to be able to afford it, or the priority given to the interests of the City over industry which 
were held to depend on foreign use of sterling.9 In contrast, the thesis argues that the continued 
existence of the sterling balances, in particular the fresh accumulation that followed devaluation, 
reflected the use policymakers made of the balances in securing other economic goals. As such the 
‘problem’ that Callaghan sought to resolve in his approach to the IMF crisis was in part constituted 
by the accumulated decisions made by governments of which he had been an integral part.  
8 Michael Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy in the UK Since 1964: The Jekyll and Hyde Years (London: 
Pergamon, 1978) p134 
9 See extended discussion in Chapter 4; Strange Sterling and British Policy p47 
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The problem of the sterling balances was one of liquidity, not insolvency and hence related to wider 
concerns over the international monetary system. As a memo written two days before devaluation 
complained, “We are, in fact, a very large net creditor in the world. But why does nobody else 
behave as though we were?" in reference to the imbalance in Britain’s investment portfolio. The 
bulk of Britain’s external assets were relatively illiquid long-term investments that could not be 
called upon to counter diversification by the sterling balance holders. As the memo ruefully 
concluded:  
This imbalance is no more than saying that while we do not have much to show in 
the window, we have a lot in the store room, but unfortunately, we do not have a 
key to it.10
The shared, inter-subjective interpretation that the structure of British assets and liabilities meant 
stability was threatened by diversification marked sterling as a weak currency. In response, British 
economic diplomacy sought to develop the sources of liquidity available to finance diversification, 
both as part of general reforms to the international monetary system and through packages tailored 
for sterling. The objective of the thesis is to trace the process by which British leaders managed this 
process and the relative priority they gave to actively reducing the amount of sterling held aboard. 
This culminated in the 1977 Third Group Arrangement, negotiated immediately after then 1976 IMF 
deal which resulted in the overhang being eliminated but not before a renewed accumulation of 
balances had taken place following devaluation as policymakers prioritised wider Bretton Woods 
reform and commitments to domestic growth (Figure 1.2).11
10 TNA FCO 2/679 “Growth and the Balance of Payments” 17 November 1967 
11 A. P. Thirlwall and Heather D. Gibson Balance of Payments Theory and the United Kingdom Experience 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) pp. 52 - 55 
6 
Source: Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 1974 Q2 “Overseas Sterling Balances 1963 – 1973” 1974; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
1975 Q1 “Table 21: Reserves and related Items, Table 25: Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-market liabilities in 
sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions”;  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1977 Q1, “Table 19, Exchange Reserves in 
sterling; and banking and money-market liabilities in sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions, Table 23: Reserves and 
related items”; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1979 Q1 “Table 15: Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-market 
liabilities in sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions Table 16: Reserves and related items,” 
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis  
The thesis fills a gap in the literature by examining the ongoing search for a resolution to the sterling 
overhang that took place between the 1967 devaluation and the 1976 IMF crisis. While both events 
have received voluminous analysis, the period in between has only recently begun to receive 
detailed historical investigation.12 The most notable contribution in this area has been Catherine 
Schenk’s work on sterling’s post-war evolution. Her 2012 book The Decline of Sterling: Managing the 
Retreat of an International Currency advanced the revisionist thesis that the continuation of 
sterling’s international role was based on the demands of the world’s monetary system rather than 
the ‘delusions of grandeur’ trope used by many previous writers. Moreover, she argues sterling’s 
12 For example see Michael J. Oliver & Arran Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation: The Battle for Sterling 1968 
- 1972” Economic History Review (2007) Vol. 60 (3); Arran Hamilton “Beyond the Sterling Devaluation: The 
Gold Crisis of March 1968” Contemporary European History (2008) Vol. 17 (1); Scott Newton “Sterling, Bretton 
Woods and Social Democracy 1968 – 1970” Diplomacy and Statecraft (2013) Vol 24 (3); Alain Naef “Sterling 
and the Stability of the International Monetary System, 1944-1971” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2018);  
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weakness was successfully leveraged to secure international support for the currency with which 
Britain managed its integration into the expanding global economy, revising the traditional 
understanding that sterling’s reserve role acted as a constraint on domestic growth.13
The thesis builds on Schenk’s analysis by using a narrative approach to demonstrate how Britain’s 
external constraint was not constant between these crises but was constituted by Britain’s 
normative commitments to the evolving international monetary system. The size of the balances 
and the danger they posed to sterling at any time depended on the nature of these commitments. 
Likewise, the availability and conditionality of international support targeted at resolving the sterling 
overhang also evolved with the wider monetary system. The success or otherwise economic 
diplomacy had in convincing foreign partners of the systematic threat posed by sterling 
diversification, the progressive American attainment of its objectives for a more flexible system as 
well as growing ideological divergence between Britain and this crucial source of support all 
influenced the extent to which Britain could negotiate the external constraint with international 
support.   
The thesis demonstrates that throughout the period between 1967 and 1977 governments 
expressed continued concern with the sterling overhang and looked to economic diplomacy to 
resolve it. However, prior to 1976 approaches to do so were determined by other foreign economic 
policy goals which influenced the danger posed by the sterling balances and the support available to 
mitigate it. Only in 1976 did resolving it become the priority of the government in return for coming 
to terms with the IMF. Between 1967 and 1970, the commitment to defend and reform Bretton 
Woods assumed priority over running down the balances. The thesis repositions the period following 
devaluation rather than 1976 as the period of greater external constraint and adjustment. This was 
due to the priority given to stabilising Bretton Woods, which required assuming more debt to defend 
13 For a more detailed exposition of Schenk’s views see the literature review in Chapter 3; Schenk The Decline 
of Sterling p204  
8 
the rate, greater proportional retrenchment in government borrowing and a fresh accumulation of 
the sterling balances. Despite the less acrimonious debates with the IMF than in 1976 (due to a 
shared Anglo-American commitment to the monetary system), the position of sterling was more 
constrained than later by the commitment to defend the post-devaluation rate and the more limited 
supply of international liquidity.    
Despite the stabilisation of sterling in the early 1970s, the prospect of the overhang remained a 
source of concern, in which Edward Heath’s Conservative government looked to Europe as a source 
surrogate of support due following the unilateral nature of the Nixon Shock. Schenk does not focus 
on sterling’s European role following accession to the EEC in 1973, noting only that Europe proved 
“cold comfort” for Heath and that his attempt to secure a European solution to the sterling balances 
was dashed.14 The thesis undertakes a more detailed investigation of Heath’s engagement with plans 
for European monetary union, arguing in contrast to his reputation as the most pro-European Prime 
Minister, in monetary relations Heath attempted to ‘go-it-alone.’ His refusal to assume any new 
obligations for sterling following the collapse of Bretton Woods that would constrain his 
expansionary domestic policies represented the prioritisation of domestic growth over 
commitments to resolve the sterling balances, resulting in an over-exposed current account even 
prior to the 1973 oil crisis.  
Labour’s return to power in 1974 amid the stagflation of the oil crisis initially saw a prioritisation of 
maintaining output and demand over inflation, in which a fresh accumulation of sterling balances 
among oil producers was encouraged as a means of offsetting the expansion of the current account 
deficit. In response, Labour looked to expand the institutional sources of finance available to sterling 
and Denis Healey enjoyed success in leading European opinion to secure an IMF facility to fund oil 
related balance of payments deficits. While this expanded the range of support available to sterling, 
other developments had less beneficial effects. The thesis also shows how the parallel process of 
14 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p326, 346 
9 
international monetary reform shaped the availability and conditionality of these support packages 
for sterling. While Schenk concludes her discussion on international monetary reform with the 
failure of the Special Drawing Rights [SDRs] to establish a realistic alternative to reserve currencies, 
the thesis continues to the amendments of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in 1976 that formalised 
floating and the demonetisation of gold.15 While not directly related to sterling, the attainment of a 
more flexible system allowed America to more effectively contain sterling crises than under Bretton 
Woods, initially using this scope to push for greater British economic adjustment via IMF mandated 
conditionality. Paradoxically however, the new flexible system also allowed America to resolve 
sterling crises more cheaply than before, now that it could create dollars without regard to its own 
gold reserves.  
In response therefore to the failure of wider international monetary reform and the growing 
ideological divergence between the British and American Treasuries, 1976 saw resolution of sterling 
finally take priority in economic diplomacy. The IMF crisis is therefore positioned as the culmination 
of a process that had begun with the devaluation of sterling, rather than a prelude to Thatcherism. 
Despite the controversial role of IMF conditionality as the neo-liberal US Treasury attempted to 
impose a policy change on Britain, the real significance of the crisis was the parallel deal on the 
sterling balances agreed with the Bank of International Settlements [BIS] that facilitated a reduction 
in foreign holdings of sterling to working balances. In contrast to analyses that interpret agreement 
with the Fund as a break with post-war policy, the thesis positions it as a continuation of strategy 
Labour applied following devaluation, in which a competitive exchange rate looked to secure export-
led growth, while agreement with institutional sources of finance managed external deficits and 
sterling balance diversification during a period of adjustment. The real significance of the crisis was 
the recognition that something finally had to be done about the sterling overhang, which took 
priority in the British assessment of the crisis, resulting in a sustained campaign of economic 
15 Ibid p271 
10 
diplomacy to secure American support for a wider commitment to sterling. Coming to terms with 
the Fund was accepted as part of achieving this goal, given American reluctance to proceed until this 
stage had been completed.  
1.3 Methodology 
To analyse how this was achieved, the thesis examines the role of the British state as the nexus 
between the national and international; between the domestic socio-political order from which 
ruling policymakers and bureaucrats ultimately draw power and the transnational relations of states 
and markets within which they must operate.16 According to Robert D. Putnam, states play a ‘two-
level game’, managing the demands of domestic pressure groups to pursue favourable policies 
(faster growth, higher living standards, concessions to labour unions), while at the international level 
minimising the impact of external foreign developments on their ability to secure domestic 
objectives. In short, in an interdependent global economy, states attempt to increase their power 
with which to pursue domestic objectives, while recognising that attainment of these objectives 
requires engagement with the structures of the global economy.17
While the stop-go cycle made contemporaries painfully aware that engagement with the structure 
of the global economy could act as a constraint on growth, it is important to recognise that such 
economic concepts are themselves determined by political choices. As Ben Clift and Jim Tomlinson 
note, “what is at play is not an inexorable logic, but socially and politically constructed 
interpretations of economic phenomena.”18 The position advanced here was that the external 
constraint on the British economy was ultimately determined by political decisions made regarding 
16 Theda Skopal, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skopal [eds.] Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985) p8 
17 Robert D. Putnam “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” International 
Organization (1998) Vol. 43 (2) p434 
18 Ben Clift & Jim Tomlinson “Whatever Happened to the Balance of Payments ‘Problem’? The Contingent 
(Re)Construction of British Economic Performance Assessment” The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations (2008) Vol. 10 (4) pp. 609, 611 
11 
the sterling balances and was amenable to negotiation via a process of economic diplomacy. 
However, this process of negotiation increasingly involved British leaders in public and embarrassing 
disagreement over the causes and solutions of Britain’s economic problems.  
Disagreement over interpretations can be particularly contentious at times of crisis. As Mark Blyth 
notes, “what constitutes an economic crisis as a crisis is not a self-apparent phenomenon but needs 
to be narrated and explained.”19 Failure and crisis can be relatively independent of one another, 
such as the collapse of sterling in 1975/6 supporting different and conflicting narratives of crisis. 20 As 
Colin Hay writes: 
the mobilisation of popular perceptions of crisis is crucial in influencing the 
trajectory imposed upon the state in the post-crisis phase... crisis is not merely a 
property of a system, it is a lived experience; it is a politically mediated moment of 
decisive intervention and structural transformation.21
The thesis therefore traces how British governments narrated the causes of sterling crises, both to 
the international community and their own electorates, according to their interpretation that the 
fundamental cause of crisis was sterling’s continued reserve role which required international 
support. In response, policy makers applied a process of foreign economic policy and diplomacy to 
secure beneficial reforms and tailored support packages. The thesis aims to reconstruct this process 
from policy formulation to execution. A useful distinction is made by John Kingdon between the 
“agenda setting” of the political leadership and “alternative specification” of the civil service.22 In 
this example, agenda setting was the responsibility of the duumvirate of Prime Minister and 
Chancellor which decided on the “problems, policies and politics” awaiting opportunity for policy 
choice: respectively the constraint imposed by the sterling balances, the availability and terms of 
international support to mitigate this constraint, and the wider political commitments in which 
19 Mark Blyth Great Transformations Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p10  
20 Colin Hay “Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change” The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations (1999) Vol. 1 (3) p.324 
21 Ibid p322 
22 John Kingdon Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies second edition (London: Pearson, 2013) 
12 
resolving the sterling balances was framed, such as defence of Bretton Woods. “Alternative 
specification” – the production of proposals to meet this agenda was the responsibility of the civil 
service, primarily the Treasury which had responsibility for questions of long term international 
monetary reform through which discussions of sterling’s future were mediated.23 A number of 
solutions were proposed: blocking the balances entirely; substitution through a new IMF mediated 
exchange account; funding them (assuming a new long term obligation in return for short term 
liabilities) via the market or financing them through drawing on medium term support packages to 
manage diversification. While all these policies were considered viable by the Treasury at one stage 
or the other, in the last resort only financing packages proved practical in combining both 
international financial support with Britain’s conceptions of its own interests, resulting in 
arrangements organised by the BIS in 1968 and 1977. 
This process begins with policy formulation, initially within the Treasury in response to the 
parameters set by the political leadership and subsequently in direct discussion between members 
of the economic ‘core executive’, namely the Chancellor, his senior Treasury advisors, the Governor 
of the Bank of England and the Prime Minister himself.24 Once policy has been decided internally it 
then evolves through a process of interaction with foreign counterparts, both at the highest level 
(notably as Prime Ministers attempted to leverage their personal relationship with the American 
President), and at an intra-organisational level, for example meetings of countries’ respective 
Treasuries or the collective discussions of central bankers organised via the BIS. This is an extended 
process of “agenda setting” and “alternative specification” as discussions between the heads of 
state continue to shape the parameters of available policies discussed in a more technical manner at 
the inter-organisational level. Final execution of policy often involves a further widening of partners, 
23 Robert F. Durant and Paul F. Diehl “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy: Lessons from the U.S. Foreign 
Policy Arena” (1989) Journal of Public Policy Vol.9 (2) pp. 179 - 205 
24 R. A. W. Rhodes,. ‘From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive’. In R. A. W. Rhodes, and P. Dunleavy 
(Eds.), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 11-37. 
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notably the IMF and BIS organisations themselves from where the money and administrative 
capability were sourced.  
Gaining insight into this process of policy formulation and execution has been achieved through a 
thorough investigation of the archival record, supported by secondary sources such as newspaper 
articles and statistical bulletins, as well as relevant tertiary literature including technical works on 
economics, international political economy [IPE], and the memoirs and other analyses of the 
participants directly involved. Given the extensive technical discussions that constitute the bulk of 
the narrative, interpretation has been drawn primarily from the archival sources which recorded key 
events and debates as they happened, while subsequent recollections have been used as 
corroboration and to add insight into the motivation of the most senior actors involved. Data on 
current account deficits has been taken from contemporary sources, using the Official Financing 
category which was discontinued in 1985. This allows the thesis to interpret movements as the 
leading actors did, through the prism of changes in the level of the sterling balances.25 To avoid the 
problems resulting immediate revisions of data that bedevilled statistical releases, data for any given 
year has been taken from a release 2 years later. 
The majority of the archival research has been drawn from the National Archives [TNA], focusing on 
memoranda, reports and records of conversations between the key participants released under the 
thirty-year rule. In one case it was necessary to make a Freedom of Information request in order to 
obtain a Treasury file detailing debates between the PM, Chancellor, Governor and Treasury over 
the retirement of the IMF standby and BIS facility in 1977/78.  
Given the process of policy formulation and execution that the thesis investigates, the major focus of 
archival research has been on the Treasury’s Overseas Finance Department, which provided the bulk 
of proposals for policy that were subsequently developed with and used by the Chancellor and PM in 
their discussions with international interlocutors. These files include both internal memoranda 
25 Thirlwall and Gibson Balance of Payments Theory p11 
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shared between Treasury officials as they discussed proposed responses to the political objectives 
emanating from their political leaders but also records of conversations with the Chancellor, Prime 
Minister as well as the Treasury’s own foreign counterparts. As Prime Ministers during this period 
tended to act as their own foreign secretary when dealing with economic matters, extensive 
attention has also been paid to files from the Office of the Prime Minister. These include the 
personal appeals the PM made to foreign counterparts in attempts to mitigate sterling’s external 
constraint (and subsequent replies), as well as analysis and advice from the PM’s own economic 
advisors. These latter documents are significant, not because of the influence they had on policy but 
rather the opposite; as the PM agreed with the Treasury view on most major proposals regarding 
reform, they demonstrate the extent to which Treasury opinion dominated policy formation.  
Although usually the duumvirate of the PM and Chancellor decided foreign economic strategy 
between them, at times of great external crisis they were forced to defend and seek support for 
their strategy from the wider Cabinet. As such, Cabinet files have been used for these periods, most 
notably during negotiations with the IMF in 1976 where there existed dramatic disagreement 
between this duumvirate and other ministers, particularly those calling for an Alternative Economic 
Strategy [AES]. As the Treasury dominated policy formulation, the Bank of England’s role in this 
process lay more in execution, particularly at the central banker only meetings of the BIS. However, 
joint Bank-Treasury submissions on sterling have been recorded in the Treasury files, as have 
personal interventions of the Governor of the Bank of England, either made to the Chancellor or the 
Prime Minister. Taken collectively these interactions give an overall impression of the relative 
disagreements between the Treasury and the Bank’s views (notably in 1976 when the Bank’s 
interpretation of the crisis was much closer to the Americans than Callaghan’s) and again serve to 
demonstrate that policy formulation was generally decided in favour of the Treasury’s 
interpretation. 
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The primary focus of the thesis is on British policy formulation but viewed through the interaction it 
had with foreign institutions and governments, of which the most notable was the American 
government. While it was not possible to visit US archives directly due to budget and timing 
constraints, resources available digitally via the Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] and 
minutes of the Federal Reserve have proved useful in understanding the international context facing 
the British leadership as they advanced their strategy for sterling. They specifically capture the 
American objectives for international monetary reform, as well as debates internally between the US 
Treasury, State Department, Federal Reserve and Office of the President over how to respond both 
to crises afflicting Bretton Woods in general and sterling in particular. Most significantly they record 
key interventions from British Prime Ministers, so we are able to gain insight into how these were 
received and how the American response was developed. While the FRUS records are not complete 
and therefore analysis of them is reliant on the decisions of the editors over what to include and 
what to omit, they have proved a useful source in understanding the international context in which 
British strategies for resolving sterling operated. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. Chapter two provides a theoretical overview of the 
nature of the external constraint imposed by sterling’s reserve role. It discusses the combination of 
power and purpose inherent in the principles of embedded liberalism, and how Britain’s 
commitment to this shaped its attitudes towards resolving sterling’s international status. It then 
analyses the external constraint faced by sterling as a result of this commitment through the prism 
of adjustment, liquidity and confidence, the major topics of reform discussions. Chapter three 
reviews the literature dealing with the external constraint. While most analyses have been critical of 
what they see as attempts to prioritise sterling’s international use over domestic investment, in 
hindsight we can see the basis of contemporary criticism changes in response to shifts in the 
international monetary system, suggesting the commitment to this played an important role. The 
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chapter provides a detailed overview of the work of Catherine Schenk, whose revisionist 
interpretation of sterling’s retirement the thesis aims to extend.  
Chapters three, four and five contains the bulk of the analysis. Chapter three examines Britain’s 
struggle back to surplus from November 1967 to May 1970 amid the turmoil that sterling’s 
devaluation unleashed on the Bretton Woods system. This was a period of considerable stress for 
Britain’s integration into the global economy. A series of exchange crises involving the dollar, franc 
and Deutschmark [DM] destabilised sterling, while expectations of a surplus were repeatedly 
disappointed into mid-1969. Devaluation had made the sterling balance holders nervous, while the 
cover of official reserves was lower than later during the IMF crisis. Contingency plans were made 
should reserves run out to float sterling and block the sterling balances, inviting retaliation against 
British investments abroad.26 Commitment to the new parity meant adjustment was sought in other 
areas. Labour’s policy response to devaluation involved bigger increases in taxes and reductions in 
spending than occurred in 1976. Britain also resolved to live within its means as a medium sized 
power, accelerating the retreat from worldwide military commitments.  
These policies were enacted not to defend sterling’s international role but the wider Bretton Woods 
system. Despite devaluation, Britain remained committed to the system, sharing a contemporary 
fear that an anticipated collapse heralded the return to the economic and political conflict of the 
inter war years. The systemic importance of sterling to Bretton Woods, combined with the 
commitment of the American leadership under President Johnson to reform, provided the British 
with leverage to secure international support for sterling.27 While this support did not come 
attached with conditionality regarding domestic policy (which was not required given Labour’s 
policies), externally it was orientated towards preservation of Bretton Woods. In particular, the 1968 
BIS Second Group Arrangement managing devaluation of the sterling balance holders offered 
26 Oliver & Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation” passim 
27 See Newton “Sterling Bretton Woods and Social Democracy 1968 – 1970” pp.427-429 
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expensive inducements in the form of exchange rate guarantees and high interest rates, facilitating a 
renewed accumulation in the balances. Hopes were instead placed on the process of international 
monetary reform, in which a general solution to reserve currencies would resolve the sterling 
overhang. Despite progress on Special Drawing Rights [SDRs] as a supplement to reserves, the level 
of compromise to secure activation undermined their attractiveness and hence ability to replace 
sterling.28
Chapter five examines the British response to the collapse of Bretton Woods following Richard 
Nixon’s decision to unilaterally break to gold-dollar link that was a foundation of the system. Despite 
being provoked by American complaints over adjustment (namely the supposed inability of the 
dollar to devalue under Bretton Woods), the major source of contention quickly became liquidity, as 
the American policy of ‘benign neglect’ flooded the world with unconvertible dollars, forcing surplus 
economies to either acquiesce in American deficits by accumulating them or by revaluing their 
currencies upwards.29
As sterling was stable during this period due to the combination of Britain’s external surplus and the 
1968 BIS deal, the short-term impact of the Nixon Shock was limited. The major development was 
the breakdown in the commitment to pegged exchange rates, a loosening of the external constraint 
that allowed Heath to float sterling in 1972 rather than restrain his domestic expansion. Aware that 
this would soon re-open the question of the sterling overhang and faced with American 
unilateralism following the Nixon Shock, Heath looked to Europe for a solution.30 Following 
agreement of British accession to the EEC in 1972, Heath attempted to accelerate the timetable for 
European monetary union in which members’ assets and liabilities would be pooled. However, any 
prospective common European monetary policy effectively aimed to recreate Bretton Woods, with 
28 Harold James International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) pp. 183-190 
29 James International Monetary Cooperation pp.228 -229; Barry Eichengreen Globalizing Capital: A History of 
the International Monetary System (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2008) p117 
30Eichengreen Globalizing Capital pp.134-140 
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fixed exchange rates and limited, conditional support for weak currencies. Heath was ultimately 
unwilling to re-impose any significant form of external constraint on the British economy and so his 
demands for unconditional and unlimited support for sterling as the price for joining precluded 
participation.31 As such, there was no restraint on expansion of the current account deficit just when 
the external environment turned against sterling once more following the 1973 OPEC oil shock.     
Chapter six deals with aftermath of the OPEC oil shock and the descent to IMF negotiations in 1976. 
The resulting inflation undermined any attempt to restore Bretton Woods and by 1976 America was 
able to secure its objective of a floating, fiat, dollar based standard. This permitted sterling crises to 
be much more effectively contained than in the past. A weak Labour government sought to buy 
domestic peace through high government spending, encouraging newly enriched oil producers to 
deposit their funds in sterling, facilitating a further build up in the balances which was concentrated 
in a relatively small number of holders. 32 Internationally, Labour was isolated in its focus on the 
unemployment impact of the oil shock rather than inflation and increasingly at odds with an 
American administration which was diverging ideologically in its diagnosis of sterling’s problems and 
frustrated that Britain’s reliance on oil producers’ funds to defer adjustment was undermining calls 
for a common front to force the price back down.33
Market confidence turned against in Labour in 1975 in response to an unprecedented current 
account deficit and the suspicion that the Bank of England was attempting to engineer a 
devaluation. Despite making sizable changes to public spending in 1975, this was not enough to 
restore market confidence in sterling, which instead looked for the IMF’s ‘seal of approval’ that 
Labour’s domestic policies were appropriate. This required a reorientation of British economic 
diplomacy back towards the US as the major source of financial support and institutional influence. 
However, the US Treasury pressed President Gerald Ford to take a tough line with British requests 
31 Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone The Road to Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p538 
32 Newton The Reinvention of Britain pp. 98-104 
33 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p375 
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for support, using IMF conditionality to restore British policy to what it perceived as a more 
sustainable footing.  
In response, the British government under James Callaghan was successful in re-framing the crisis as 
one revolving around the sterling balances and securing additional support aimed at resolving 
sterling’s international role. Callaghan was able to leverage acceptance of IMF conditionality to 
secure American support for an additional facility for the sterling balances while also facing down 
opposition within his party in favour of AES that would require a level of protectionism 
unprecedented since post-war reconstruction. For their part, the newly flexible international 
monetary system allowed America to finance support for sterling without regard to pressure on its 
gold supply. Ford offered his backing for a separate facility for the sterling balances (following 
agreement with the IMF) in return for a commitment by Callaghan to prevent any future 
accumulations. Despite Callaghan’s personal disappointment on the size of the facility and timing of 
its announcement, the BIS Third Group Arrangement, operating in conjunction with the IMF deal 
resulted in an overwhelming market endorsement of sterling, the first time Britain had combined 
tangible measures to reduce the balances with a political commitment to do so. The removal of the 
sterling overhang resolved the most significant constraint on British foreign economic policy.  
In chapter seven I offer my conclusions, arguing that the experience of this period suggests the true 
determinant of states’ ability to pursue autonomous policies lies in the strength of their political 
relationships with sources of financial support and the success with which they contest narratives of 
crises.  
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Chapter 2 
Constituting the External Constraint 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the repeated sterling crises experienced by 
Britain between 1967 and 1977 were not determined solely by economic criteria but the shifting 
material and ideological bases of the global economy. The renewed accumulation of sterling 
balances following devaluation is explained by Britain’s commitment to the principles of embedded 
liberalism that had characterised post-war cooperation in monetary relations. As part of the 
compromise of embedded liberalism, Britain looked to secure autonomy in domestic policy 
consistent with stability in external exchange. Sterling balance accumulation was acquiesced to in 
the interest of stabilising the international monetary system and maintaining output in the face of 
the external crises. As part of this commitment, Britain expected to be able to negotiate the external 
constraint imposed by adherence to the system’s provision of adjustment, liquidity and confidence 
through a process of general reform and tailored support packages for sterling.  
This process was undermined by ideational change within the US government, as frustration grew 
over the constraint imposed by the international monetary system on America’s ability to secure its 
wider foreign policy objectives. From 1971 ideological change in the US Treasury saw the adoption of 
neoliberal principles over the previous commitment to embedded liberalism, accommodating the 
expansion of global capital markets with a more flexible, fiat-dollar based standard that more easily 
financed their aid, trade and security commitments. These material and ideational changes 
prompted growing divergence from the British in their interpretation of sterling crises (both causes 
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of and solutions to), while also allowing them to isolate the systematic impact of these crises more 
effectively than under Bretton Woods. In response to both the changed international monetary 
system and basis of the relationship with the crucial American source of support and influence, 
Britain prioritised resolution of the sterling overhang during the 1976 IMF crisis, negotiating a final 
support package in return for coming to agreement with the Fund over domestic policy and a 
renewed commitment to prevent any future accumulations.   
The chapter first develops a constructivist approach to international monetary relations to 
understand the nature of Britain’s commitments to external stability and domestic autonomy. It 
then analyses the constraints imposed by sterling’s reserve role and its adherence to systemic 
provision of adjustment, liquidity and confidence that these commitments implied.  
2.1: The Construction of Balance of Payments Crises 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the perceived weakness of Britain’s balance of payments was held 
to impose a significant constraint on the growth of the British economy, particularly when compared 
with the stronger growth of surplus economies like West Germany and Japan.1 Officially, the post-
war objective of maintaining demand in the economy meant concern focused on the current 
account trade in goods and services. According to this analysis, current account deficits stemming 
from the low global income elasticity of demand for British exports, ultimately constrained the 
growth of the British economy.2
This analysis however only explains part of the external constraint Britain faced. As Figure 2.1 
demonstrates, since the 1980s Britain has persistently run deficits far exceeding those responsible 
1 As its simplest, the balance of payments is an accounting identity which, by definition, must always be in 
balance. Taking the totality of an economy’s exchange with the rest of the world in goods, services and 
financial transactions over a period of time, all credits are matched by corresponding debit. The term balance 
of payments deficit is technically a misnomer since as an accounting identity the balance of payments must by 
definition always balance through an equivalence of payments and receipts.  see Peter Jay, “The American 
Way of Calculation” The Times 24 July 1969; Economic Report of the President (Washington D.C: US 
Government., 1968), pp. 167 – 169; Eric Chalmers International Interest Rate War (London: Macmillan, 1972) 
pp167 - 168    
2 A. P. Thirlwall & Heather D. Gibson Balance of Payments Theory p136 
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for the repeated sterling crises in the 1960s and ‘70s without generating anywhere near the concern 
among policymakers and markets. This indicates the extent to which balance of payments deficits 
constitutes a problem is dependent on material and ideational changes in both the global economy 
and Britain’s place within it.3
Source: Office of National Statistics. Current Account Balance, Seasonally Adjusted [HBOP], Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted [YBHA], Accessed Online 
Material accounts of international monetary relations, both Marxist and realist, argue that in a 
system in which governments’ pursuit of domestic objectives requires private resources, there exists 
a structural dependency of the state on capital which constrains policy choice.4 The growth in global 
capital flows that accelerated with the end of Bretton Woods has established a conflict between 
states and supranational markets, limiting the ability of discretionary fiscal and monetary policy to 
secure national objectives.5 For left-wing parties, this raises the dilemma that even with limited 
capital mobility, polices of redistribution can provoke capital flight, requiring them to moderate 
3 Clift & Tomlinson “Whatever Happened to the Balance of Payments ‘Problem’” p610 
4 Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital” American 
Political Science Review (1988) Vol 82 (1) p.13  
5 Marice Obstefld and Alan M. Taylor Global Capital Markets Integration, Crisis and Growth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) p12 
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policies before they assume power in order to reassure markets.6 Control of inflation, which 
preserves the value of currencies held by foreign exchange dealers, takes priority for states 
dependent on global capital markets rather than institutional sources of finance such as the IMF.7
While according to the terms of the macro-economic trilemma, a floating exchange rate can insulate 
monetary policy from capital flows, state managers have proved reluctant to assume a purely 
market determined rate that might undermine other macro-economic goals, including inflation.8
While not ignoring the role of material shifts in economic relations, social constructivist approaches 
to political economy highlight the extent to which problems and outcomes are constituted through 
the causal power of ideas.9 This relative autonomy of the ideational creates space for actors to differ 
in how they perceive, define and interpret a set of material conditions as problems to be solved.10
Markets are embedded within wider framework of political and social relations, dependent on the 
state for their effective functioning.11 As such, policy makers do not interpret their economies in 
purely material terms but according to interpretations based on their own notions of social purpose, 
which combine to shape economic outcomes. According to Abdelal et.al:  
Economic activity and international interdependence tend to be treated not as ends 
in themselves or as brute material constraints, but rather as a mode of acting within 
the world according to different constituted identities.12
6 Mark Wickham-Jones “Anticipating Social Democracy, Preempting Anticipations: Economic Policy-Making in 
the British Labor Party, 1987-1992” Politics and Society (1995) Vol. 23 (4) pp. 465-467  
7 Jim Buller and Matthew Flinders, “The Domestic Origins of Depoliticisation in the Area of British Economic 
Policy,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2005) Vol. 7 (4) p528
8 Obtfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets pp. 29-31  
9 Clift & Tomlinson “Whatever Happened to the Balance of Payments ‘Problem’?” p609 
10 Ben Clift Comparative Political Economy States Markets and Global Capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014)
p145 
11 Mark Blyth Great Transformations: pp 3 - 4 
12 Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, & Craig Parsons, “Introduction: Constructing the International Economy” in Rawi 
Abdelal,  Mark Blyth, & Craig Parsons [eds.], Constructing the International Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2010) p9 
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As Jim Tomlinson argues therefore, economic problems should be seen as “neither ‘natural’ nor as 
self-evident, but as the product…. of a particular conjecture of economic and political events.”13
Throughout the post-war period, official focus on the current account obscured the extent to which 
capital export in the form of military expenditure, official aid and private overseas investment were 
significant elements of Britain’s external deficits. This expenditure was instead taken as given, in line 
with Britain’s worldwide military, financial and trading interests as part of its identity as a world 
power. As a result, achieving the current account surpluses required to pay for it assumed a greater 
significance.14 Similarly, while sterling’s reserve role was widely held to act as a constraint on 
domestic policy, requiring high interest rates and other inducements to prevent diversification, the 
accumulation of these balances from devaluation and into 1976 suggests they continued to play a 
role within the framework of a wider conception of Britain’s interests and responsibilities.   
To understand why requires analysis of Britain’s integration into the open, liberal, multilateral 
trading order that had been born at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, enshrined in institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade [GATT]. Together, these agreements and institutions constituted a regime, best understood as 
the “principles, norms, rules and decision-making” around which actors’ expectations converged 
during the post-war period, conditioning understanding of their rights and responsibilities, while also 
fostering cooperation in international monetary relations.15 This commitment to multilateralism 
stood in stark contrast to the breakdown of the global economy during the Great Depression when, 
according to an influential 1944 League of Nations report, protectionism, bilateralism and beggar-
thy-neighbour currency depreciations had destabilised global politics and eventually led to war.16
13 Jim Tomlinson “Balanced Accounts? Constructing the Balance of Payments Problem in Post-war Britain” The 
English Historical Review (2009) Vol. CXXIV (509) p865  
14 Ibid. p883 
15 Stephen D. Krasner “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in 
Stephen D. Krasner [ed.] International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) p1; Donald J. Puchala 
and Raymond F. Hopkins “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Krasner [ed.] 
International Regimes p62-63 
16 Eichengreen Globalizing Capital pp.43-44, 61 
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In an influential article, John Ruggie argued that the system established at Bretton Woods fused both 
power and purpose to form a regime based on the principles of “embedded liberalism.” The 
experience of the inter-war period, including the development of Keynesian economics, informed 
the design of Bretton Woods as a framework that would facilitate governments to autonomously 
pursue welfare maximising expansionary domestic policies without destabilising an integrated, 
liberal global economy. According to Ruggie: 
This was the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic 
nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism 
of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon 
domestic interventionism.17
The intersubjective, normative commitment to the principles of embedded liberalism constituted a 
powerful reason to defend and reform the institutions of Bretton Woods. In turn, this generated a 
“grammar” used to determine the “interpretation of the appropriateness of acts.”18 For example, 
capital controls were permitted, since based on the understanding of the founders, short term 
capital flows could destabilise expansionary policies. This approach was vindicated in the twenty-five 
years following the Bretton Woods conference. The great post-war economic boom in which output 
and living standards grew at unprecedented rates was driven by trade in manufactured goods 
between developed economies.19 While the precise contribution of the Bretton Woods institutions is 
a subject of debate, the period 1945-71 was characterised by macroeconomic stability in exchange 
rates, a distinct lack of major financial crises and sustained growth in trade and investment.20
As a result, the constraint imposed by the sterling overhang was determined by the priority Britain 
attached to stability in international monetary relations as providing the framework for domestic 
17 John Ruggie “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order” International Organisation (1982) Vol. 36 (2) p393 
18 Clift & Tomlinson “Whatever Happened to the Balance of Payments ‘Problem’?” p611 
19 George Kenwood and Alan Lougheed The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000 4th ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1992) p286 
20 Michael D. Bordo “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview” in Michael D. 
Bordo and Barry Eichengreen [eds.] A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International 
Monetary Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p27 
26 
policy autonomy as well as the stable trading and investing relationships upon which prosperity was 
held to depend.21 The attempt to defend and reform Bretton Woods following devaluation required 
stabilisation of the balances with new inducements to holders that proved so attractive they 
facilitated a fresh accumulation following agreement of the 1968 Second Group Arrangement. 
Following breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and particularly in response to the 
consequences of the 1973 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], the balances were 
used to maintain output and facilitate more expansionary domestic policies than would otherwise 
have been possible.22
In return, Britain expected that the shared normative commitment to the principles of embedded 
liberalism would provide financial support needed to finance diversification and fund deficits as it 
retreated from a global role.  What has been called the “ultimate constraint on growth” for Britain 
was therefore its ability to borrow, which shifted with the amount if liquidity available in the global 
economy and the willingness of lenders, public or private, to extend finance to Britain.23 As such 
extending these source of support proved the major objective of economic diplomacy for most of 
the period under consideration. Only in response to the changed ideological circumstances of 
1975/76 did resolution of the sterling overhang finally take priority, as the culmination of general 
reform process in line with the new neo-liberal focus of the US Treasury failed to resolve sterling’s 
international role, requiring a more direct approach.  
21 See for example, Roy Jenkins speech ref:, Hansard HC Deb 25 June 1968 Vol. 767 cols. 222-223 
22 David Andrews makes the distinction between the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates and 
dollar-gold convertibility, the normative framework of the Bretton Woods order, namely that states should 
cooperate in monetary relations to “enjoy maximum degree of national economic policy autonomy within an 
international framework conducive to a massive expansion of trade,” which continued beyond 1971, see David 
M Andrews “Bretton Woods System and Order” in David M. Andrews [ed.] Orderly Change: International 
Monetary Relations Since Bretton Woods (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) pp 10-11 
23 Thirlwall & Gibson Balance of Payments Theory p7 
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2.2: Ideational Change and Conflict in Monetary Relations 
The design of Bretton Woods was never comprehensive enough to prevent disagreement over its 
future direction. As Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo argue, while actors must adapt to 
accommodate institutional change: 
“strategic manoeuvring by political actors and conflict among them within 
institutional constraints can influence the institutional parameters within which their 
interactions occur.”24
While this offered opportunities for Britain to renegotiate the terms on which it maintained the 
sterling balances, ideological conflict over the scope of reform also moderated the terms and 
availability of financial support.  
The failure of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates to cope with return of inflation 
and global capital flows, combined with the novel experience of stagflation following the OPEC shock 
to generate renewed interest in neoliberal economic ideas that advocated control of the money 
supply and public spending to bring down inflation.25 Analyses of the causal power of ideas hold that 
the failure of Keynesianism to solve these new economic challenges spurred a process of policy 
innovation and a re-conception of the role of the state, prioritising control of inflation over the post-
war focus on maintaining demand and unemployment.26
This process has been analysed domestically in Britain as a process of state learning, in which the 
response to the oil shock involved innovations in control of the money supply and public 
expenditure. These were adopted reluctantly by Labour before a more enthusiastic acceptance by 
Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979.27 Internationally however this process began at the beginning of 
24 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics” in Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth [eds.] Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp.16-17 
25 Blyth Great Transformations p10 
26 Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998) p6 
27 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain” 
Comparative Politics (1993) Vol. 25 (3) p279 
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the 1970s in response to growing American frustration with the entire post-war economic and 
security architecture. This included concerns that the n-1 pattern of exchange rates under Bretton 
Woods prevented the dollar from adjusting (see below) but extended to frustration over trade 
discrimination by the now reconstructed western European economies and complaints that these 
countries were not pulling their weight in sharing the burden of defence (exacerbated by Britain’s 
withdrawal ‘east of Suez’ in 1971).28
The initial attempt of the Nixon Shock was to secure a broad reform to monetary, trade and defence 
relations. While John Connally was Secretary of the Treasury, neo-liberal ideas were used 
operationally, such as the (planned) temporary use of floating exchange rates before re-establishing 
parities at the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971. The almost immediate breakdown of the 
Smithsonian agreement as well as the differential rates of inflation unleashed by the 1973 OPEC oil 
shock allowed Connally’s successors George Schultz (a university friend of Milton Friedman) and 
William Simon to pursue a more radical agenda. This involved the establishment of floating 
exchange rates as the formal method of adjustment, the demonetisation of gold, the removal of 
American capital controls and the encouragement of private capital markets to intermediate flows 
following the OPEC shock. Collectively these changes allowed America’s global interests to be 
financed much more cheaply.29
The conflict resulting from this ideological change in the US government was exacerbated by the 
response to the 1973 oil crisis, in which they were reluctant to create new institutional sources of 
financing to maintain oil deficits for fear of entrenching the higher price. Instead they preferred that 
countries adjust to the new circumstances, which proved easier for America due to its lower 
dependency on foreign imports. This implied a significant change in their perception of the sterling 
balance problem than in 1967-1970. As Mark Blyth argues: 
28 Francis J. Gavin Gold, Dollars and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) p194 
29 Eichengreen Globalizing Capital p137 
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Since structures do not come with an instruction sheet, economic ideas make such 
an institutional resolution possible by providing the authorities diagnosis as to what 
a crisis actually is and when a given situation actually constitutes a crisis. They 
diagnose’ what has gone wrong” and thus ‘what is to be done’30
According to the neo-liberal analysis of the US Treasury, the sterling crisis that erupted in 1975 
resulted from over-expansionary economic policies and too conciliatory an approach to trade unions 
resulting in a rate of inflation that was much higher than in comparable countries. Their perception 
of the crisis was primarily interpreted through the prism of inappropriate domestic policy and their 
solutions accordingly looked to retrenchment in government expenditure and greater control of the 
money supply in line with the prescriptions of neo-liberal economic thought then in the ascendancy. 
A harder line with the British over IMF conditionality was permissible due to the more flexible, fiat 
dollar standard that allowed sterling crises to be more effectively contained than under Bretton 
Woods. 
In contrast, the official British point of view determined by Prime Minister Jim Callaghan was that 
the fundamental cause of the crisis was sterling’s continued reserve role, and therefore any solution 
that did not take in the sterling balances would fail to resolve the problem. While Callaghan’s 
attempt to narrate the crisis as stemming from the sterling balances finally prioritised resolving 
sterling’s reserve role, it also resulted in contentious debates with the US Treasury. According to the 
American analysis, merely coming to terms with the Fund’s proscriptions for domestic policy would 
resolve the so-called problem of the sterling balances. This objection forced Callaghan to first come 
to terms with the Fund, however his public and private campaign to secure additional support for 
sterling raised expectations that such a facility would be forthcoming. Although considering the 
economic case weak, the US Treasury concluded that this meant it could be financed cheaply and 
eventually acquiesced in return for Callaghan making a renewed commitment to prevent any future 
accumulation of the sterling balances following the conclusion of IMF negotiations. Despite differing 
30 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations p10 
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interpretation of the nature of the crisis (and prospective solutions) according to their respective 
economic ideology (neoliberal vs embedded liberal), Callaghan’s economic diplomacy was successful 
in securing a final support package for sterling, ending its reserve role.  
2.3: Sterling as an International Currency 
The resolution of the sterling overhang marked the end of sterling’s role as an international 
currency. Prior to this, Britain had maintained its international use in the interest of stabilising the 
wider international monetary system or prioritising domestic expansion. Instead the process of 
international monetary reform was expected to provide some resolution of the constraint imposed 
by the sterling overhang, through Anglo-American cooperation based on their shared identity as 
issuers of international currencies. Sterling’s continued international use however became 
increasingly contentious through its impact on the domestic economy.   
According to the field of International Political Economy, international use of a currency stems from 
the political and economic foundations of the issuing state (such as its share of global output and 
trade); the development of its financial capital markets; and political and military ties which 
encourage foreign use while reassuring domestic investors of the security of their investments.31
From this international use flow both benefits and risks, of which the most relevant is the extent to 
which international use provides “macroeconomic flexibility,” increasing autonomy in domestic 
policy.    
For ‘strong’ currencies, international use enhances macroeconomic flexibility, by enabling purchases 
of foreign goods and services abroad in domestic currency – what the French termed the ‘exorbitant 
privilege’ of the dollar in the post-war world allowing US companies to buy up European 
counterparts cheaply.32 Conversely a ‘weak’ currency faces what might be termed the “exorbitant 
31 Benjamin Cohen Currency Power Understanding Monetary Rivalry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2015) pp.121-123 
32 Gavin Gold, Dollars and Power pp.202-203 
31 
duty.” Excessive accumulation of liquid foreign liabilities in the form of mobile debt such as the 
sterling balances require higher interest rates to induce holders not to diversify.33
Despite the contemporary assumption that as reserve currencies the dollar and sterling faced similar 
problems, subsequent experience demonstrated this was not the case. Despite concerns over the 
future of dollar, the lack of a credible alternative meant its future was secure as it has continued to 
form the basis of international payments until the present day. For sterling however, the real threat 
of diversification (including into dollars), marked it as a weak currency. Its international role 
therefore served as a constraint on domestic macroeconomic autonomy, as the need to maintain 
confidence among foreign holders led to higher interest rates and other inducements that limited 
domestic credit, investment and hence growth.  
One dimension of difference between sterling and the dollar was the time they had been used 
internationally. According to Chey, the benefits accruing to the nation issuing an international 
currency, such as macroeconomic flexibility, is strongest in the earliest phase of its use. Over time 
however, foreign holdings of the currency accumulate to the point where they constitute a 
constraint of the operation of monetary policy, requiring higher interest rates or a depletion of the 
nation’s own reserves to manage diversification.34 Thus while renewed accumulation could provide a 
short-term source of macroeconomic flexibility for Britain (as resulted following oil producers’ 
deposit of earnings into sterling between 1974 and mid 1975), ultimately this exacerbated the 
problem once market confidence turned against sterling. 
Another major difference between the two was their power in the international economy. Despite 
the contemporary view that the travails of Vietnam and challenge of OPEC meant that US power was 
in decline (with consequences for stability of the international economy), in hindsight we can see 
this was an exaggeration. The US remained a superpower, dominating the institutions of the global 
33 Cohen Currency Power pp.24-45 
34 Hyoung-Kyu Chey “Theories of International Currencies and the Future of the World Monetary Order” 
International Studies Review (2012) Vol.14 (1) pp57-58 
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economy while the dollar continued to serve as the world’s premier currency.35 In contrast, by 1967 
the foundations of sterling’s international power – the financial, political and military links between 
Britain and the Sterling Area – had clearly waned.  
Collectively therefore, the changing material bases of sterling’s international role, in terms of the 
duration of its use and politico-economic power of the British state meant the commitment to its 
continued use acted as a constraint. 
The International System – Adjustment, Liquidity and Confidence  
The maintenance of sterling’s international role was tied to Britain’s commitment to the principles of 
embedded liberalism which in turn subjected sterling to the international monetary system’s 
provisions of adjustment, liquidity and confidence. Although the operation of these were widely held 
to act as additional constraints on the British economy, it was expected that ongoing process of 
reform would alleviate both them as well as resolve sterling’s reserve role. It was only with the 
culmination of the reform process in 1976 with the establishment of a fiat, floating dollar standard 
that left sterling’s international status unresolved that Britain prioritised ending it via a tailored 
support package.  
Prior to the 1971 Nixon Shock, Anglo-American cooperation had formed the basis of British 
strategies for reform, based on the assumption that they had shared interests as issuers of 
international currencies. Subsequent experience proved this to be a mirage. For the Americans, the 
major concern was with adjustment. The n-1 pattern of exchange rate parities in which currencies 
were expressed in relation to the dollar supposedly precluded the dollar’s adjustment. Instead, the 
Americans relied on changes in other currencies to improve the competitive position of the dollar. 
The reluctance of surplus economies to appreciate their currencies, combined with the sterilisation 
of the resulting capital inflow in order to prevent expansion of domestic spending, both of which 
35 Benjamin Cohen International Political Economy An Intellectual History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008) pp.67-68, 76 
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would have resulted in increased foreign demand for American goods, prompted the search for 
more dramatic solutions, culminating in the Nixon Shock.36
Adjustment under Bretton Woods was also a source of constraint for sterling. While the founders of 
the system had envisaged regular changes to the exchange rate pegs, the case of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium’ in which this was to happen was never clearly enough defined to be operational.37
The system suffered from a devaluation bias, in which countries running deficits faced real pressure 
to either devalue or deflate before resources ran out, while the sanctions against surplus countries 
appeared only “moral and persuasive.”38 Changes in exchange rate parities were infrequent; weak 
currencies associated devaluation with defeat, while countries running surpluses sought to preserve 
their competitive advantage by resisting appreciation. In the time between fundamental 
disequilibrium first emerging and adjustment, imbalances built up in the system which made the 
eventual adjustment even more painful.39  According to Samuel Brittan, the Bretton Woods 
compromise gave  
Neither the stability of really fixed rates, nor the independence of internal policy of 
flexible systems. It does on the other hand manufacture balance of payments 
problems and currency crises on a scale peculiarly its own.40
The constraint imposed by the need to maintain Bretton Woods’ exchange rate parity was at its 
most contentious during Harold Wilson’s first Labour government between 1964-70. In opposition, 
Wilson had promised to re-forge the British economy in the “white heat” of scientific change driven 
by the establishment of a National Plan for industry. However, the need to defend sterling against 
successive exchange crises (beginning almost immediately upon Wilson arriving in power), resulted 
36 S.W. Black “International Money and International Monetary Arrangements” in Ronald W. Jones & Peter B. 
Kenen [eds.] Handbook of International Economics Vol.2 International Monetary Economics and Finance
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 2006) p221 
37 W. M. Scammell International Monetary Policy Bretton Woods & After (London: Macmillan Press, 1977) p84 
38 Ibid p42 
39 Gianni Toniolo Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements (Cambridge: Cambrdige 
University Press, 2007) p431
40 Samuel Brittan The Price of Economic Freedom A Guide to Flexible Rates (London: Macmillan, 1970) p9 
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instead in a series of measures intended to defend the rate by restraining growth of both public and 
private credit (thus restricting imports), while moving resources into exports. According to the 
traditional interpretation, Wilson’s decision to rule out devaluation until 1967 prioritised defence of 
the sterling parity and international monetary system over the demands of the domestic economy.41
While contemporaries and historians have both criticised Wilson for not loosening the adjustment 
constraint by devaluing sooner or even floating the currency, subsequent experience suggests this 
was no panacea. Devaluation in 1967 was followed by years of further restraint on spending in order 
to secure an external surplus. When the currency was floated in 1972 in order to prevent an 
expansion being derailed by capital outflow, the result was an unprecedented current account 
deficit. While the sterling balances were temporarily stabilised due to the terms of the 1968 Basle 
deal, Edward Heath’s prioritisation of domestic expansion over commitments that might reduce the 
sterling balances meant these continued to threaten stability.  
Given the continued existence of the sterling balances, Britain’s major concern in international 
reform was the systematic provision of liquidity, notably its dependence on foreign currencies 
including sterling. Prior to the Nixon Shock, the great post-war boom in trade raised fears that there 
was insufficient liquidity in the system to support future growth. According to the eponymous Triffin 
paradox formulated in 1960, the inelastic supply of gold meant the dollar provided the main source 
of liquidity growth under Bretton Woods. As global trade expanded faster than output, the system 
required an expanding supply of dollars to finance it. However these dollars undermined confidence 
in the system as foreign holders of dollars came to doubt that the US would be able to meet its 
obligation to supply gold at the fixed price of $35 per ounce.42 A process of systemic reform followed 
to increase liquidity in the system while also providing central banks with the fire power to defend 
exchange rate pegs during short term emergencies in order to reduce the need to resort to 
41 See Clive Ponting A Betrayal of Promise Labour in Power 1964 – 1970 (London: Penguin, 1990) 
42 See Robert Triffin Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1961) for the classic exposition of this problem.  
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deflationary policies. These included an expansion of members’ quotas at the IMF and the 
development of swap agreements between central banks.43 Additionally, the General Agreement to 
Borrow [GAB] involved an agreement among 10 leading industrial economies to provide $6bn of 
additional liquidity to the IMF in the event of a large drawing being required.44 Proposals for a new, 
synthetic form of liquidity, issued by the IMF into which reserve currency holdings could be 
converted formed the basis of reform discussions during the 1960s. The creation of such a new 
reserve asset would allow the US to transition to a balance of payments surplus without choking the 
world of liquidity upon which the growth of trade depended.45 However despite agreement being 
reached on a new Special Drawing Right by 1968 (and Britain’s enthusiastic initial adoption of its use) 
its terms and availability in the face of determined French opposition meant it ultimately played a 
minor role in global liquidity.46
British commitment to Bretton Woods was based on the assumption that with America also 
concerned about monetary reform, changes to the systematic provision of liquidity targeting the 
dollar would also include sterling, resolving its international status while also maintaining Britain’s 
integration into the global economy. This assumption was revealed hollow by the fallout from the 
Nixon Shock. The attitude of ‘benign neglect’ towards the dollar forced adjustment on other 
economies; they could either appreciate their currencies to prevent capital inflow or hoard 
unconvertible dollars. This allowed America to finance its deficits and worldwide commitments 
without regard to its own reserves.47 (see Figure 2.2)  
This massive expansion of global liquidity undermined any progress towards reform of liquidity 
provision that Britain had depended on for resolving sterling’s overhang. Meanwhile, the growth of 
43 James International Monetary Cooperation pp.161-162 
44 Ibid. pp.152-153 
45 TNA T312/2145 “Reserve Creation and October IMF Meeting” 3 September 1968 
46 Mainly as a result of the US Congress being ultimately unwilling to accept paying more on SDRs than it did on 
foreign holdings of dollars which undermined the attractiveness of the asset, see Robert N. McCauley and 
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Drawing Right Substitution Account Have Worked?” International Finance (2015) Vol. 18 (2) p191 
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international trade and the development of multi-national corporations generated both the demand 
for, and the supply of, international capital markets.48 The accumulation of offshore dollars led to 
the creation of dollar capital markets, known as Eurodollar markets since they were primary based in 
Europe, particularly London.49 The OPEC shock of 1973 resulted in massive surpluses for oil-
producing states which, unable to consume them given their size and development, were re-
mediated back to oil consuming states, adding a further boost to the re-emergence of global capital 
flows.50
Source: Federal Reserve Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941 – 1970 (Washington DC: Federal Reserve, 1970) Table 14.1 “U.S. Reserve 
Assets, End of Month, 1972-70” Table 15.1 “U.S. Liquid and Nonliquid Liabilities to Foreign Official Institutions, and Liquid Liabilities to All 
Other Foreigners, Varying Dates, 1949-70”; Federal Reserve Annual Statistical Digest 1971 – 1975 (Washington DC: Federal Reserve, 1976) 
Table 59: “U.S. Reserve Assets”, Table 62 “U.S. liabilities to foreign official institutions, and liquid liabilities to all other foreigners”; Federal 
Reserve Annual Statistical Digest 1974 – 1978 (Washington DC: Federal Reserve, 1979) Table 49: “U.S. Reserve Assets”, Table 50: “Selected 
U.S. liabilities to foreign official institutions” 
The resumption of global capital flows, and Britain’s growing dependence on them into the 1970s to 
fund external deficits, raised the prospect that while greater access to the system’s increased 
liquidity could finance balance of payments deficits on a greater scale than before, the need to 
maintain market confidence could emerge as a new source of constraint, as argued by the structural 
accounts of international monetary relations.51 This was particularly urgent while the sterling 
48 Margaret de Vries International Monetary Fund 1972 – 1978 Cooperation on Trial Vol.1 (Washington DC: 
IMF, 1986),p 99 
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overhang remained, as markets interpreted the threat posed by diversification as marking sterling as 
a weak currency, requiring greater retrenchment than otherwise to stabilise the rate.  
At the time however, institutional sources of support such as the IMF and BIS continued to provide 
important sources of liquidity for sterling. Lacking their own surveillance mechanisms, markets the 
IMF’s ‘seal of approval’ before committing the required funds. Lenders were aware that through 
providing sources of liquidity to Britain they loosened the external constraint, raising the possibility 
that inappropriate domestic policies could then be pursued. Accordingly, they sought to tie British 
borrowing to specific conditions that mandated the scope and direction of government borrowing 
and monetary growth. As Ben Clift and Jim Tomlinson note in their review of IMF conditionality, in 
response to complaints from developing economies that nations like the UK received easier terms, 
British drawings from the mid-60s onwards were characterised by a “greater specificity of 
undertakings, targets and strings attached.”52 In particular, the IMF attempted to tie British policy to 
quantitative restrictions according to its pet theory of Domestic Credit Expansion [DCE], but also on 
the level of government expenditure as expressed in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
[PSBR]. This process reached its apogee in 1976 when in response to what he perceived as excessive 
IMF demands, the Chancellor Denis Healey famously told the Fund’s Managing Director to “take a 
running jump.”53 However the subjective nature of market opinion meant being seen to accept the 
Fund’s policy prescriptions and thus gaining the IMF’s ‘seal of approval’ could be enough to restore 
market confidence, thus reducing the chance that supplied funds would actually be drawn upon.54
52 Ben Clift and Jim Tomlinson “Negotiating Credibility: Britain and the International Monetary Fund, 1956–
1976” Contemporary European History (2008) Vol. 17 (4) p549 
53 Chris Rogers The IMF and European Economies: Crisis and Conditionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
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2.5: Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the continuation of sterling’s reserve role and adherence of the 
monetary system’s provision of adjustment, liquidity and confidence involved constraints on 
Britain’s domestic economy and policy. Ultimately however these constraints were determined by 
Britain’s political and ideological commitment to the compromise of embedded liberalism, which 
was believed to help secure wider objectives. While this commitment implied constraints, they 
proved negotiable through a process of economic diplomacy that expanded the sources of support 
available to sterling. 
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Chapter 3: 
Sterling as a Constraint: Literature Review 
No analysis of the period between the 1967 devaluation and the 1976 IMF crisis can avoid engaging 
in the debate over the nature of Britain’s supposed post-war decline. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, concerns over international role of sterling in constraining economic growth have, 
until recently, dominated the historical narrative. The present thesis continues an ongoing revision 
of this argument by demonstrating the extent to which the external constraint imposed by the 
sterling balances was constituted through the nature of Britain’s political commitment to the 
principles of embedded liberalism and was amenable to negotiation through Britain’s economic 
diplomacy.  
3.1: Decline and Declinism  
 As Jim Tomlinson has noted in his overview of ‘declinism’, British writers and leaders have been 
concerned about the erosion of British military and economic supremacy since the turn of the 19th
century.1 It was during the great post-war boom however that the extent and cause of Britain’s 
decline, and the search for solutions, became the subject of national debate. Despite the 
unprecedented growth rate of British living standards during the 1950s and 1960s, the superior 
performance of the ‘economic miracles’ experienced by European economies coincided with 
Britain’s political and military retrenchment from Empire to give rise to both popular and elite 
1 Jim Tomlinson “Inventing 'Decline': The Falling behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years” The 
Economic History Review (1996) Vol. 49 (4) p731 
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disquiet over reduced power of the British state and the poor performance of the economy upon 
which power depended.2
Contemporaries and historians working within the declinist tradition from both sides of the political 
divide have advanced a multitude of reasons for the supposed under-performance of the British 
economy. A listing of the causes proposed indicates the extent to which the debate touched all 
aspects of the British polity. To the left, primary causes were the hegemony of finance over 
investment in industry, the preference for soft Commonwealth and Empire markets over dynamic 
European ones and a liberal nature of the British state in comparison to the activist, interventionist 
French one. Right wing observers meanwhile stressed restrictive trade union practices and the 
private sector being crowded out by public sector investment.3 Even Britain’s victory in the Second 
World War constituted a handicap, as an exhausted but relatively undamaged Britain sought to 
continue a worldwide military presence. Meanwhile, defeated countries had the benefit of wiping 
the slate clean, reconstructing with up to date capital stock and securing agreement from 
management and labour that priority should be given to growth.4
The failure to escape from the ‘stop-go’ cycle of accelerating growth followed by retrenchment led 
to complaints that sterling’s international role was being prioritised over the demands of the 
domestic economy. The general consensus was that British governments’ efforts to re-establish 
sterling as an international currency were based on considerations of prestige rather than the real 
needs of the economy and that these efforts actively harmed the prospects for growth. However, 
2 Andrew Gamble, “Theories and Explanations of British Decline” in Richard English and Michael Kenny [ed.] 
Rethinking British Decline (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) pp. 3-4 
3 Tomlinson, “Inventing 'Decline': p. 731; Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy 2nd edition, 
(London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984) pp. 6-18; Scott Newton and Dillwyn Porter Modernization Frustrated: the 
politics of industrial decline in Britain since 1900 (London : Unwin Hyman, 1988) p. xiii; Gamble, “Theories and 
Explanations of British Decline p5 
4 Mancur Olsen The Rise and Decline of Nations Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 1984) 
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the target of criticism evolved as did the wider Bretton Woods system, suggesting Britain’s 
commitment to the wider monetary system played an important role.  
One of the first to grapple with the problem was A. C. L. Day, who wrote The Future of Sterling in 
1953. This was a time of liquidity shortage in the international monetary system, in which European 
economies were attempting to conserve hard currency dollars in their trade. Day assigned the effort 
then underway to achieve sterling convertibility to a misguided attempt to restore the City of 
London to its former role as the world’s premier financial centre. This followed on from the failure to 
realise that Britain’s economic growth now depended primarily on the strength of her 
manufacturing industry rather than the profits made from international banking and finance.5
The real danger however stemmed not from a lack of investment in the domestic economy but 
rather the threat to sterling from the rush to establish convertibility in a system experiencing a 
liquidity shortage. The overhang of short-term sterling liabilities to assets, subject to the prospect of 
increased volatility as the political links with the Sterling Area ossified, threatened insolvency even if 
the current account of trade and services was balanced.6 According to Day it seemed  
unwise for a weakened Britain to take upon herself the position of pivot of the 
world’s payment system, unless there is a very adequate cushioning system available 
to absorb the inevitable shocks. At the moment this cushioning is clearly quite 
inadequate.7
Day understood the constraint imposed by the sterling balances was not easily evaded. Funding the 
balances via a long term amortisation would require a substantial drain on British resources through 
payments on the debt, while increasing British assets to a level commensurate with liabilities would 
involve years of sustained surplus which would represent investment foregone in domestic 
industry.8 Day recognised early on that the best solution lay in an increase in global liquidity which 
5 A. C. L. Day The Future of Sterling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) p153  
6 Ibid p157 
7 Ibid p9 
8 Ibid p164-165 
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could cushion the impact of sterling diversification on the domestic economy. For this he looked to 
the Americans, noting that while both sterling and the dollar were international currencies, only the 
dollar was universally acceptable.9 While hoping therefore for an American driven increase in 
liquidity, Day also worried about the unpredictability of the US, noting how foreign trade was 
peripheral to her economy and global interests subordinated to domestic ones in her formulating of 
economic policy. He therefore hoped for a reformed system more resilient to shocks emanating 
from the US and while recognising the crucial nature of the Anglo-American relationship, presciently 
warned that “no economic policy for the rest of the world can be safely founded on an assumption 
of a stable American policy.”10
In an influential analysis in 1958, Andrew Shonfield undertook a devastating critique of British post-
war economic policy that became one of the foundational texts of declinism. Taking as his central 
thesis that British politicians needed to “learn to grow faster in wealth” Shonfield explained that 
contemporary concern over inflation and disappointing growth stemmed Britain’s “stubborn refusal 
to invest in the creation of more productive capacity,” contrasting domestic rates of capital 
accumulation unfavourably with the faster growing economies of western Europe and Japan.11
Sterling’s international role played a key part of Shonfield’s argument. He excoriated successive 
Chancellors for prioritising external surplus over domestic investment, resulting in economising at 
home to free up resources for export, including capital goods which could have been used 
domestically.12
The persistent weakness of the balance of payments constrained growth as industrial investment 
became the first item to be sacrificed by any government seeking to reduce the external deficit.13
Why then was the balance of payments weak? Shonfield noted the excessive burden of foreign 
9 Ibid p168 
10 Ibid pp.7-8 
11 Andrew Shonfield British Economic Policy Since the War (London: Penguin, 1958) p15, 42 
12 Ibid p31 
13 Ibid p50 
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military expenditure and private international investment but paid particular attention to the nature 
of the sterling balances within a shifting international economy. Although Britain had managed to 
rebuild its foreign assets since the war, the cost of servicing its liabilities, in particular the sterling 
balances, had also increased. Thus, the net investment income received from foreign investments 
paid for only 4% imports in 1956 compared with 20% before the war. This stock of debt constrained 
the management of the British economy in the form of interest payments. In the 19th century when 
Britain was the world’s largest creditor and money market, interest rates could adjust the flow of 
foreign borrowing by keeping money at home rather than flowing abroad. Now when servicing the 
sterling balances, an increase in rates resulted in further net outflow in the form of interest 
payments.14
The root cause of this problem was, Shonfield argued, psychological, the result of “great power 
maladies” that insisted on trying to perpetuate Britain’s worldwide role through excessive overseas 
military spending and foreign investment.15 At the centre of this was the “obsession with the status 
of sterling as a reserve currency,” referring to the argument made in 1957 by the then Chancellor 
Peter Thorneycroft that “it brings us a great deal in the way of wealth, strength and prestige,” to 
suggest that the last factor was overwhelmingly the most important.16 Following on from this 
delusion led the real impact of prioritising the needs of the Sterling Area, including access to the City 
of London to incentivise holders to keep their balances deposited there, while starving British 
industry of funds for investment.17 In response, he called for massive domestic investment drive, 
protecting the balance of payments through cutting back on military expenditure and overseas 
investment. He also envisaged a long-term guarantee on official sterling balances in order to manage 
their withdrawals which, combined with increased domestic capital controls and the assumption of 
14 Ibid 72-73 
15 Ibid 122 
16 Ibid p151, 157 
17 Ibid p127 
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British owned securities by the government, would provide the firepower to manage diversification 
by the Sterling Area.18
The arrival into power of a Labour party committed to raising the growth of the economy through a 
National Plan for industry raised hopes that a solution based on the French experience was at hand. 
Almost immediately however these hopes were dashed by the need to defend sterling. Fred Hirsch, 
writing in 1965, argued that the decision not to devalue upon coming to power undermined the 
prospects of faster growth as well as social reform.19 This represented a shift in the focus of criticism 
of Bretton Woods, away from a shortage of liquidity and towards problems with adjustment. While 
conceding some deflation was necessary in 1964 in response to an overheating economy and in 
order to move resources into exports, Hirsch argued that only in combination with a devaluation of 
the pound could it have provided the framework for a “belated twentieth century economic miracle 
that many believed Britain was due for.”20
Hirsch identified three sources of pressure on sterling: the deficit on the current account caused by 
weak export performance; excessive capital outflow from military spending and private investment; 
and a run on the sterling balances provoked by an inadequate reserve of short-term assets against 
liabilities. The post-war experience had been characterised by all three, often simultaneously. The 
latter however was particularly significant as it exaggerated disturbances caused by trading deficits 
while simultaneously making the same deficits harder to resolve by creating a barrier to devaluation 
which Hirsch viewed as the best solution to the British deficit. Sterling’s reserve function meant 
policymakers resisted devaluation as well as refrained from limiting capital outflow in order not to 
upset the Sterling Area and provoke diversification.21 A large measure of blame was laid at the door 
18 Ibid pp.265-270
19 Fred Hirsch The Pound Sterling p14 
20 Ibid p15 
21 Ibid p25 
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of the Bank of England. Devaluation was held by the Bank to be inconsistent with sterling’s reserve 
role upon which the City’s banking functions were believed to depend.22
Hirsch proposed a floating exchange rate for sterling, both to effect a more orderly process of 
adjustment while also acting as a spur to international reform of the role played by currencies in 
international reserves.23 Writing at a time of declining confidence in both sterling and the dollar, 
Hirsch argued for the liabilities of both countries to be assumed by the IMF whereby Britain and 
America would accept a guarantee of the value of their currencies (expressed in gold) in return for 
the IMF acting as a “considerate holder” which would draw down its balances only when the 
currencies were in demand and their respective economies in surplus.24 In doing so, Britain would be 
removed from the constraint of the sterling balances which were a legacy of the war and no longer 
imparted any benefit on the economy.25
More sympathetic to the City was economics editor of the Financial Times Samuel Brittan, who 
nevertheless arrived at a similar conclusion to Hirsch. Brittan described the contemporary concern 
with the balance of payments and the stop-go cycle as a “pseudo-problem” resulting from the 
attempt to maintain an inappropriate exchange rate and/or over expansionary domestic policy.26
Brittan argued the exchange rate was an area in which the government had the power to make a 
decisive policy at speed but under Bretton Woods successive administrations had rejected action in 
favour of a series of moral exhortations including “export drives, incomes policy, ‘Back Britain’ 
drives, travel allowances, consultations with industry and knighthoods for exporters,” in which the 
impact of government was indirect and where any success would take years to materialise.27 A false 
price given by an permanently overvalued exchange rate distorted the economy while under Bretton 
22 Ibid p46 
23 Ibid p91-92 
24 Ibid p96 
25 Ibid 111 
26 Samuel Brittan The Price of Economic Freedom: A Guide to Flexible Rates (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1970) p. xi 
27 Ibid p12, 22 
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Woods adjustment had come to be perceived as a last resort, taking place in large jumps rather than 
the smooth, continuous adjustment implied by a floating rate.28
Brittan was careful not to position floating sterling as a panacea. Despite writing in 1970 at a time 
when the devaluation of 1967 had finally produced a surplus, he warned that this was likely to be 
the temporary result of a combination of favourable forces including a credit squeeze, import 
deposits, low growth and the residual impact of devaluation which would be undermined by the 
current “explosion” of wages and the cost of joining the EEC.29 Brittan was concerned that a floating 
rate must be accompanied by “sensible” internal policies, involving deflating the economy to move 
resources to exports and import-saving industries.30
Brittan did not view liquidity under Bretton Woods as a constraint on British policy, rather the 
opposite. Given the government’s commitment to fixed exchange rates, this required prompt 
adjustment in the form of deflation at the first sign of an external deficit. Instead however, the 
generous support available via the IMF and central bank credits, coupled with the prospect of 
devaluation as a last resort meant imbalances were given time to build, resulting in a more painful 
and extended adjustment when it finally arrived. He therefore gave short shrift to the prospects of 
liquidity reform then underway.31 Nor were the existence of the sterling balances held to be a direct 
constraint on the British economy. Although referring to the “misplaced pride” which has precluded 
funding the sterling balances at the end of the war, he noted post-war build-up had softened the 
impact of reconstruction, meaning without them pressure on reserves would have been even 
greater.32 Instead the constraint imposed by the existence of sterling balances was an indirect one, 
28 Ibid p11 
29 Ibid 15 
30 Ibid p65 
31 Ibid p5, 10 
32 Samuel Brittan Steering the Economy: Role of the Treasury (London: Penguin, 1971) p260 
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through inhibiting the government against devaluation or floating the currency for fear that if used 
by a reserve currency this would provoke a stampede for the exit.33
Despite writing at a time of significant change in the world’s international monetary system, Brittan 
was sanguine that the reforms secured since 1967 could help manage a sterling float while the 
economy was still in surplus, providing for a more effective process of adjustment once a deficit 
reappeared. Devaluation and the partial demonetisation of gold meant that a run on the dollar was 
less likely, while the Second Group Arrangement whereby sterling was provided with a credit line 
with the BIS and a commitment by the sterling balance holders to keep a minimum proportion of 
their reserves in sterling in return for a dollar guarantee of their value “ought to mean the end of the 
old sterling balance problem.” This was to overlook just how attractive these guarantees were, 
facilitating a fresh build-up of balances while Britain struggled to adjust to the post 1973 inflationary 
oil crisis.34 Brittan also failed to predict that although floating did not rule out deflationary action on 
the part of the government, it did not rule it in either, resulting in the Barber Boom being unchecked 
by any need to defend the rate, with consequences down the line for the sterling balances 
culminating in the IMF crisis.  
Sterling’s problems in the 1970s prompted the nascent field of International Political Economy to use 
it as a case study in its examination of the role of reserve currencies. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
Susan Strange analysed sterling through a typography reproduced below that conceptualised 
currencies according to the political economy of their use.  
33 Ibid p261-262 
34 Brittan The Price of Economic Freedom p68 
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Table 3.1 Susan Strange’s Politics of International Currencies.  
Form Features 
Top Currency Issues in and/or backed by the state that 
exercise/enjoys world economic leadership, 
i.e., the dominant state in the world market 
Master Currency Circulates mostly in geo-political blocks, e.g., 
thanks to the political dominance of issuing 
state 
Negotiated or political currency Tied to international regimes with emphasis on 
mutual benefits rather than coercion  
Passive or neutral currency Circulates domestically, minor role in 
international regimes.  
Source: Strange Sterling and British Policy p5 
According to Strange, sterling’s post-war experience was explained by its status as a Negotiated 
Currency, one in which the issuing state had lost the position of political and economic leadership 
that had once made sterling both a Top Currency and a Master Currency. Sterling’s status as a 
Negotiated Currency resulted in a need to bargain with holders over the terms on which they would 
continue to use it as an international currency.35 This imposed a defensive posture on British 
governments, requiring inducements in the form of military spending or access to London capital 
markets to preserve sterling’s international role. As Strange noted: 
The Master Currency depends heavily on the stick. But if the stick is weakened or if 
the issuing state for any reason becomes too embarrassed to use it, then it must be 
replaced by carrot36
35 Strange Sterling and British Policy p5 
36 Susan Strange “The Politics of International Currencies” World Politics (1971) Vol. 23 (2) p220
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In explaining why Britain endured the constraint implied by sterling’s reserve role, Strange also 
resorted to psychological arguments, coining “Top Currency syndrome”, a belief that the interests of 
the world economy were also the interests of the British economy.37 The loss of sterling’s 
international status was only slowly perceived, initially obscured by Britain’s temporary advantage 
following victory in the war, the existence of the Sterling Area (large parts of which were still under 
British political control) and the absence of general convertibility which meant British policymakers 
could continue in the belief that sterling would remain an international currency second only to the 
dollar.38
This failure to adapt to Britain’s decline and the determination to preserve sterling’s status as an 
international currency therefore imposed a constraint on the domestic economy. The need to 
defend the exchange rate, the increasing burden of aid, trade and security concessions to members 
of the Sterling Area and reluctance to interfere in the business of the City facilitating capital outflow 
all combined to act as a drag on the growth of the domestic economy.39 Although towards the end of 
the 1960s a shift in opinion could be detected in both the City and Westminster that asked whether 
Britain might be better off without sterling’s reserve role, the responsibility felt towards the fate of 
the international  monetary system caused by ‘top currency syndrome’ continued to prevent any 
consideration of radical changes in the commitments taken on by sterling.40
Of particular relevance is Strange’s focus on the importance of the Anglo-American relationship to 
sterling’s preservation as an international currency, noting that sterling would have collapsed had it 
not been for American financial support and its forbearance in pushing for an end to the 
discriminatory Sterling Area.41 The analysis was continued by a generation of historians writing in the 
1980s and 90s who related the defence of sterling to the needs of the ‘‘special relationship’ with 
37 Strange Sterling and British Policy p47 
38 Strange Sterling and British Policy p298-299 
39 Ibid p300 
40 Ibid p302 
41 Ibid 61 
50 
America upon which Britain’s post-war great power depended. Clive Ponting’s review of the 1964-70 
Labour government, provocatively entitled Breach of Promise, claimed that the promise of Wilson to 
remake the British economy according to a National Plan was betrayed by the need to placate 
American geopolitical interest in order to secure financial support for sterling. Britain made a 
commitment not to devalue, restrain internal demand and maintain the burden of military presence 
in the Far East in return for American dollars.42 Echoing Hirsch, Ponting contended the refusal to 
devalue in 1964 wasted an opportunity for sustained growth in British output and exports, 
succumbing instead to a series of exchange crises and successive rounds of deflation, failing on its 
own terms when devaluation finally occurred in 1967.43
The argument that Britain’s desire to continue a worldwide role prioritised the interests of sterling 
over the needs of domestic economy is a consistent theme in the historiographical record. Peter 
Clarke argued that defence of an overvalued exchange rate militated against a National Plan while 
requiring an incomes policy that undermined support for Labour among the unions.44 A vicious circle 
arose in which defence cuts required to stabilise sterling were ruled out by the nature of Wilson’s 
agreement to maintain a presence east of Suez in return for American support.45 David Reynolds 
argues that Britain’s post war experience was characterised by a growing dependence on American 
support in order to play a world-wide role. The influence afforded by the Commonwealth and the 
Sterling Area, upon which it was assumed British prosperity depended, evaporated in the wave of 
decolonisation from the mid 1950s onwards, while the need to defend sterling diverted British 
attention from European integration, with disastrous consequences.46
Sidney Pollard likewise draws on the historical influence of Empire in constraining the growth 
potential of the British economy. The existence of the sterling balances, requiring high interest rates 
42 Pointing Breach of Promise p191 
43 Ibid p200 
44 Peter Clarke Hope and Glory Britain 1900 – 1990 (London: Allen Lane, 1990) p311 
45 Ibid p312 
46 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Longman, 2000) p190, 195-196  
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in order to maintain confidence while also postponing devaluation until 1967 was a direct constraint 
on the economy inherited from Empire, in which the problem was compounded by Britain’s heavy 
overseas expenditure, itself made necessary by the need to induce sterling holders to maintain their 
balances through aid and security concessions worldwide.47 The defence of sterling incurred costly 
obligations to international institutions which also diverted investment away from the domestic 
economy.48
In summary the declinist thesis held that Britain’s post-war economic performance was hindered by 
a lack of domestic investment. The consensus was that Britain’s external commitments, either to 
stability of the international monetary system, the international role of sterling or building up 
private foreign investment, was a major cause of this lack of investment and hence a constraint on 
growth. This has usually been given a psychological explanation – the ‘delusions of grandeur’ thesis - 
whereby British post-war leaders attempted to continue playing a world role long after the economy 
stopped being able to afford it.  
3.2: Revisionist Interpretations of Sterling’s Decline 
More recent historical investigation has challenged the ‘declinist’ hypothesis, challenging the 
fundamental notion of decline due to failure of policymaking by noting that the performance of the 
economy in terms of growth, unemployment, inflation and balance of payments deficit was superior 
from 1951-73 than it was from 1979-97.49 Externally this revisionist approach has been taken 
furthest by Catherine Schenk, whose work has examined the post-war retreat from sterling’s 
international status within the context of the international monetary system. Focusing on the 
evolution of the Sterling Area, Schenk has argued that during the 1950s the system provided mutual 
benefit to both Britain and the other members. The latter received access to London’s capital market 
at a time of restrictions on foreign investment, while the mutual pooling of members dollar holdings 
47 Sidney Pollard, The Development of the British Economy 1914 – 1990 (London: Hodder, 1992) p312 
48 Ibid p313 
49 Jim Tomlinson Balanced Accounts 
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in London bolstered the foreign exchange reserves available to defend sterling. With the majority of 
trading relationships between members denominated in sterling, there was a mutual interest in 
maintaining the stability and value of the currency.50
Schenk revised the declinist arguments that the Sterling Area represented the domination of 
financial over industrial interests, that restrictive domestic policies were necessary to support the 
pound and that excessive foreign investment was required to maintain the coherence of the area, 
taking preference over domestic investment.51 Instead the availability of the Area’s dollar holdings 
helped loosen the UK’s balance of payments constraint, whereas otherwise the economy would 
have had to have been deflated further to bring the external account back into balance.52 Noting the 
low productivity of domestic investment, Schenk argues that capital outflow was not drag on British 
growth it has been commonly portrayed, instead creating demand for British exports while also 
building up supply of oil through Britain’s continued role in the Middle East and generating invisible 
earnings for the balance of payments.53 Instead she criticises the traditional perception of the 
balances as a “homogenous mass of short term liabilities hanging over the central reserves” as 
mistaken.54 The supposed imbalance of liabilities to assets was both misleading and damaging to 
confidence;  Britain’s net overseas position was positive. Although Britain’s pattern of long term 
investment meant a large share of these assets were illiquid, the liquidity of the liabilities was also 
exaggerated. Publication of the size of the total balances was not mirrored by a proper accounting of 
the resource available to Britain, focusing only on Britain’s holdings of gold and foreign reserves and 
not taking into account the support available from the IMF and central bank swap arrangements 
which could be quickly activated to defend the rate.55
50 Catherine Schenk “The Sterling Area and Economic Disintegration” Geschichte und Gesellschaft (2013) Vol. 
39 (2) p. 11 
51 Catherine Schenk Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility (Abingdon-on-Thames: 
Routledge, 1994) pp.5-7 
52 Ibid p29 
53 Ibid p112 
54 Ibid p20,  
55 Ibid p29, 35 
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In the most extensive review of sterling’s post-war retreat from its international role, The Decline of 
Sterling, Schenk extends her revisionist argument into the 1960s and 1970s, contextualising the 
travails of the currency during this period with regard to the evolution and crisis of the world’s 
international monetary system and the impact this had on sterling as the world’s second reserve 
currency. The development of the world economy through the 1960s shifted the relative benefits 
and costs accruing to both Britain and the Sterling Area, resulting in the retirement of sterling as an 
international currency. The growth of global capital markets, particularly in offshore dollars traded in 
London (the so-called Eurodollar markets), reduced the attractiveness of access to London’s sterling 
markets for members of the Sterling Area while also undermining the belief that the City of London’s 
business depended on sterling’s international role.56 At the same time, Britain’s growing orientation 
towards Europe threatened the long term trading relations upon which the Sterling Area was built, 
while also impressing on the negotiators of Britain’s three attempts to join the EEC that sterling’s 
reserve role was viewed in Europe as a burden that Britain’s prospective partners were reluctant to 
assume.57 The interdependence of the global economy combined with the complexity of Britain’s 
economic and political relations both with Europe and worldwide meant the sterling balances defied 
unilateral fixes, instead relying on multilateral negotiation within the context of international 
reform. Defaulting on the debts incurred as part of the sterling balances was not a serious 
proposition for a country as dependent on trade as Britain, particularly at a time of stress in the 
global economy resulting from concern over the future of the dollar.58
Schenk criticises the ‘delusions of grandeur’ thesis, noting that even in the 1950s British 
governments were ambivalent to sterling’s international role, recognising it as a source of friction 
with the United States, Europe and the Commonwealth. The evolution of monetary system, in which 
56 Catherine Schenk “The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London: 1955 -1963” Explorations in Economic 
History (1998) Vol. 35 p.235 
57 Catherine Schenk “Sterling, International Monetary Reform and Britain’s Application to Join the European 
Economic Community in the 1960s” Contemporary European History (2002) Vol. 11 (3) pp. 345-346 
58 Ibid p6 
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foreign currencies came to supply the liquidity required to maintain the growth of world trade 
meant sterling occupied an important structural role, second only to the dollar. The major sterling 
balance holders had limited options available given the dollar was also weak while surplus 
economies like Japan and Germany resisted the internationalisation of their currencies. Moreover, a 
rush to the exit could provoke a collapse in sterling and hence the value of their holdings. 
Consequently, there developed a collective interest in perpetuating sterling’s reserve role on behalf 
of the stability of the world economy.59
Rather than seeking to prolong sterling’s reserve role at cost to the domestic economy, British 
governments instead sought to leverage its structural importance to manage its decline at least cost 
to the international trade and financial links upon which domestic prosperity depended. The 1960s 
witnessed decisive action on the part of successive British governments to withdraw from Britain’s 
continuing worldwide role, including its military presence ‘east of Suez’ as well as the reserve role of 
sterling, against the wishes of the American administration upon whose support sterling depended, 
in order to divest Britain of the impediments to assuming a European role.60 The turmoil of the 
international monetary system following sterling’s devaluation in 1967 provided British with 
leverage (in the form of the threat posed by a further devaluation) to secure international support 
on generous terms. According to Schenk: 
the hard bargains driven by British negotiators and the evidence that the 
contractionary terms of the IMF or American credits were not honoured rather 
contradicts the usual interpretation, that the interests of the domestic economy 
were sacrificed to the international status of sterling.61
 As well as short term support to defend the rate, the debate over the future role of reserve 
currencies raised the prospect that global reform to the system’s provision of liquidity offered the 
potential for a long term solution of the sterling balances in the form of substitution into a new asset 
59 Ibid p30-31 
60 Ibid p117 
61 Ibid p204 
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created and administered by the IMF. This process ultimately amounted to minor revisions to the 
world’s monetary system, becoming bogged down in debates between American and the French 
over the role of gold amid wider disagreements concerning burden sharing in defence and 
discrimination in trade. Nevertheless, concern over the future of sterling was significant enough for a 
series of negotiated support packages to support sterling diversification arranged via the BIS.62 The 
final coup de grace for sterling was negotiated in 1977 with the Third Group Arrangement. Schenk 
reinterprets the significance of the IMF crisis of 1976 with regards to the retreat of sterling, noting 
the negotiation of the BIS arrangement subsequent to the IMF deal represented the culmination of 
the long term strategy to retire sterling with the support of the international community, 
successfully engaging international support for sterling and mitigating the domestic restraints or 
external barriers that would be required in absence of such support.63 As such the constraint 
imposed by sterling’s reserve role was less to do with the delusions of a continuing world role but 
rather with the evolving structure of the international monetary system, which were successfully 
negotiated by governments on agreeable terms representing the least cost to the domestic 
economy.  
While Schenk has covered the period under consideration in detail, the present thesis seeks to build 
on her approach by presenting a single narrative investigating the continuing use British policy made 
of the sterling balances following devaluation, while expanding the liquidity available to mitigate the 
constraint they imposed. This enables us to better understand the terms of the engagement with the 
IMF (and the US government) in 1976 by comparing and contrasting with the evolution of previous 
support packages since 1967 amid change in the international monetary system’s provision of 
adjustment, liquidity and confidence.  
62 Ibid p271-272 
63 Ibid p430 
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Chapter 4 
The Battle for Bretton Woods 
4.1: Introduction 
For the British Ambassador to the United States Sir Patrick Dean, 1968 began with his annual report 
on the state of Anglo-American relations. Following sterling’s devaluation little over a month 
previously, Dean was concerned. Speculation over the status of the dollar was destabilising the 
wider Bretton Woods monetary system. To compound matters, the Labour government was 
accelerating Britain’s withdrawal from its remaining worldwide military commitments in order to 
reduce capital outflow and restore balance in international payments. Together, these 
developments threatened to undermine the monetary, trade and security architecture that had 
fostered cooperation and integration between Western economies in the post-war period. For a 
generation of politicians that had come of age during the turmoil of the interwar years, this was an 
alarming prospect.  
In his report, Dean reported that the Americans were not only sympathetic to the plight of the 
British, but “positively anxious,” that the policies to stabilise sterling were successful, if only because 
of the effect failure would have on the dollar. However, despite recognising that some of the 
adjustment would have to fall on Britain’s defence budget, they were nevertheless “greatly 
alarmed,” at the prospect that a hasty withdrawal would threaten the West’s control of “unique 
political and strategic assets” in Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia.1 American support for 
sterling could be undermined if Britain was no longer perceived to be pulling its weight in global 
affairs. As Dean noted: 
1 TNA PREM 13/3551 Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office 004” 01 January 1968 
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Much of the American Press reporting from London presents an image of the British 
public fiddling while Rome is burning. The insouciance of "Swinging London", the 
constant and irresponsible pressure for wage increases and the much-publicised 
strikes of recent months…the alleged frivolity and preoccupation with private and 
public welfare excites the Puritan lurking in every American.  
The impact of this view on the executive branch of the US government would, Dean felt, be limited 
by America’s self interest in British retrenchment. A bigger problem was Congress (the symbol of 
“American Puritanism and hypocrisy”) – which ultimately controlled the purse strings: 
If they convince themselves that the United States is in some way subsidising the 
British welfare state while we are shifting more of our defence burden on to 
American shoulders, they could make it very difficult indeed for the Administration 
to provide the financial support we need when sterling is in trouble.2
Dean pleaded for this to be considered when formulating policy. He argued that despite the 
sometimes excessive demands of the Americans, their continued support was vital. This was to 
prove a prescient assessment of what was to follow over the next ten years.  
The immediate aftermath of sterling’s devaluation was a crisis that threatened the very existence of 
Bretton Woods. Speculation over the dollar, franc and Deutschmark further weakened confidence in 
sterling, leading to successive rounds of international borrowing to defend the rate. Although in 
hindsight this was beginning of the end for Bretton Woods, policymakers on both sides of the 
Atlantic remained committed to the system’s defence. As late as 1970 they could congratulate 
themselves of having succeeded in stabilising the system and laying the groundwork for significant 
reforms. This political decision to commit to the defence and reform of the Bretton Woods system 
and the priority given to its stabilisation over other objectives in economic diplomacy (namely 
removal of the sterling overhang), were key determinants of the external constraint faced by Britain 
during the post-devaluation period.   
2 Ibid
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The post-devaluation period has traditionally received less attention from historians, appearing as a 
post-script to the events leading up to devaluation. “Two years hard slog,” as the Chancellor Roy 
Jenkins remembered it, in which Britain struggled to achieve surplus on the external account. More 
recently there has been a growing interest in this period. Michael Oliver and Arran Hamilton have 
detailed the continuing exchange crises afflicting sterling post-devaluation as well as the contingency 
plans drawn up in the Treasury to deal with them, including floating sterling and blocking the sterling 
balances.3 Separately, Hamilton has argued the Gold Crisis in March 1968 represented a much more 
dangerous threat to sterling than its devaluation the previous year, given that reserves to defend the 
rate were even lower at this point.4 Scott Newton has shown that the post-devaluation struggle to 
defend the new rate threatened the ability of Labour to maintain a social-democratic order in Britain 
as instability around Bretton Woods combined with the continued development of global capital 
markets to destabilise sterling.5  Together these analyses highlight the extent to which, as Wilson 
noted in his television address, devaluation was ‘not the end of the affair but the beginning of a long 
and dangerous process which could lead us not upwards but still further downwards.”6
For Catherine Schenk, the devaluation marked “the great turning point” in sterling policy, prompting 
the search for mechanisms by which its international role could be safely diminished, although it was 
not until the third EEC membership application in 1971 that this became an explicit British policy.7
For the sterling balance holders, devaluation led to a “profound sense of betrayal,” reinforced by the 
subsequent decision to withdraw militarily ‘east of Suez,’ as traditional trade, finance and security 
links between Britain and the OSA ossified, threatening mass diversification which could sink 
attempts to hold the rate.8 Given the reliance of British prosperity on external trade (and hence a 
stable monetary system), this was a complex task beyond the reach of Britain alone, requiring 
3 Oliver & Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation” p497 
4 Hamilton “Beyond the Sterling Devaluation” pp. 73 – 95 
5 Newton “Sterling, Bretton Woods and Social Democracy” pp. 427-455 
6 Oliver & Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation” p506 
7 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p117 
8Ibid p313 
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instead multilateral negotiation to secure sterling’s immediate stability and future retirement from 
its role as a global currency.9 Sterling’s key role in Bretton Woods allowed Britain to secure a series 
of financial support packages from the IMF, leveraging the threat of a second devaluation or floating 
the currency to “strike fear into the heart of the IMF and Johnson administration.”10 However, hopes 
for a more comprehensive solution to the sterling balance problem via reform of Bretton Woods 
liquidity resulted in “confused and inconclusive,” discussions, culminating in the Special Drawing 
Right which was ultimately unable to prevent the collapse of the system amid concern over the 
status of the dollar. Combined with Labour’s reluctance to concede policy oversight to the IMF, the 
tentative status of reform prompted the search for alternative sources of support, notably the BIS 
which, it was felt, could be relied upon to make less intrusive demands on British policy autonomy. 
The resulting Second Group Arrangement organised by the BIS and corresponding Sterling 
Agreements negotiated with 34 individual members of the OSA, stabilised sterling but also reflected 
the extent to which traditional relationships had eroded and needed replacing with a “formalised 
network of bilateral contracts.”11
From the perspective of the 1976 crisis, this thesis argues that the years after devaluation was the 
period of greatest adjustment for Britain’s integration into the global economy, requiring a 
proportionally greater degree of retrenchment both at home at abroad and higher borrowing to 
defend the rate, at a time when domestic fundamentals were nevertheless in better shape. On the 
other hand, financial support to stabilise sterling was more readily available. Both factors are 
explained by the joint Anglo-American commitment to Bretton Woods’ defence and reform. With 
both sides fearful that a collapse in the system could herald a return to the economic and political 
conflict of the interwar years, stabilising Bretton Woods assumed priority over other British 
objectives in economic diplomacy.  
9 Ibid p121 
10 Ibid p204 
11Ibid pp.23-24 
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Once devaluation had occurred therefore, it was recognised that no further movement on the 
exchange rate could occur without fatally undermining Bretton Woods. Despite concerns in 1968 
that devaluation had not been large enough to restore balance, a second devaluation or floating 
were considered only as an emergency response to an external crisis.12 Paradoxically therefore, 
devaluation reinforced rather than loosened the adjustment constraint.  
Defending the rate amid the turmoil of repeated exchange crises involving the dollar, franc and DM 
required international support, which was obtained on a scale proportionally greater than in 1976.13
The symbiotic relationship between sterling and Bretton Woods meant this was available with much 
less public disagreement than ten years later. IMF attempts to tie lending to conditions in the form 
of public borrowing or control of the money supply were easily handled by the Treasury. However, 
as well as withdrawing from Britain’s expensive worldwide military commitments, Labour also 
responded to devaluation with a proportionally greater shift in public borrowing than in 1975/77 
(albeit from a lower starting point), achieving a rare budget surplus in 1969 to coincide with the 
return to external surplus.14
From the point of view of policymakers, these sacrifices were justified as Bretton Woods provided 
the framework for trade and investment that would drive British growth in the post-devaluation 
period, while expecting general reform to the system’s provision of liquidity would resolve sterling’s 
international status and with it the constraint imposed by the overhang. As such, although financial 
support for sterling was easily available and not tied to domestic policies beyond those Labour were 
already pursuing, externally they were predicated on the continuation of Bretton Woods. These 
involved commitments that look expensive in hindsight. Restoring confidence to sterling balance 
holders amid the threat of diversification (at a time when the ratio of reserves to liabilities was lower 
than in 1976), took the form of expensive exchange rate guarantees and high interest rates under 
12 Oliver & Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation” p497 
13 Comparisons between 1967 and 1976 are expressed as a % of GDP where possible, since the inflation Britain 
experienced in the 1970s distorts comparisons expressed at current prices.  
14 Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 1984 Q4 “Funding the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 1952-83”  
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the 1968 Basle deal. In contrast to the 1977 Basle deal, when an offer of foreign currency bonds to 
facilitate diversification combined with a commitment to prevent future accruals reduced overseas 
holdings to working balances, the 1968 instead resulted in a build-up of sterling balances. This 
reversed the previous decline in the balances and began the fresh build-up that would eventually 
need to be resolved ten years later (see Figure 4.1)  
Source: Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 1974 Q2 “Overseas Sterling Balances 1963 – 1973” 1974; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
1975 Q1 Table 25: “Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-market liabilities in sterling to holders other than central 
monetary institutions”;  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1977 Q1, “Table 19, Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-
market liabilities in sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions,”; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1979 Q1 “Table 15: 
Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-market liabilities in sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions”
The short-term success in restoring stability to Bretton Woods, as well as some progress on 
international monetary reform by 1970 appeared to vindicate this strategy. Subsequent events 
would prove that it was ultimately dependent on the Americans’ own attitude towards Bretton 
Woods. While the Johnson administration remained committed to reform, Washington was a 
reliable source of financial support and institutional influence. However, the turmoil unleashed on 
the dollar by sterling’s devaluation prompted an American reappraisal of the constraints imposed by 
its own political commitment to Bretton Woods. The chain of events this led to would have dramatic 
consequences for attempts to resolve the sterling overhang.   
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4.2: Dealing with Devaluation November 1967 
For Britain, the devaluation of sterling on 19 November 1967 from $2.80 to $2.40 was the 
culmination of a three-year struggle to defend the rate which had begun immediately upon Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government coming to power. The decision to rule out devaluation in 1964 
provoked widespread criticism that by doing so Labour prioritised the demands of international 
financial markets over domestic investment, which required reducing government expenditure and 
domestic growth in order to defend the rate.15 By the beginning of 1967 however, the strategy 
appeared to be working. The British economy was moving from “crisis to convalescence” according 
to The Times, as balance of payments figures released for the final quarter of 1966 showed a surplus 
of £121m.16 Summing up his budget speech in April, the Chancellor Jim Callaghan drew an analogy 
from his service in the Navy: “The economy is moving ahead. Every seaman knows the command at 
such a moment – ‘Steady as she goes’.”17
The decline to devaluation was nevertheless swift, the combination of domestic and international 
crises that undermined confidence in the currency. According to Wilson’s memoirs, devaluation 
became inevitable when the economic consequences of crisis in the Middle East following the Six 
Day War were compounded by dock strikes in London and Liverpool.18 Although a Middle East oil 
embargo on supplies to the West following the Six Day War was lifted in September, expectations of 
a change in parity had been raised in international currency markets and were exacerbated by a 
publication from the EEC implying that the currency would need to be devalued before Britain’s 
prospective membership bid could be accepted.19 Despite a raise in the Bank Rate in October – 
characterised by President Johnson’s special advisor Walt Rostow as part of a “last ditch British 
15 Ponting A Betrayal of Promise
16 “Britain Pays off $625m Debt” The Times 9 March 1967; “Surplus of $121m on Payments” The Times 16 
March 1967 
17 James Callaghan Time & Chance (London: Politico, 2006) p214 
18 Harold Wilson The Labour Government 1964 – 1970 A Personal Record (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1971) 
p439  
19 Toniolo Central Bank Cooperation p398 
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effort” to hold the sterling parity – it was not enough to restore calm to markets which had expected 
a bolder move.20
Wilson’s view has been endorsed by revisionist historians who stress instead the “extraordinary 
combination of events” rather than policy failure that led to devaluation. These include deflationary 
policies in the US and Germany, unfavourable shifts in international interest rates as well as 
dislocation stemming the closure of Suez Control in response to the West’s support of Israel.21
Moreover, as Tim Bale argues, the experience of defending the rate over three years allowed Wilson 
to justify devaluation to the international community as inevitable, despite the dislocation he knew 
it would cause, forced upon Britain due to the ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ of sterling’s position and 
therefore permissible according to the ‘rules of the game’ prevailing under Bretton Woods.22
Presenting the decision to a domestic audience, Wilson argued devaluation offered the potential for 
Britain to breakout of “rigid limitations on the ability of our people and government to solve our 
problems by our own exertions,” concluding his speech by asserting “we are on our own now – it 
means Britain first.” 23  Both arguments were in fact disingenuous. The continued commitment to 
Bretton Woods meant the limitations imposed by its provision of adjustment, liquidity and 
confidence remained, notwithstanding the one-time improvement in competitiveness that 
devaluation represented. Moreover, Britain was not on its own, but required the financial support of 
her allies. While this was readily available, it was on terms that did not necessarily put Britain first, 
but rather Bretton Woods.  
Labour’s immediate objective was to secure a turnaround in the balance of payments and stabilise 
sterling, while also protecting living standards and maintaining a respectable rate of growth. 
20 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1964 – 1968 Vol. VIII International Monetary and Trade Policy 
“Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson” 19 October 1967 
21 Scott Newton “The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International Economy and Post-War Social 
Democracy” English Historical Review Vol. CXXV No. 515 p 920 -925 
22 Bale “Dynamics of a Non-Decision” p213 
23 Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 65. 
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However, the commitment to Bretton Woods and the opportunities presented by reform (see 
below) meant this had to be achieved without resorting to drastic measures like floating the 
currency and/or blocking the balances. Balancing these internal and external demands would 
require international support mediated via the IMF. In turn, this gave the IMF an interest in domestic 
economic policy, to ensure that (according to its analysis) domestic policy supported external 
objectives.  
Both Labour and IMF agreed that there needed to be some movement of resources into the export 
sector. Disagreement arose over how much needed to be cut from domestic expenditure to secure a 
balance of payments surplus. Following his announcement of devaluation, Callaghan introduced 
requests on banks to reduce lending, reductions in defence expenditure and capital investment in 
nationalised industries of £200m.24 However, Leslie O’Brien, Governor of the Bank of England, 
believed these measures to be much too small and unlikely to impress the IMF, recommending 
increases in income tax, in addition to greater cuts in public expenditure.25 Although a $1.4bn 
package with the IMF was rapidly arranged, the exact relationship between the IMF’s money and 
government policy provoked debate, both contemporary and historical.  
As part of the standby, the British were committed to drafting a Letter of Intent outlining which 
measures they were taking to ensure devaluation was a success, based on discussions with an IMF 
mission which had arrived in London. This has led some to believe the IMF extracted meaningful 
conditions in return for the money. Samuel Brittan considers the IMF mission and the need to draft a 
Letter of Intent brought home to Wilson and parliament that IMF money was not without strings and 
that greater action was needed to free up resources and make devaluation a success.26 Michael 
Stewart notes that the left wing of Labour were disappointed that the need to secure IMF money 
involved public spending cuts when devaluation had finally freed the government of the obligation 
24 TNA PREM 13/1447 "Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer" 18 November 1967 
25 TNA PREM 13/1447 "Letter from Leslie O'Brien to the Chancellor" 17 November 1967 
26 Brittan Steering the Economy p377 
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to defend the sterling parity.27 Catherine Schenk considers that the IMF played a “hard game” and 
“pushed the British government beyond their initial intentions.”28
However, it is also worth noting that devaluation locked Britain and the IMF into a symbiotic 
relationship, given the joint commitment to defence of Bretton Woods. As Hamilton has noted, the 
change in parity did not in itself constitute a major break in the Bretton Woods system of 
adjustment, being permitted under the IMF’s rules in cases of ‘fundamental disequilibrium.’29 Yet 
the result of sterling’s devaluation was a systemic crisis that engulfed Bretton Woods as markets 
speculated on a change in the price of gold (as a means of shorting the dollar) and on a second 
sterling devaluation. Within the context of a widespread fear of a return to the protectionism of the 
1930s, the threat that a second sterling devaluation would result in controls on trade and payments 
as well as involve blocking the sterling balances moderated the IMF’s line regarding conditionality. In 
short, the IMF needed devaluation to work as much as Britain did and could be relied upon to 
support it on easy terms. Despite the leader of the IMF mission Richard Goode making it clear he 
was under pressure from Washington to have conditions attached to the aid, the British stubbornly 
resisted anything that seemed like untoward intrusion in their ability to make domestic policy as 
they saw fit.30 This was in contrast to 1976 when sterling crises could be much more effectively 
contained thanks to wider reform to adjustment and liquidity that protected the dollar. Therefore, 
while the IMF’s money and ‘seal of approval’ were as important as they would be later, in 1967 the 
Fund could be relied upon to provide the money without insisting on too many demands.  
This was supported by the attitude of the American government under President Johnson, which 
likewise remained committed to Bretton Woods. Like sterling, the dollar was a weak currency as 
external deficits undermined confidence. Both countries were interested in reforms to adjustment 
that would bring pressure to bear on surplus economies as well as deficit ones. In the short term, 
27 Stewart Politics & Economic Policy in the UK since 1964 p85 
28 Schenk Decline of Sterling p198 
29 Arran Hamilton “Beyond the Sterling Devaluation” pp.73-75 
30 TNA PREM 13/1447 "Letter from Leslie O'Brien to the Chancellor" 17 November 1967 
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they collaborated to pressure countries with stronger currencies like Germany and Japan to revalue, 
thus improving the competitive position of sterling and the dollar.31 This ensured a sympathetic 
source of pressure on the IMF when securing financial support for sterling, again in contrast to 1976, 
when the US government was openly critical of British economic policies.32
The lack of meaningful conditions is made clear by comparing the argument over public borrowing. A 
major topic of concern for the IMF was the government’s Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
[PSBR], which in 1976 proved a major clashing point. In 1967 however the British could easily dismiss 
a suggestion that the ceiling be put on the level of borrowing as "obviously politically impossible." 
The IMF pushed for a commitment to cut public borrowing to a fixed amount should current policies 
be inadequate to restore the balance of payments surplus, another point that the British conceded 
(indeed proposed) in 1976 as a means of moderating immediate cuts.33 In 1967 however they 
proposed a more relaxed approach, suggesting instead to update the Fund “from time to time, 
giving them our assessment of the situation and whether any further measures are called for."34
 A similar approach was taken with regards to control of credit. The IMF was concerned over the 
ability of the government to finance its borrowing via the banking system, provoking a 
contemptuous response form the Treasury. According to one official, "Richard Goode…. has rather 
too many bees in his bonnet - particularly on control of credit in the public sector,” noting the IMF 
wanted to apply monetary principles “perfectly alright for the Argentine or a lesser-developed 
African country,” but completely inappropriate for Britain’s “sophisticated monetary system.”35
Despite mounting speculating in the press and in the House that the IMF would impose strict 
conditions in return for the money, the reality was that the British deftly handled the IMF’s 
31 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p204 
32 Glen O’ Hara “The Limits of US Power: Transatlantic Financial Diplomacy under the Johnson and Wilson 
Administrations, October 1964–November 1968” Contemporary European History (2003) Vol. 12 (3) p 260 
33 TNA T328/92 "Draft Letter of Intent" 20 November 1967 
34 TNA T328/92 "Outline of Draft Letter of Intent" 19 November 1967 
35 TNA T328/92 "Letter from D. F. Hubback to E. W Maude" 24 November 1967; TNA T328/92 "Note on 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Borrowing Requirement. Hubback to Maude" 24 November 1967 
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objections to its policy mix and minimised the degree of conditionality attached to the support. 36 A 
nominal commitment to reducing the borrowing requirement to £1bn was presented to parliament 
as an “estimate on how policy would evolve,” and did not constitute a ceiling on government 
borrowing.37 Following the new Chancellor Roy Jenkins’ statement on the matter on 30 November, 
his opposite number on the Conservative benches Ian Macleod concurred in this view:  "we 
recognise that there are nothing so crude as conditions attached to this,” to which Jenkins replied: 
"in spite of misleading reports to contrary, the Fund has not attached conditions to this credit."38 The 
IMF board considered the standby on 29 November, making it both the quickest ever negotiated as 
well as the largest.39 As Harold James has noted, the ease with which Britain secured funding 
aroused the ire of other countries, particularly less developed countries which were subject to much 
greater conditionality.40
The reality was that unlike those countries Britain was systemically important enough for easy credit 
to be in the interest of the wider international community – too big to fail in today’s parlance. 
Despite a gruelling six hour briefing in front of the OECD’s committee on monetary reform (Working 
Party No.3) on the 30th, during which the British delegation came under a “barrage of questioning,” 
this view was ultimately endorsed. 41  Britain defended its right to raise its public borrowing that 
might result from an increase in investment in the nationalised industries, which in other countries 
would entail private companies raising money directly from the markets and would not show up on 
the government’s balance sheet.42 In addition to the IMF money, the world’s major central banks, 
36 Financial Times 25 November 1967; TNA T328/92 "Telegram from UK Director of IMF to Foreign Office" 27 
November 1967 
37 TNA T328/92 "Publication of Letter of Intent" 30 November 1967 
38 Hansard HC Deb 05 December 1967 Vol. 755 c. 1175 
39 Margaret de Vries The International Monetary Fund 1966-1971 The System Under Stress Vol.1 (Washington 
DC: IMF, 1979) p343 
40 James International Monetary Cooperation p190 
41 Financial Times 30 November 1967 
42 TNA T328/92 "WP3 Introductory Speaking Notes for Sir Denis Rickett" 28 November 1967 
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operating through the Bank of International Settlements in Basle put a further $1.5bn at Britain’s 
disposal at the end of November.43
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1971 Annual Report (Washington D.C: IMF, 1971) p30
Source: Margaret de Vries, The International Monetary Fund 1966-1971 The System Under Stress Vol. 1 Narrative (Washington DC: IMF, 
1976) p330
As figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate, the threat that a sterling crisis might escalate into one that could 
bring down the entire Bretton Woods system meant support to ensure the defence of the post 
43 Toniolo Central Bank Cooperation at the BIS p399 
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devaluation parity was forthcoming on easy terms. Such an interpretation was later endorsed by the 
Fund’s Managing Director, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. Although he claimed, “the Fund always observed 
the principle that those policies and practices must be applied to all members in an impartial 
manner,” he nevertheless recognised that Britain constituted a special case, a “situation of 
extraordinary importance,” which, if left unresolved threatened to undermine the entire Bretton 
Woods system.44
In summary, Labour was able to secure financial support for devaluation on more generous terms 
that would be available to other currencies due to the systematic importance of sterling to the 
world’s monetary system. The true cost was in a renewed commitment, even stronger than made in 
1964, to rule out adjustment using the exchange rate. To do so, it was feared, would be to provoke 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and with it the prospect of export-led growth. As such, 
adjustment was sought in alternative ways.  
4.3: Government Expenditure Debates November 1967 – April 1968  
The change in parity restored competitiveness to sterling, but this was not enough to bring about a 
surplus in the current account and stability in the currency markets. In the short run, the devaluation 
worsened the current account by making standing orders for imports more expensive and those for 
exports cheaper.  This process was christened the J-curve as the current account deficit initially 
deteriorated before eventually improving (in the shape of a J).45 According to the Keynesian 
absorption approach to the balance of payments developed in the 1950s, under a full employment 
economy there had to be some reduction in domestic demand to free up resources going into 
exports.46 Thus although devaluation meant excessive deflation required to defend the old rate had 
been avoided, there was nothing automatic about the return to surplus and stability.  
44 TNA T328/92 "Managing Director's Statement on UK Stand By Agreement" 29 November 1969 
45 Anthony G. Webber “International Exchange Rate Movements and their Effects on Prices, Balance of 
Payments, Output and Employment” in Amnon Levy (ed.) Handbook on the Globalization of the World 
Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998) p535 
46Thirlwall & Gibson Balance of Payments p152 
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Britain had, for the most part, resisted the IMF’s attempts to impose conditionality or oversight to 
the standby agreed at the end of 1967. However, the government recognised the need to free up 
resources to move into the export sector. As we have seen, O’Brien had criticised the domestic 
measures accompanying devaluation as insufficient to restore confidence. On 16 January 1968, as 
well as announcing the decision to accelerate the withdrawal east of Suez (see below), Wilson also 
unveiled a round of further expenditure cuts, including such items of totemic importance to the 
Labour party as the reintroduction of prescription charges and the postponement of raising the 
school leaving age to 16.47 It was not enough. In anticipation of further increases in taxation to be 
announced later that year, a consumer boom had emerged as shoppers attempted to “beat the 
budget.” Shortly after taking helm at the Treasury, Callaghan’s successor Roy Jenkins had defended 
the decision not to move more decisively on restricting domestic consumption. “We do not want to 
dig a hole and leave it empty. We want it to be there only when export demand is ready to fill it.” 
This, he later admitted, had been a mistake.48 Jenkins did however bring forward his budget from 
April to March in response to the febrile atmosphere of an international crisis in the gold market 
(see below). The result was a decisive end to the boom, the Chancellor delivered the most 
deflationary budget since the war, increasing taxation by £923 million. 49
Simultaneously, Labour took the momentous decision to accelerate the withdrawal of Britain’s 
military commitments in South East Asia – the so-called ‘east of Suez’ bases. Although the Suez Canal 
itself had long since fallen from British influence, the ongoing presence in the region was valued by 
the United States as contributing to holding back Communist incursion. Nevertheless, in the post-
devaluation re-appraisal of Britain’s place in the world, it was decided that this role could no longer 
47 Stewart, Politics and Economic Policy in the UK Since 1964 p88 
48 The Times 13 March 1968; at the time Jenkins had defended the decision not to deflate the economy in 1967 
but subsequently came to view it as “dangerous nonsense”, see Roy Jenkins A Life at the Centre (London: 
Papermac, 1994) pp. 352 - 353
49 The Times 20 March 1968 
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be afforded. The withdrawal demonstrated a decisiveness on the part of Labour, showing that they 
could move against American interests, albeit within the context of the defence of Bretton Woods.  
The military commitment was a major cause of Britain’s external deficits and hence sterling’s 
instability. As Jim Tomlinson has argued, throughout the Wilson period the private sector 
comfortably paid its way in the world but the overall external account was dragged into deficit by 
government overseas spending, of which the military presence was the most notable expense.50
Reducing these commitments seemed an obvious economy to make within the post-devaluation 
round of government spending cuts but this decision was complicated by the relationship with the 
Americans. They had previously constituted an important source of leverage over a United States 
increasingly anxious about the ‘Domino Theory’ of communist incursion and which feared losing the 
region. A widely held view was that some form of quid pro quo had been established in which Britain 
would maintain its east of Suez presence in return for American financial support. D. B. Kunz has 
asserted that support for the sterling throughout the 1960s was tied to the maintenance of these 
commitments, but Saki Dockrill has shown that the link was never formalised, as the Americans 
feared assuming responsibility for all of sterling’s liabilities if they pressed too hard on the defence-
sterling link.51
As Dean had noted in his New Year’s message, Washington was hoping for a British presence east of 
Suez until the mid-70s, by which time it was anticipated the Vietnam war would have been won.52
However, British and American security interests had diverged. Following the end of the Malayan 
‘Emergency’ (like Vietnam, never officially a war), there was less need for a military presence in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, while the threat to sterling because of these commitments had increased. 53
50 Jim Tomlinson The Labour Governments 1964- 1970 Vol. 3 Economic Policy (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004) p14 
51 D.B. Kunz, `Somewhat mixed up together: Anglo-American Defence and Financial Policy during the 1960s', 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, (1999) Vol. 27, (2) pp.213-232; Saki Dockrill Britain’s Retreat 
East of Suez The Choice Between Britain and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) pp. 120 -121  
52 TNA PREM 13/3551 Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office 004” 01 January 1968 
53 Dockrill Britain’s Retreat East of Suez p121 
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In the summer of 1967, a defence review had planned a timetable for withdrawal whereby it was 
anticipated that the British presence would be halved by 1971, followed by full withdrawal in 1976.54
However, the need to secure sterling following devaluation meant this timetable was accelerated. 
On the 4 January 1968 the decision was taken to complete the withdrawal by the end of 1971, with 
the Cabinet giving its assent to the idea that "our standing in the world depended on the soundness 
of our economy and not on our worldwide military presence.”55 Announcing the decision to the 
public later that month, the new Chancellor Roy Jenkins argued the decision would 
cut us free of one of the most crippling legacies of our past – the attempt to 
maintain great power status on the basis of a medium power economy.56
As Figure 4.4 shows, collectively the measures resulted in a more significant shift in public borrowing 
relative to GDP than occurred during the contentious IMF debates in 1976, involving a more 
extensive reduction in dependence on foreign borrowing, albeit from a lower base and at a time of 
growth in the global economy. This demonstrates the commitment of Labour to securing success in 
its post-devaluation strategy of export-led growth within a reformed Bretton Woods. It also however 
demonstrates the severity of the constraint imposed by the commitment to Bretton Woods 
provisions given that in other fundamentals, affecting sterling’s creditworthiness such as control of 
the money supply and inflation, Britain’s performance was better during this time than later.57 It 
therefore placed a heavy burden on economic diplomacy to secure a lasting improvement in 
Britain’s external relationship with the international monetary system, notably the sterling balances.  
54 John Darwin The Empire Project The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830 - 1970 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) p645  
55 TNA CAB 128/43 “Conclusions of a Meeting” 4 January 1968 
56 The Times 01 October 1967 
57  Luca Benati, “Evolving Post-World War II U.K. Economic Performance” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
(2004) Vol. 36 (4) p708 
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Source: Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 1984 Q4 “Funding the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 1952-83” 
4.4: Anglo-American Relations November 1967 – April 1968  
The decision to withdraw militarily east of Suez has generally been taken as a turning point in the so-
called ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America.58 This interpretation however overlooks a 
strong commonality of interest between the two powers in seeking to defend and reform Bretton 
Woods. Despite the occasionally frosty relationship between Wilson and President Johnson, 
cooperation over monetary reform was effectively compartmentalised from conflict over military 
burden sharing. Although support for sterling in the post-devaluation period was mediated through 
58 Roy argues that following the resolution of the Gold crisis in March 1968, the United States displayed 
“considerably less interest and sympathy” for sterling now that it could no longer be considered the dollar’s 
first line of defence, see Rajarshi Roy “The battle of the Pound : the Political Economy of Anglo-American 
relations 1964-1968” (Unpublished PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000) 
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international institutions like the IMF and BIS, the US remained the key source of support and 
influence.  
In its defence of sterling therefore, Labour sought to align with the US as much as possible, 
highlighting their common identity as weak reserve currencies and mutual interest in liquidity and 
adjustment reform. The commitment of the US under the Johnson administration to a reformed 
Bretton Woods meant sterling’s instability became a source of leverage. In the immediate aftermath 
of devaluation, Wilson talked up this interaction, noting in a telegram to Johnson that, providing the 
balance of payments could at last be restored to a sustainable surplus, Britain would continue to 
maintain her military presence in Europe.59 Wilson also argued devaluation would provide for long 
term stability for Bretton Woods: 
This misery of the abscess which breaks out, is temporarily healed, then breaks out 
again. Each of us has shrunk from having the tooth pulled out. But when we finally 
decided to do so, the feeling of relief is not simply an illusion. The removal of a 
certain poison from the system purges the whole system itself.60
The initial American reaction to the east of Suez withdrawal was ambiguous. The Foreign Secretary 
George Brown returned from the US having been berated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk who had 
rhetorically demanded “act like Britain.”61 Two diarists of the Labour government recall Johnson 
objecting to the policy, sending a telegram which, according to Tony Benn, “warned us in the 
strongest terms that this would be a catastrophic decision.”62
When Johnson and Wilson came face to face in February however, the issue appeared to have been 
dropped. The President was more concerned with Bretton Woods than the Far East, reading from a 
paper “in Rooseveltian terms” about the potential danger of the rise of protectionism in fostering 
59 TNA PREM 13/1447 "Telegram from Wilson to Johnson" 17 November 1967 
60 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p181 
61 Dominic Sandbrook, White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties 1964 – 1970 (London: Penguin, 
2009) p509 
62 Tony Benn Office Without Power Diaries 1968 - 72 (London: Hutchinson, 1988) p17; Richard Crossman The 
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Vol. 2 Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966 – 
68 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976) p650 
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economic and political instability. Wilson disagreed with the contention that they were on the verge 
of a revival of inter-war protectionism but eagerly agreed with one idea: that since the pound and 
dollar were linked it was in America’s self-interest to support sterling.63 According to the British 
record of the meeting, Johnson made no attempt to discuss the decision to withdraw east of Suez. 
As Wilson confided to the Canadian Prime Minister (the next stop on his tour), the only time the east 
of Suez had come up during his stay in Washington was when a distinguished American baritone had 
sung “Road to Mandalay” at a White House dinner. Wilson had been at pains to stress Britain had 
left Mandalay some twenty years previously.64 Perhaps because he felt he had let Wilson off the 
hook, Johnson subsequently made some negative comments about Wilson in an interview with The 
Times.65
Disagreement also emerged over American policies to defend Bretton Woods. In a bid to restrict US 
capital outflow, Johnson announced a series of measures on New Year’s Day which restricted foreign 
investment and lending by American corporations and banks, while appealing to ordinary Americans 
to avoid non-essential travel abroad.66 This policy was somewhat unwelcome to the British. Although 
Under Secretary of State Nick Katzenbach stressed the preferential treatment for the UK, by 
permitting 65% of the level of capital transfers in 65/66, Wilson complained that the base year had 
been poorly chosen as America had made virtually no investment in the UK that year.67 Despite 
Wilson’s concerns over the American measures, they were designed to shore up confidence in the 
dollar. This commitment to Bretton Woods on the part of the Americans therefore implicitly 
supported the British strategy of adjusting to surplus within the stable, open, multilateral trading 
and monetary order it provided. It stands in stark contrast to the measures unveiled by Nixon in 
63 TNA PREM 13/2455 "Record of a Conversation between the PM and the President at the White House" 08 
February 1968 
64 TNA PREM 13/3551 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the PM of Canada” 10 February 
1968 
65 TNA FCO 7/857 "Heren's Article in The Times of 23 February" 24 February 1968; The Times 24 February 1968 
66 The Times 02 January 1968 
67 TNA FCO 59/194 "Note of a Meeting" 02 January 1968; TNA FCO 59/194 "Record of an Informal Discussion 
Between the Prime Minister and Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach at Chequers" 06 January 1968 
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August 1971, notably the 10% import surcharge and the breaking of the gold-dollar convertibility 
which fatally undermined the monetary system, if not the liberal trading order that had developed 
alongside it. Therefore, notwithstanding the disagreements between London and Washington over 
their respective New Year measures, this joint commitment to Bretton Woods provided the basis for 
ongoing cooperation, particularly with regards to its reform. This is of key importance in 
understanding the ongoing British commitment to Bretton Woods, since it was felt that only within 
the context of a generalised reform to the system’s provision liquidity (backed by American influence 
and resources) would Britain be able to deal with the problem caused the sterling balances.   
4.5: Liquidity Reform and the March 1968 Gold Crisis  
Although sterling was stabilised following devaluation by the IMF money and subsequent spending 
measures, a new crisis soon destabilised the currency in the first months of 1968. Although centred 
on the dollar’s relationship to gold (hence becoming known as the Gold Crisis), sterling was directly 
involved as markets bet on a second devaluation. The crisis and the ongoing debate over liquidity 
reform in which it took place demonstrated the extent to which stability of sterling was inherently 
linked to the stability of the wider monetary system. However direction of influence could run both 
ways. While sterling was impacted by events largely outside the control of policymakers in London 
(as speculators bet that the official dollar-gold price would soon be changed), in which commitment 
to the new sterling parity constrained policy, the danger of a second devaluation meant further 
short term support was available on easy terms from an American administration similarly 
committed to defending Bretton Woods.  
Before analysing the Gold Crisis, it is important to situate it within the context of the ongoing debate 
over liquidity reform. International monetary diplomacy since the mid-1960s had been attempting to 
defuse the ticking time bomb of an increasingly untenable official gold price of $35. Progress was 
accelerated in response to the crisis of March 1968. This debate, which continued over the entire 
period of this thesis, centred on the role of gold in international payments. It was one in which 
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Britain had direct interest given sterling’s role in the monetary system yet struggled to make an 
impact. Nevertheless, it is important to understand given that how changes in the world’s monetary 
system over the next ten years directly impacted the British ability to negotiate the external 
constraint.  
Concerns over a looming liquidity shortage had been growing since 1965 as private demand for gold 
grew, putting pressure on the official price and the resources of the gold pool cartel set up to 
manage it. Growth in foreign exchange reserves also slowed down.68 In response, Johnson 
announced in 1966 that he wanted to achieve reform to liquidity before the IMF Annual Meeting in 
September 1967.69 The French took the role of America’s principal antagonists and interlocutors in 
demanding a return to a system more fully based on gold. This reflected both the French preference 
for the metal as well as the suspicion that the dollar based system gave the US an unfair 
advantage.70 In response to concerns about a growing liquidity shortage, they argued liquidity could 
be increased through a revaluation of gold’s official price (while incidentally benefiting their sizable 
holdings).71 Although some doubts were being expressed privately in Washington about the wisdom 
of resorting to excessive measures domestically to supply the French with gold at $35 per ounce, the 
official American line opposed a rise in the gold price, declaring it in January 1968 as “completely 
unacceptable.”72 The US wished to phase out gold for official monetary payments, viewing the 
commitment to honour officially held dollars for gold as a constraint on their own monetary policy, 
and feared that while it would take some pressure off the dollar in the short term, merely raising the 
price would ultimately entrench its role.  
For Britain, a major reason for the commitment to Bretton Woods and the constraint this imposed 
on sterling policy was the prospect of international reform that would alleviate sterling from the 
68 de Vries System Under Stress p401 
69 TNA T312/1735 “Memo from J. M. Stevens to Sir William Armstrong” 08 February 1967 
70 Harold James International Monetary Cooperation p169 
71 Christopher S. Chivvis “Charles de Gaulle, Jacques Rueff and French International Monetary Policy under 
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burden of its international role. In a reiteration of Keynes’ proposals in 1944 for an International 
Clearing Union, the British advocated a new reserve unit, issued by the IMF which would be available 
to countries unconditionally while also directly transferable between central banks (to avoid political 
interference from the Fund). This however was unacceptable to the French who viewed the proposal 
as an attempt by deficit economies to more easily appropriate the savings of surplus ones. In 
response they proposed a much more limited and conditional form of ‘drawing rights’ on the Fund’s 
existing resources. Summing up the differences and implications for domestic policy, one Treasury 
paper noted: 
A Drawing Right is inevitably regarded as a right to incur a liability… a sense of being 
beholden to an outside institution remains and must produce a different mental 
attitude from that of someone who has spent an asset. The spender of the asset may 
be resolved to recover his asset again, in the same way as he would be resolved to 
pay off a drawing, but he would remain his own master meanwhile.73
A recurring theme of these debates was however the moderation of British influence in an attempt 
to conserve political capital for other ends. At the time of this initial debate in March 1967, Britain’s 
second application to join the EEC meant advocacy for a new reserve unit could not be pushed too 
far without jeopardising the relationship with the French upon which the (ultimately doomed) 
application depended.74 The Americans however, also in favour of a reserve unit, lobbied hard those 
members of the EEC it perceived as sympathetic.75 At a meeting of EEC deputies in April 1967, the 
Dutch, Germans and Italians came out in favour of a radical form of drawing right, similar in all main 
respects to the unit (in that it was unconditional and directly transferable), but the French remained 
adamantly opposed.76 In compromise, the official European line settled on proposing new automatic 
drawing rights, albeit with tightened conditions and a European veto over their activation.77
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At meetings in May and June of the leading industrialised economies – the Group of Ten [G10]  - 
agreement was reached that the new reserve facility would be based on a gold value guarantee and 
earn interest while the amounts created would depend on the IMF Managing Director’s assessment 
of the world’s need for liquidity over five year periods.78 The language involved a delicate 
compromise with the final unit known as Special Drawing Rights [SDRs], aiming to act as a 
“supplement to existing reserve assets” rather than as a replacement for them.79 One particular 
sticking point was “reconstitution” – how long rights could be drawn upon before being repaid. The 
French were insistent on this point since, in their view, the new unit was a credit not a reserve, while 
the Americans correctly feared that placing restrictions on the new asset would prevent its use. A 
compromise was reached in which participants agreed that over the first five year period 
participants would not draw more than 70% of its allocation.80 At French insistence, issuance of SDRs 
would require the support of 85% of the Fund’s voting power, giving the EEC an effective veto.81 The 
resolution for SDRs was agreed in September at the Fund’s 1967 Annual Meeting in Rio de Janeiro 
which requested the Fund’s staff to propose the amendments to the Fund’s articles that would 
provide for the new facility. However, disagreement remained, with Callaghan and Henry Fowler, 
the US Secretary of the Treasury announcing their intention to treat SDRs as “front line reserves” 
while the French representative Debre argued they only amounted to an extension of the Fund’s line 
of credit.82
Thus at the same time as Britain was descending into the 1967 devaluation crisis, meaningful 
progress was being made on reforms with the potential to alleviate the sterling balance problem. 
This justified the post-devaluation commitment to Bretton Woods. However devaluation itself also 
intensified concerns over liquidity as speculators began to bet against the dollar through buying 
78 Ibid p151 
79 Ibid p155 
80 Ibid p158 
81 Harold James International Monetary Cooperation p170 
82 de Vries System Under Stress p159 
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gold, driving up the price and testing the commitment of the members of Gold Pool to its defence. 
Charles Coombs of the New York Fed had previously described sterling and gold as “twin time 
bombs: if one exploded, the other would explode as well.”83 Demand for gold had been so high 
during and immediately after the sterling crisis in November 1967 that the Fed was forced to airlift 
gold into London to maintain the price at $35 per ounce.84 The Americans remained committed to 
the Gold Pool, whereby leading central banks cooperatively intervened in the gold markets to 
manage the price, as a vital defence of Bretton Woods. On 24 November, the Chairman of the Fed 
William McChesney Martin phoned O’Brien requesting the British put out a declaration defending 
the official price. Jenkins understood that it would be American support that would keep Britain 
afloat during the crucial transitional period while her balance of payments moved into surplus but 
was wary of appearing as America’s only supporter in the face of a hostile EEC (although this concern 
became somewhat academic three days later when De Gaulle vetoed Britain’s second application).85
Further cajoling from Washington drew together a communique from the members of the Gold Pool 
in Frankfurt on 26 November.86
By early December markets had calmed down but the Treasury remained concerned about the risk 
to sterling from a crisis in the gold markets. A much-circulated paper “Gold and the Dollar” proposed 
that the underlying instability of the Bretton Woods system in recent years lay not in the balance of 
payments difficulties of any particular country but in a systemic imbalance between “one half of the 
world’s economy and the other,” which the world’s monetary system in its existing form was unable 
to correct. According to this thesis, the continental Europeans and their apparently perpetual 
surpluses were as much to blame as Britain and the US for monetary instability.87
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Given the dollar’s privileged position within Bretton Woods as the only currency linked to gold, 
speculating on a rise in the price of gold was the main means of shorting the dollar. A break between 
the two was therefore the most likely outcome of America failing to restore its external account to 
surplus and/or reform of Bretton Wood’s provisions on adjustment and liquidity. The Treasury paper 
was candidly open about how little influence Britain would have over the outcome of a break 
between gold and the dollar. “A good deal would depend on whether we were in the Common 
market or not,” the paper concluded, expecting that Britain would be part of a gold based bloc likely 
to appreciate against the dollar if in, while finding themselves under American “power and influence 
with a dollar standard” if not.88
The British position was complicated by the existence of large, gold guaranteed debts to the IMF. As 
one Treasury paper noted, rather than profiting from a rise in its gold holdings (as France would), 
Britain would be at risk of a large increase in its liabilities.89 With this in mind, O’Brien had responded 
to Martin’s request for Britain to further increase its commitment to the Gold Pool by sounding out 
if the Americans would be prepared to support the British in respect of her gold guaranteed 
liabilities should the gold price of the dollar be raised – something that was then commonly 
expected to be by as much as 100%. After forwarding the request on to Fowler, the US Treasury 
Secretary stated he could not recognise it since he “could not admit such a possibility” as a change in 
the price of gold.90 Ultimately the precariousness of the British situation and the uncertainty of what 
support would be forthcoming in event of a rupture imposed a conservatism on the British outlook 
and an inclination to maintain as much of the present system as possible in the short term, while 
working towards progress on monetary reform in the medium term.91
Speculation in gold markets was given added impetus by the comments of leading officials. Otmar 
Emminger of the German Bundesbank questioned the wisdom of providing gold to speculators at 
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artificially low rates and waxed lyrical at a speech in February 1968 on the prospective diminution of 
gold’s role in the system from the “sovereign of sovereigns” to a mere “constitutional monarch.”92
Shortly after this speech, the US Senator Howard Jarvis called for an end to gold convertibility and 
profligate government spending, a comment which sparked heavy buying in the gold market.93
Within the Johnson administration itself, Fowler’s advisory committee had already determined the 
solution to the crisis. Unanimously rejecting a rise in the price, they inclined rather to separate the 
private and public gold markets with the private price being determined by supply and demand 
while the public price would remain fixed at $35 per ounce. It was hoped that the measures, 
combined with a stringent domestic tax hike, would buy time for the Americans to restore their 
monetary arrangements to a more sustainable footing.94
On 8 March, while Fowler was meeting his advisory committee, the London gold market witnessed 
the heaviest demand for gold since the devaluation of sterling the previous November.95 Although 
when he called on Martin on 13 March, O’Brien found the Americans apparently determined to go 
on as before, the following day Fowler called Jenkins and requested that the London gold market be 
closed the next day. A conference in Washington was hastily arranged to consider the international 
response to the crisis.96
While the threat to the dollar could be contained through splitting the public and private gold 
markets, this would not solve sterling’s now precarious position. By the time of the Washington 
conference the crisis had reached an acute stage for the British who faced the very real possibility 
that their reserves would be exhausted within a matter of days. A humiliating second devaluation 
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beckoned. Potentially they would not even be able to wait until an American decision to change the 
gold price, still the British expectation of American policy, demonstrating how despite their 
combined commitment to Bretton Woods, Anglo-American negotiations did not form the basis for 
policy formulation, limiting British influence. As a memo for the Prime Minister noted:  
While it would be quite acceptable to act in unison with the dollar, a second sterling 
crisis before a dollar crisis would represent a political catastrophe of major 
proportions.97
Later in the evening of 14 March, O’Brien called Martin to tell him that the British were prepared to 
declare the next day, a Friday, hence closing both the gold and exchange markets and taking the 
pressure off sterling. In return, the British wanted an American commitment to support sterling in 
the New York currency markets which would still be open. The alternative was to “let the rate go.”98
In return, Martin told his opposite number that the Americans were considering withdrawing from 
the Gold Pool and separating private and public gold markets.  
Although not confident that the policy would be a success, Jenkins recognised that given the 
weakness of the British economy and sterling’s reliance on American support meant the British 
negotiating team they had “little, if any” influence over the American decision to establish a two-tier 
gold market.99 Contingency planning in the Treasury considered Britain’s options if support for 
sterling was not forthcoming. Guarantees to sterling holders or blocking the sterling balances were 
considered but floating looked the most likely outcome. A pre-emptive float was ruled out in that it 
would undermine the forthcoming budget and because Britain lacked the resources to prevent the 
rate plummeting downwards.100 The British were concerned that the Americans would be too 
preoccupied with the establishment of the dual market to pay much attention to sterling. As such, 
the only practical policy was to draw attention to the perilous position of sterling and the threat this 
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posed to Bretton Woods in the hope that this would prompt fresh international support to tide 
Britain over the crisis. The Treasury considered extending the Bank Holiday to the following Monday 
and Tuesday in the hope this would draw attention to the severity of sterling’s plight to those in 
Washington with the resources to help.101 On the evening of 14 March, Wilson sent Johnson a 
telegram outlining the precariousness of sterling’s position: 
I fully recognise the need for you to take urgent action almost certainly tonight, not 
only in your interests but in ours and indeed of the world. What is important is that 
the action taken must be one which holds our two nations together. …If in the 
interests of urgency and speed you take a decision which puts us at immediate risk it 
is vital that we are covered by you during the days immediately ahead. Otherwise 
both currencies will go. Alternatively, we would have to take urgent action to protect 
ourselves which could only have the effect of dumping the whole burden back on 
the dollar.102
Meanwhile in Washington, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury William Armstrong confirmed 
that the dual price system appeared to be “the only runner”, but that the Governor of the Bank of 
England had succeeded in drawing attention to the special status of sterling at this critical juncture. 
Armstrong hoped to get an extra $5bn of support on top of existing lines of credit and 
recommended backing the Americans’ dual market system in return for such support.103 After 
speaking to Armstrong the next day, Jenkins reported back to his Cabinet colleagues on the progress 
of the British delegation. Armstrong now reported that the likely amount of fresh support for 
sterling would be $2.2bn, bringing total available credit including existing lines of support up to 
$5bn. Later that day Armstrong told Jenkins negotiations were now at a crunch point and that total 
support would likely be $1bn short of the $5bn figure.104  In the end, the British delegation was 
successful in only gaining new support of $1.75bn, although when added to unused central bank 
facilities and IMF lines of credit it totalled a more press friendly figure of $4bn.105
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The significance of the gold crisis has been recently reappraised. Oliver and Hamilton describe the 
gold crisis having “the potential to be the most severe sterling debacle of the post-war era,” as 
Labour struggled with the implications of dwindling reserves and considered such extreme resorts as 
floating the currency, blocking the sterling balances and initiating a ‘siege economy’ involving 
extensive controls on trade and payments.106 By March 1968 reserves were so low that serious 
consideration was given to a fundamental break with Bretton Woods.107 However, as Newton 
argues, the danger that such a break with Bretton Woods would result in a return to conditions of 
the 1930s – protectionism, floating, competitive devaluations – meant Labour could use their 
contingency plans for blocking and floating sterling to secure support from the Washington 
conference held in response to the crisis.108 This provided a short term inducement to retain the 
commitment to Bretton Woods while reforms to liquidity progressed.   
While this strategy was successful as sterling navigated the gold crisis while maintaining the 
commitment to the post-devaluation parity, it did reveal the dependency of British sterling policy on 
the US, both for short term financial support and influence in monetary reform debates. While the 
revisionist approach praises the ability of Labour to leverage sterling’s weakness to secure 
international support, the danger of constantly talking up British weakness was that it might 
undermine the value of the Anglo-American relationship in American eyes. In a National Security 
Meeting concerning Anglo-American relations in May 1968, the Secretary of State for Defence noted 
“the UK does not have substance, backup, hardware or funds to face up to any big problem in the 
world.”109 According to Roy, the gold crisis marked a turning point in the Anglo-American economic 
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relationship as the Americans became less concerned with sterling now it no longer constituted the 
“front line” defence of the dollar.110
Nevertheless, mutual interest as reserve currencies committed to the defence of Bretton Woods 
resulted in continued cooperation over international reform. This joint Anglo-American approach 
can be seen in the struggle to ratify the SDR, which for Americans considered the next step in 
monetary reform now that the separation of the gold market had bought time. In a ministerial 
meeting of the Group of Ten in Stockholm at the end of March, the British lined up with the 
Americans against the French in pushing for a large and early activation of SDR. According to Jenkins, 
the Stockholm meeting saw the French at their most obstinate, attacking the US’s lax monetary 
policy as the cause of the recent gold crisis and calling immediately for a rise in the price of gold. In a 
message to Wilson, Jenkins described Debre, the French Finance Minister as 
Clearly determined at this stage to stand out on every point, even where he was 
totally without support: his interventions were frequent, often lengthy, sometimes 
brutally offensive, but always highly elegant and articulate.111
Despite the French obstructionism, the delegates at Stockholm agreed to amend the main IMF 
articles to allow the issue of SDRs if and when the scheme was activated. Debre, who had spent 
most of the time criticising the proposals as contrary to the agreement reached the previous 
November in Rio (arguing it was a credit rather than asset), was placated in the communique by the 
concession that SDRs would be activated only after a collective judgement that “there was a global 
need to supplement reserves"112
The British and the Americans therefore maintained a cooperative and productive relationship in the 
field of international monetary reform, which enabled the British to present their demands for fresh 
support as a necessary part of achieving a more stable system. Activation of the SDR would, it was 
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hoped, provide the British with another source of finance with which to manage the problem of the 
sterling balances. Despite concern over the balance of payments in the short term, the outcome of 
the Stockholm conference permitted some optimism about the future of Bretton Woods in the 
medium term. These sentiments were shared in Washington where Johnson’s adviser Rostow 
argued the outcome of the Washington conference and agreement in Stockholm constituted the 
“building blocks in the development of a stronger monetary system.”113
Despite British attempts however the was little appetite for linking expansion of international 
liquidity with resolution of sterling’s status as an international currency. The hope of the Wilson 
government was that the long-term prospects of Bretton Woods involved transitioning to a system 
based on SDR with gold becoming a subsidiary rather than a reserve asset. Wilson’s advisor Nicholas 
Kaldor thought it possible that the IMF might become the monopoly buyer and seller of gold, 
gradually phasing it out as a means of international payments with SDRs becoming the exclusive 
means of settling trade imbalances. For Kaldor, this meant “we should gradually be able to escape 
from the burdens and dangers inherent in our reserve currency status.”114
However, the objection of the French indicated the difficulty in using the SDR to effect a meaningful 
resolution to the sterling overhang. Against the background of disappointing trade figures, Jenkins 
met with his senior advisors to outline the prospects for the monetary system. Two possible 
outcomes were delineated. On the one hand, the American tax increase would cool down the 
overheating domestic economy, while a reduction in capital outflow would likewise help stabilise the 
overall American balance of payments. The dollar would strengthen and speculation over gold would 
lessen thus improving the prospects for Bretton Woods. Alternatively, a revival of speculation would 
see traders moving out of dollars and sterling and into gold and the stronger European currencies. 
This would not lead to immediate demonetisation of gold on the American part, rather a suspension 
113 FRUS 1964 – 68 Vol. 8 “Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President 
Johnson” 02 April 1968 
114 TNA T312/2139 “The Price of Gold" 02 April 1968 
88 
of gold sales. In this pessimistic (and ultimately correct) outcome the British would be in a position of 
gloomy impotence with the French, Germans and Americans determining the future course of 
Bretton Woods.115 Despite some progress, the uncertainty of Bretton Woods reform therefore 
meant the stability of sterling could not be assured in the short term.  
4.6: The Second Group Arrangement March 1968 – September 1968
With the future availability of SDRs unclear given French opposition to activation, Britain was 
prompted to look for a specific solution tailored towards the holders of the sterling balances. As 
Figure 4.5 shows, reductions in reserves held in sterling contributed almost as much as the current 
account to Britain’s deficit in 1967 and exceeded it in 1968 as sterling balance holders responded to 
devaluation and the weakening of defence links between Britain and the OSA.  
Source: Central Statistical Office United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1964 – 1974 (London: HMSO, 1975) Table 1.3 “Analysis of Capital 
Transactions and Official Financing” p11 
The result, as shown above in Figure 4.1, was a reduction in the level of balances held as exchange 
reserves by official monetary institutions. Given the later commitment of Labour government to end 
sterling’s reserve role this would seem to be a step in the right direction. However, the prioritisation 
given to defending and reforming Bretton Woods meant that diversification threatened to 
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undermine Britain’s ability to maintain sterling’s post-devaluation exchange rate peg. Britain 
therefore looked to secure a further support line tailored toward financing prospective 
diversification.  
While a previous arrangement in 1966 had provided funding to enable sterling to deal with 
fluctuations arising from NSA holders, the Bank of England had been pushing for a more 
comprehensive package aimed at the members of the OSA. Accordingly, the Bank of England began 
discussions with the BIS at the beginning of 1968 about a medium-term financing facility to offset 
anticipated diversification by OSA holders.116 This approach was however rooted in the Bank of 
England’s continued preference for maintaining sterling as a reserve currency. Fforde of the Bank 
believed the loan would help preserve sterling’s role as a reserve currency and even made the case 
that sterling’s international role could be beneficial in the context of the EEC, although conceded this 
was an “unfashionable” view.117
The Bank of England’s approach was based on the belief that the BIS would prove more “accessible” 
and flexible in its provision of credit in support of the balances than the IMF. Following the 
Washington conference in March 1968 which formally separated the public and private gold 
markets, the Bank intensified efforts to come to an arrangement with the BIS on a medium-term 
credit. On 12 May, the Bank submitted proposals to the BIS requesting a $2bn credit line which could 
be drawn in response to OSA diversification over the next three years, but this did not generate 
much enthusiasm in Basle. Instead, the European members required greater commitment from the 
Bank of England, in the form of guarantees on the exchange value of OSA sterling holdings that 
would also prevent diversification, rather than merely financing it.118
Exchange guarantees would involve the UK making payments to sterling holders if the value of 
sterling dropped below an agreed rate. Both the Bank and Treasury were unenthusiastic but 
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recognised that the strength of feeling among European central banks meant they were necessary to 
move forward with the scheme. Accordingly, the Bank of England offered a dollar guarantee on the 
value of OSA sterling holdings above 10% of their total reserves.119 The BIS also wanted the OSA 
countries themselves to contribute to the arrangement, since they after all would be the main 
beneficiaries of greater stability in the value of their exchange reserves. The OSA deposited some of 
their non-sterling reserves with the BIS to increase liquidity for the $2bn facility for sterling 
(although as this was arranged through the BIS in the form of swap agreements with the world’s 
leading central banks, they did not assume any risk). In addition, Britain committed to negotiating 
with the OSA members individually to establish the amount of sterling each member would hold as a 
proportion of their total of reserves – known as minimum sterling proportions [MSPs]. Together with 
the exchange guarantees, the MSPs reduced the likelihood of the facility being drawn on by 
providing powerful incentives for the OSA to keep their foreign exchange holdings in sterling rather 
than diversifying.120
The Second Group Arrangement as it was formally known was approved in Basle in July 1968. As part 
of the deal, the British were committed to negotiate bilateral Sterling Agreements individually with 
members of the OSA. This took place over the summer towards the deadline of September. By then 
the Treasury had negotiated deals with 30 countries, which together constituted 77% of OSA 
holdings.121 These negotiations involved agreeing the level of MSP and the guaranteed exchange rate 
of sterling below which payments would be made from the UK Treasury.122 The level of MSP varied 
between holders, with colonies like Hong Kong committing to holding 99% of their reserves in 
sterling while India, which had already diversified significantly in the immediate post-war period, 
only committed to a 13% MSP.123 Despite a last-minute decision by the Bank of France not to 
119 Ibid, p287 
120 Cappie Bank of England p409 
121 Toniolo Central Bank Cooperation p425 
122 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p292 
123 Ibid. p295 
91 
participate, the second Sterling Group Arrangement was formally announced on 9 September 1968. 
In October, the Bank of England drew $600m which turned out to be the only drawing ever made 
under the arrangement as the British balance of payments and prospects for sterling improved over 
1969 (see below). 
According to the BIS official historian Toniolo,  the arrangement was as a success, marking an 
important contribution to currency stability.124 Edmund Dell is less sure, noting that by guaranteeing 
the OSA the dollar value of their holdings while still paying out a higher interest rate than the dollar 
due to sterling’s increased vulnerability, the arrangement proved an expensive commitment, one 
that led to an increase in sterling holdings rather than a decrease.125 For Catherine Schenk, the 
Sterling Agreements marked a “drastic change in the organisation of the sterling area,” transforming 
the relationship between Britain and the rest of the OSA from a “a voluntary association of states 
that had traditional economic and commercial ties to the UK to a formalised network of bilateral 
contracts between the UK and various members.”126 While incentives based on trade, finance and 
security eroded over the 1960, devaluation had provoked a “profound sense of betrayal” among the 
sterling balance holders whose holdings were now exposed to sterling’s weakness. Now new 
inducements had to be explicitly issued in contracted form to prevent mass diversification before 
any further movement on the exchange rate.127 In Susan Strange’s taxonomy, Sterling had become a 
Negotiated Currency, its continued international use dependent on the incentives to do so on offer 
from the issuing state.  
From the perspective of the 1976 IMF crisis, we can see that the generous terms on offer through 
the Second Group Arrangement began the process of a medium term build up in the sterling 
balances which, when subsequently exacerbated by post OPEC-shock oil producers depositing their 
124 Toniolo Central Bank Cooperation p425 
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earnings in sterling, provided a major driver of crisis in 1976. While both Britain and the wider 
international community were in favour of running down sterling’s international role (particularly 
the prospective European partners who had no desire to assume sterling’s liabilities), paradoxically 
they resisted any meaningful run down in the balances following devaluation.128
Instead, prioritisation was given to defence of Bretton Woods, requiring inducements to holders in 
the form of high interest rates and exchange guarantees so attractive that they facilitated a renewed 
build-up in the levels held. While successful from the perspective of creditors, in that the most of the 
$2bn credit was not in fact drawn upon, given the commitments made by the British, a more 
equitable and satisfactory outcome for sterling would have been to use some of the credit line to 
draw down the sterling balances. 129 While this would not have reduced sterling’s liabilities it would 
have involved some transformation in structure from short to medium term while also preventing 
the build-up among more volatile holders. However, given the reluctance of creditors to see their 
money actually used, this would have involved a longer discussion and potentially more expensive 
commitments on the part of the British. Thus while the scheme helped secure confidence in sterling, 
it did not contribute to the liquidity problem of the sterling overhang. This contrasts with the 1977 
Third Group Arrangement, which included a foreign currency bond offer to facilitate diversification 
and a commitment to prevent future accumulations which resulted in a reduction to working 
balances.  
4.7: 1968 Exchange Crises May 1968 – November 1968
The position of sterling remained perilous throughout 1968 as the balance of payments stubbornly 
resisted efforts to transition to a surplus. This objective had been made harder to achieve due to the 
turmoil afflicting Bretton Woods, itself exacerbated by sterling’s weakness. The Washington 
Conference and the Second Group Arrangement were ad hoc responses to this instability which, it 
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was hoped would buy time for more permanent solutions (such as activation of SDRs) to come into 
effect. However, Bretton Woods’ adjustment mechanism remained a source of instability, as 
revealed by a series of exchange crises in 1968 afflicting the franc and DM which also threatened the 
post-devaluation sterling parity. The cost of Britain’s commitment to Bretton Woods was exposed by 
the inability of the system to effect adjustments without high political drama and consequent crisis 
on the exchanges. Having devalued sterling and committed to the defence of the new parity, British 
competitiveness could only be preserved and improved through the behaviour of other currencies. 
However this required political influence that Britain, dependent on the wider international 
community for financial support, simply did not have. As the exchange crises of 1968 demonstrated, 
they were unable to induce the Germans, French or Americans into their preferred choice of policy.  
The threat of a second devaluation was never far from policy makers’ minds throughout 1968 while 
the external account remained stuck in deficit. A meeting between the US and British Treasuries in 
May in Bologna brought home the precarious nature of sterling. A phone call from Robert Roosa in 
New York informed Denis Rickett of the Treasury of a rumour circulating that the British were 
planning a fresh devaluation of 30%. With classic understatement, Rickett "naturally did no more 
than express mild surprise.” Although it had no basis, as Rickett acknowledged the fact that 
someone of Roosa’s experience and background could give credence to such rumours indicated the 
unstable nature of sterling during this period.130 In June the government decided to draw the IMF 
standby of $1400m made available the previous November to refinance short term debt owed to 
central banks.131
While sterling was coming under suspicion, events in France were taking an even more dramatic 
turn. A series of student protests and general strikes in May had plunged the French economy and 
political scene into crisis, even threatening revolution. In response, de Gaulle had conceded large 
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increases in wages, which the British Treasury estimated would plunge the French balance of 
payments into deficit to the tune of $500m. Currency traders anticipated this by moving from francs 
into Deutschmarks. 132
This movement exposed the shortcomings of the Bretton Woods method of adjustment. The historic 
German fear of inflation meant that under fixed parities the Germans enjoyed an ever-increasing 
competitive advantage over other countries as the real value of their currencies eroded faster than 
the deutschmark. This resulted in enormous external surpluses. As well as resisting revaluation of 
their currency the Germans also resisted any increase in inflation, sterilising the impact of the capital 
inflow on the domestic money supply through selling domestic bonds.133 These contradictions 
resulted in an exchange crisis at the end of 1968 as speculators took advantage of a one-way bet in 
which the Deutschmark could potentially be revalued but had no chance of being devalued.134
These contradictions revealed the cost of Britain’s commitment to Bretton Woods. Labour looked to 
the system to provide a stable external framework that would facilitate the trade upon which they 
relied for export led growth as well as for providing a solution to the long-term sterling balance 
problem. In return Britain received support for sterling but at the cost of a maintaining an exchange 
rate parity that required deflation at home and borrowing abroad. In the zero-sum game of 
competitiveness, revaluations or devaluations on the part of other economies could improve or 
worsen the position of sterling. The main problem was that such adjustments were inherently 
politicised under Bretton Woods, resulting in a cycle of crisis in which heavily publicised summits 
featuring the very heads of government attempted to negotiate new exchange rate parities, feeding 
the sense of uncertainty and provoking yet more speculation on the exchange markets. Britain’s 
commitment to Bretton Woods meant it was trapped in this cycle, unable to float yet marked as a 
weak currency under constant threat from speculation. 
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The farce of Bonn conference in November 1968 revealed the extent of the cost this commitment 
imposed on the British economy, as well the limits to British influence within an extremely 
politicised method of adjustment. The conference attempted a multilateral realignment of the franc 
and DM while preserving stability in the dollar and sterling. For sterling, speculation over the DM 
was immediately damaging by provoking speculation but if the result of the crisis was a revaluation 
this would ultimately improve competitiveness. The actual outcome was the worst of both worlds; a 
damaging exchange crisis in which Germany resisted revaluation.  
Once again, the Labour government looked to leverage their commitment to Bretton Woods as a 
source of influence. Heide-Irene Schmidt considers that despite a wider American reappraisal of the 
British capabilities following the Suez decision, “the Fowler reflex” was to respond to British 
dramatizing of the crisis into a “life or death affair” for Bretton Woods as a whole.135 O’Hara argues 
that the Americans, well aware of British contingency planning for further devaluation or floating, 
could not tolerate this and therefore went along with British pressure on the Germans and the 
French.136 However, the inability of the Labour leadership to align their approach with the Americans 
and the subsequent failure of the conference to effect adjustment on either the French or Germans 
reveals the limited influence Britain had on events at this time. Threats to float sterling were 
received with concern but were not enough to induce favourable changes in policy on foreign 
governments dealing with their own domestic concerns.  
Meeting with representatives of the Treasury and Bank of England on 18 November, Jenkins 
discussed the news from the meeting of central bankers in Basle the previous weekend. The French 
had indicated they were preparing to devalue, almost a year exactly since the sterling devaluation of 
1967. Some in the Treasury argued that British un-competitiveness had been underestimated the 
previous November and that a second devaluation should be considered but Jenkins decided to lean 
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on the Americans, demonstrating his commitment to the stability of Breton Woods. It was therefore 
agreed that Jenkins would inform the Americans that a German revaluation, ideally of 20% but of an 
absolute minimum of 5%, would be necessary to prevent sterling floating in the event of a French 
devaluation.137 The next day Jenkins called Fowler to stress the importance of closing foreign 
exchange markets to buy time for sterling while a solution to the franc/deutschmark crisis was 
found. Fowler agreed that there should be no difficulty in closing the New York market, though 
doubted the Swiss could be persuaded to close theirs.138
On the afternoon of 18 November, O’Brien reported from Basle that although the French did not 
consider themselves to be in fundamental disequilibrium, there had been a flight of capital from 
their reserves which they were not willing to offset through borrowing. The French were pressing for 
a German revaluation of 15% but were willing to share an aggregate adjustment with them through 
a partial devaluation. O’Brien had unveiled the threat of floating sterling and noted it had been 
received with “deep concern.”139 However this was not enough to force the required adjustment. 
Prior to a meeting of the Group of Ten finance ministers on 20 November the Germans pre-empted 
the meeting by releasing a statement on the 19th decisively ruling out any revaluation of the 
deutschmark, proposing instead a border tax adjustment which they claimed would be equivalent to 
a revaluation of 4%.140
At this point the British and American approach to resolving the crisis diverged.  The British believed 
the best course of action would be to force the Germans to change direction; in a telegram to the 
President, Wilson described the French issue as of “secondary problem” which could be contained 
with relative ease.141  Wilson then summoned the German ambassador just after midnight to 
denounce the German measures as “barely a third of what was required” and threatened to 
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withdraw the British military presence in Germany.142 In contrast, Johnson preferred to focus on 
preventing the French from devaluing, believing the “native German dislike of throwing a strong 
financial position,” meant pushing for a German revaluation was a lost cause.143
The actual conference on 20 November appeared to vindicate the President’s approach, but not 
before the debacle of adjustment under Bretton Woods was laid clear beneath the gaze of the 
world’s press. The Germans were defiant in defence of their policy, indicating they were prepared to 
increase swap credits by $600m provided to other countries and extend them for 6 months. “What 
[are] other countries prepared to do?” Karl Schiller, the German minister for Economic Affairs 
rhetorically demanded.144 Conversely, after negotiating a devaluation of the franc, de Gaulle then 
vetoed it as “the worst absurdity,” thus inadvertently preserving the competitiveness of sterling, if 
only for reasons of French prestige. 145 According to The Times: 
If a script had been written with the purpose of making people believe that the 
world currency system was breaking down, it could not have been more strikingly 
devised.146
Due to the French decision not to devalue, the British threat of a second devaluation was not called 
out. Nevertheless, the British did resort to tighter credit controls and an import deposit scheme 
under which importers paid 50% of the value of their goods before they were brought into the 
country.147  As such, Britain ended the year with the outlook for her balance of payments marginally 
improved.148 Nevertheless, the failure of the Bonn conference to establish new parities for the franc 
and the deutschmark meant new exchange crises would be forthcoming in 1969. What had been 
demonstrated was the true cost of Britain’s commitment to Bretton Woods. While 1968 had 
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involved substantial support for sterling, it had also required significant public expenditure cuts and 
expensive inducements to maintain holdings in sterling, with little progress on monetary reform that 
would resolve the overhang. The politicised nature of adjustment in Bretton Woods meant the 
achievement of an external surplus was a protracted affair, dependent on the decisions of other 
countries. In contrast to Wilson’s claims a year previously that devaluation marked the end of “rigid 
limitations on the ability of our people and government to solve our problems by our own 
exertions,” by the end of the year these limitations appeared more rigid than ever. 
4.8: Stabilising Sterling – January 1969 – October 1969
Sterling remained unstable throughout the first half of 1969. The threat of a fresh exchange crisis 
involving the franc and/or Deutschmark underlined British apprehension about the stability of their 
own currency.149 Given the slow progress of international reform, the threat of floating the currency 
and blocking the balances made at the Bonn conference was not an empty one. Despite the 
commitment to Bretton Woods made by the Labour government, the danger of crashing out was 
never from the leadership’s minds during the repeated crises following devaluation.  
The commitment made to defend the new parity of 1967 could not of course be absolute, any more 
than the one made in 1964 had been. Indeed, despite reiterating to the Americans their desire to 
maintain their commitment to the parity, within the British Treasury there was a genuine fear that 
with the balance of payments still stuck in deficit at the beginning of the year, a French devaluation 
without a corresponding German appreciation would seriously imperil what prospects for surplus 
then existed. The grave nature of the British position was laid out in a series of contingency plans 
that were developed in the Treasury. Together, they demonstrate how limited Britain’s room for 
manoeuvre was within the framework of their commitment to defend and reform Bretton Woods. 
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While this commitment eased the financing constraint with liquidity available via the IMF and BIS, it 
also made Britain the captive of events, ceding initiative to Washington, Paris and Bonn. 
Hecuba, the codename for a unilateral float between the start of the year and the spring budget, 
detailed the proposed response to a result of a crisis of confidence in sterling resulting from either 
some external source or domestic instability. The first question Hecuba asked policymakers was 
whether Britain should add “to our already enormous short-term debts by further borrowing?” If 
not, then floating would be the only option. As the paper acknowledged, this would be “a grave 
decision,” and listed the likely effects as devaluation by other countries, leaving America in an 
exposed and uncompetitive position and therefore provoking the suspension of gold sales by the US, 
undermining the cornerstone of Bretton Woods.150
The causality could also run in the other direction as changes in Bretton Woods impacted on sterling. 
Proetus dealt with likely ramifications of a US embargo on the sale of gold, brought about by a run 
on gold or a series of devaluations, specifying an excessive devaluation of the franc. Would the 
Germans allow the Deutschmark to appreciate to restore stability to the system? It was “impossible 
to say” according to the Treasury planners, although if the Germans refused to it would leave the 
dollar “in a curious and exposed position, overvalued and unable to do anything about it.” This 
would not necessarily be a concern for the US, since the discipline provided by gold convertibility 
would have been removed, allowing the US to flood the world with unconvertible dollars and putting 
the onus on Europeans either to absorb them or revalue their currencies.151 This ‘benign neglect’ 
would indeed be the American policy after suspending convertibility in August 1971. However, by 
then the prospects for sterling had improved, (albeit temporarily), and Britain was in the novel 
position of managing a capital inflow.  
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According to Oliver and Hamilton in their extensive review of these contingency plans, Britain 
understood the need for greater flexibility in the world’s monetary system but planning for it in 
1968/69 was undertaken “from a position of weakness and as a unilateral response.”152 From the 
perspective of the constraints imposed by Bretton Woods, they reveal the costs of leaving the 
system. On balance, British policy makers decided that the British interest remained in defending 
Bretton Woods and remaining subject to its provisions on liquidity, confidence and adjustment. 
However, by 1969 this was no sure thing. Avoiding floating would require fresh borrowing, 
something the government might not be prepared to accept, due to either the large stock of existing 
borrowing or because of unacceptable conditions attached to the loan. As a paper on the subject 
noted, Britain’s short and medium-term debts now totalled over £3.4 billion, not far short of the 
liabilities incurred during the Second World War. A further crisis and defence of the existing sterling 
rate could see the debts break the £4bn mark. At this stage it was the total stock of debt that was 
the most pressing concern. Conditions on borrowing from the IMF had not so far been an issue. 
Borrowing short term from other central banks could conceivably raise conditions, but as Ryrie of 
the Treasury argued, they were unlikely to demand policies that the British were not already 
following.153
Although 1969 was the year of the long awaited turnaround in Britain’s balance of payments there 
was one last crisis to be navigated, a sequel to the Bonn conference involving an eventual correction 
of the Deutschmark and franc parities.  As before Britain looked to align its policy with the Americans 
but since the beginning of the year faced a new administration following the decision of Johnson not 
to stand for re-election and the subsequent victory of Richard Nixon over Hubert Humphrey. The 
initial contact with the new administration took place in January when Paul Volcker, the US Treasury 
official responsible for international monetary affairs, visited London. Jenkins took the opportunity 
to argue that the appearance of new speculative pressures at any time could make new credit to 
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support sterling necessary, while reaffirming his government’s commitment to the parity even in the 
event of a franc devaluation within a “justifiable” range. Volcker made politely non-committal 
noises, advising Nixon to stick to the line that further credit would be very difficult to arrange, 
without “shutting the door” to any future arrangements.154
May 1969 witnessed renewed speculation against the franc and the Deutschmark, negatively 
impacting sterling as traders moved into the Deutschmark in anticipation of a revaluation. The 
speculation hit sterling particularly bad, with the reserves losing over $200m in one day, while 
Jenkins described 16 May as “the nadir of my whole Treasury experience” as money flowed out of 
the reserves to defend the rate.155
This development was noted with concern in Washington. According to a briefing paper for the 
President on 2 May, while both a franc devaluation and Deutschmark revaluation were probably 
inevitable, there was a danger that they would not come soon enough to prevent a massive run on 
the pound, leading to devaluation, floating, and/or protectionism. 156 The US was therefore inclined 
to look favourably on a request for another IMF standby by the British. Maude of the British 
Treasury had first sounded out Schweitzer on the possibility of further support at the end of January 
1969, to which the head of the IMF had agreed the British had “virtually no alternative.”157
While liquidity was once again available to help manage the external constraint imposed by Britain’s 
continued commitment to Bretton Woods, the repeated calls on the IMF’s resources to support 
sterling provoked fresh demands for Fund oversight on economic policy. In response to the request 
for fresh support in 1969, the IMF was clear this would require a second Letter of Intent. This would 
include some commitment to a ceiling on Domestic Credit Expansion [DCE], which was a wider 
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definition of money supply than had been included in 1967, being equal to money growth added to 
the net deficit on balance of payments.158
DCE proved a sticking point in negotiations with the IMF as it was counter to the official British 
understanding of monetary policy and therefore potentially represented an intrusion on formulation 
of policy. According to the theory, when DCE ran ahead of forecast it represented an economy that 
overheating, a deteriorating balance of payments or a combination of the two. There were 4 options 
open to a government to restrict DCE and bring the economy and balance of payments back into 
equilibrium. 1: Exchange control restrictions, 2: Actions to reduce Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement, 3: Restraint on credit to the private sector 4: increased sales on government debt 
outside the banking sector. 
Dealing with each in turn, the UK Treasury was reluctant to credit them with much application to the 
problem in hand. 1: would be presumably unacceptable to the IMF, while it was not thought there 
was much scope for option 2 given the cuts of the previous year. Option 3 was considered to be 
already in place, while 4 was thought not applicable to the UK given the volume of outstanding debt 
and the importance of confidence.159 There were also more philosophical disputes regarding DCE. 
The Fund wanted DCE to be used as an indicator for trouble and to prompt the need for corrective 
action. According to this strand of thinking, the causality ran from excessive demand to the money 
supply. This was in line with the general intellectual atmosphere at the time in mainstream UK policy 
circles. However, the more contentious strand in IMF thinking was the argument that there was a 
feedback from increases in DCE into increases in real demand. This was the strand of monetarism 
that had begun to influence policy, first in the IMF and then outwards into other policy centres. In 
the Treasury’s view, the IMF (and monetarists in general) discounted effects in changes in liquidity 
preference and variations in velocity, although the Treasury noted that the IMF did not associate 
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itself with the extreme “Friedmanite” view that credit restraint was an “intrinsically superior” form 
of economic management, only that it should not be neglected.160
 At this stage however, the IMF was not dogmatic in its advocacy of the new tool and Schweitzer 
seemed amenable to some negotiation on what the British commitment would be when Rawlinson 
of the Treasury raised some of the British difficulties with the concept.161 The IMF mission arrived in 
London in April. According to Rawlinson, the importance of the standby was critical. As in 1976, the 
Fund’s ‘seal of approval’ endorsing the current policy mix could be as important in placating market 
perceptions as the money itself:  
We need the money…also if we fail to conclude an agreement with the IMF, our 
creditors, who to some extent rely on the lead from the Fund, may draw the 
conclusion that our policies are in some way defective.162
Once again Richard Goode led the Fund’s delegation to London. In discussion on the projected 
British balance of payments, Goode took the view that it was both disappointing and optimistic. 
Goode believed that a higher target for surplus should be set for £300m for the financial year, but 
that it was dangerous to rely on local authorities and public corporations borrowing to bring in 
£100m on the capital account. So soon after fiscal adjustment, it was therefore essential to establish 
credit restraint to improve the balance of payments and restore reserves.163 In response, the 
Treasury stated that it would be very difficult to justify further measures, in both the fiscal and 
monetary fields, so soon after the Budget without a serious effect on confidence.164
In a meeting between Goode and Jenkins and his Treasury team at the beginning of May, Jenkins 
explained his reservations were not due to any philosophical objections to a tight monetary policy. 
He conceded monetary policy was the weapon to use given that further fiscal tightening or cuts in 
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public expenditure were not currently practical. The problem Jenkins and his team had was that it 
was not, in their opinion, as precise a tool as the IMF believed, and in any case, it was politically 
important for the government not to appear to be taking instruction from the IMF.165 This was to 
stand in stark contrast to 1976 when it was only through the appearance of Britain taking political 
instruction from the Fund that market confidence returned to sterling.  
Once again Britain was able to secure access to financial support for sterling without conceding any 
meaningful commitments to the Fund regarding policy. The IMF agreed to $1bn support in four 
drawings, starting at the end of June. Although Britain was set quarterly targets for credit growth, 
these were construed as commitments by the British representatives at the IMF rather than from 
the Chancellor himself. Jenkins and his Treasury team stood firm in their refusal to countenance any 
binding targets for British credit growth, instead threatening to walk away and warning about the 
danger that failing to agree a deal would pose to the world’s monetary system.166
The relative ease with which Britain secured the IMF’s support in 1968/69 stands in stark contrast to 
1976, when contentious debates erupted over the size of the PSBR and rate of money growth. Under 
Bretton Woods, the shared Anglo-American commitment to the system’s defence and reform meant 
support was available to sterling without detailed conditionality. Nevertheless, the political 
commitment to the system’s rigid adjustment and limited liquidity constrained Britain in other ways.  
As we have seen, measures to restore confidence stabilised the sterling balances but did not reduce 
them. Meanwhile defence of the post-devaluation exchange rate required a higher stock of debt 
being assumed to stabilise the currency than later, even including the public sector’s use of foreign 
capital markets in the lead up to the 1976 crisis (see Figure 4.6). 
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1976 Q1 “UK Official Short and Medium Term Borrowing From Abroad”; Bank of England 
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The IMF money and, more importantly, improvement in Britain’s external account allowed Britain to 
ride out a final wave of currency speculation as the franc and deutschmark were adjusted over the 
second half of 1969. Following the resignation of de Gaulle in April, the resistance towards 
adjustment for reasons of prestige within France had evaporated, and a unilateral 12.5% devaluation 
was announced on 8 August.167 This resulted in renewed speculation that a deutschmark revaluation 
was on the cards. What followed next was a significant break with the accepted norms of Bretton 
Woods adjustment as the Germans let the DM temporarily float in September in response to 
massive capital inflows before setting a renewed parity in October.168
While the successful experiment of floating the DM reinforced academic calls for introducing greater 
flexibility into international adjustment, in the immediate term the realignment of both the DM and 
franc stabilised Bretton Woods. Britain’s efforts finally began to pay dividends for the British as the 
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current account moved into a sustained surplus. As we have seen this had not been without cost. 
Britain resisted floating sterling, incurred debt to defend the parity while also agreeing to the 
expensive Second Group Arrangement to restore confidence among the sterling balance holders. 
However, the availability of sufficient support had meant this cost was bearable while Britain’s 
integration into the world’s open trading order had been maintained. These commitments had been 
entered into on the understanding that the best resolution for sterling balance problem lay in a 
general reform to the system’s provision of liquidity. This in turn depended on American attitudes 
towards reform, a position that was undergoing transition as a result of the newly elected Nixon 
administration.  
4.9: Richard Nixon & Anglo-American Reform Discussions January 1969 – October 1969 
The entry of Richard Nixon into the White House at the beginning of 1969 marked the beginning of a 
transition in American attitudes towards Bretton Woods that culminated in the Nixon Shock of 
August 1971. This was to have profound implications for the monetary system, loosening the 
multilateral commitment to stability and reform upon which British hopes for a solution to the 
sterling overhang depended as well as undermining the key source of influence sterling’s weakness 
gave the British in securing financial support.  
In the immediate term however Nixon’s actions contributed to the stabilisation of Bretton Woods, 
following on from the realignment of the DM and franc, that helped facilitate British transition to 
surplus over the year. Nixon’s immediate concern was the state of the domestic US economy. The 
previous administration had primed the economy through its spending on Vietnam and Johnson’s 
Great Society programmes of increased domestic welfare spending. 169 In response Nixon’s new 
administration endorsed the ideas of the Chicago economist Milton Friedman and initiated a policy 
of ‘gradualism’ in monetary policy, predicated on a stable and predictable growth of the money 
169 James Patterson, Grand Expectations The United States 1945 – 1974 (Oxford: Oxford History of the United 
States, 1998) p531 
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supply.170 Accordingly, Martin raised the discount rate to 6%, the highest in 40 years. Since banks 
were restricted on the interest rates they could offer (through Regulation Q, part of the 1933 
Banking Act), once Treasury rates rose above the ceiling, they faced a liquidity crisis as savers 
switched to Treasury bills. Inadvertently, this stabilised Bretton Woods as banks borrowed on the 
Eurodollar market, pushing up rates there and keeping the dollar strong as capital flowed towards 
the US.171
Less beneficial to Bretton Woods was Nixon’s Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy’s first press 
conference in which he made some "curiously ambiguous remarks" about gold, repeatedly declining 
to affirm the government’s commitment to $35 per ounce, despite being warned by reporters that it 
would invite speculation. Kennedy instead insisted that he wished to leave “every option open,” 
setting off a brief run on the dollar.172 This ambiguity towards the founding principles of Bretton 
Woods would ultimately result in the US unilateralism of the Nixon Shock in which the Americans 
broke the gold dollar link in August 1971 without consultation of its allies, notably Britain.  
The British were not blind to the prospect that the pressures of defence of Bretton Woods might 
induce Washington to think in terms of radical alternatives. As the British economist John 
Williamson noted, the US could not deflate sufficiently to reduce its deficit, since the American 
propensity to import was so small. Accordingly, they looked to other countries to act, such as 
revaluation on the part of the deutschmark. This also tied into their wider geopolitical objectives. As 
Williamson noted: 
The US wishes to play a global role in which foreign exchange shortages do not act as 
a constraint on foreign policy. This implies the desire for a system in which either 1) 
their deficits are automatically financed or 2) adjustment occurs promptly and 
smoothly. They are rich enough to be indifferent to which of these occurs and also to 
the income redistribution that results from different arrangements about reserve 
assets.173
170 Allen J. Matusow Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars and Votes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1998) pp. 17 - 20 
171 Chalmers International Interest Rate War (London: Macmillan, 1972) pp.104 - 105 
172 The Times 19 December 1968 
173 TNA T312/2334 “Talks with the Americans" 27 March 1969 
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Williamson believed that this meant that while the US would threaten suspending convertibility, it 
would not in the end actually resort to it, out of the fear unilateralism in monetary policy would 
undermine other foreign policy objectives.174 The Bank of England was less sanguine, noting 
presciently that the Nixon administration was looking for a sphere in which a bold initiative was 
possible, under pressure from Congress to lessen the impact of Bretton Woods on the domestic 
economy and inclined to be more demanding of increased foreign contribution to the upkeep of the 
Western economic and security order.175
In their direct contact with the British, the Americans at this point remained committed to Bretton 
Woods. At the beginning of March, Volker and Solomon headed the US delegation that met Maude, 
Rawlinson and Figgures from the British Treasury. After a discussion on international interest rates, 
the talk turned to the SDR proposals. Here, the primary issue was when they would be activated, and 
in what quantity. While acknowledging the trade-off between speed and certainty – the risk that 
moving too quickly would antagonise those who had doubts about the scheme – Volcker informed 
the British that the US was in favour of an early activation and wanted to move the debate away 
from the $1bn - $2bn range currently proposed towards a more significant offering. This, Volcker 
argued, would have a calming effect on the world’s monetary system, both by relieving liquidity 
strains which were increasingly apparent in light of the American domestic credit squeeze, and by 
demonstrating that the world authorities were capable of concerted action towards reforming the 
system. 
The British delegation agreed in favour of early activation of SDRs, although Figgures acknowledged 
the extent of SDRs could be a source of embarrassment for the British, since a campaign for a large 
amount might be taken as searching for a means to finance the deficit without adjustment. On the 
174 Ibid. 
175 TNA T312/2334 "USA" 02 April 1969 
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contrary, Figgures claimed, the British wanted SDRs to assist in running a surplus; since under the 
current system, a deficit implied deterioration in another country’s balance of payments.176
Although these talks delivered nothing concrete, they demonstrated the compatibility of thinking on 
both sides of the Atlantic regarding the SDR, forming a basis for a common front aimed at activation. 
In July, Group of Ten deputies hammered out agreement on the timing and scope of SDR activation. 
Under the agreement, $9.5bn of SDRs were to be introduced over the three years, with $3.5bn in 
the first year, beginning 1 January 1970.177 The required amendments to the Fund’s articles occurred 
at the Fund’s General Meeting in September 1969.178  Although in hindsight we can see that the 
system was about to be flooded with liquidity as Nixon unleashed a domestic boom with an eye on 
re-election, the tight monetary conditions prevailing in 1969 (see above), appeared to vindicate 
those who argued that the system required a controlled increase in liquidity as American 
transitioned back to surplus.179 The path to gaining European acquiescence to the SDR scheme had 
involved assurances that they would not be used to fund the sterling balances. Nevertheless, there 
remained hope in London that the system might evolve in that direction.180 The ratification of the 
SDR, and the general movement of opinion towards greater flexibility in adjustment appeared to 
offer potential to ultimately resolve the constraint imposed by the sterling overhang, justifying the 
cost of commitments made since devaluation.   
4.10: Conclusion 
While in hindsight devaluation can be seen as the beginning of the end for Bretton Woods, at the 
time both American and British policy was based on the objective of defending and reforming it. For 
the British this involved a renewed commitment to the system, involving defending the post-
devaluation exchange rate peg throughout the repeated crises that followed. This commitment was 
176 TNA T312/2334 "Note of a meeting at the US treasury 3.30pm” 03 March 1969 
177 FRUS 69 - 76 Vol 3 “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State” 25 July 1969 
178 The Times 01 October 1969 
179 James International Monetary Cooperation p171 
180 Schenk Decline of Sterling p269 
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based on a number of justifications. There was a profound psychological fear that collapse in Bretton 
Woods could herald a return to the instability of the inter-war period. More positively, Labour’s 
export led growth strategy relied on a stable framework of trade and investment to provide demand 
for British goods. The prospect that reform to the system’s provision of liquidity raised hopes that a 
multilateral solution to the problem of sterling’s reserve role might be forthcoming.  
The argument advanced here is that this political commitment to Bretton Woods determined the 
nature of the constraint faced by Britain during this time, as well as Labour’s ability to negotiate it. 
Following the one-off improvement to competitiveness following devaluation, adjustment remained 
rigid, with floating or a second devaluation considered only as a last resort. Liquidity to fund deficits 
and diversification was limited and mediated through international institutions. The commitment to 
Bretton Woods took priority, requiring a proportionally greater adjustment than would occur in 
1976, as well as higher borrowing to stabilise sterling, despite other fundamentals such as control of 
inflation and the money supply being in better shape. This indicates the constraint that the 
increasingly inflexible Bretton Woods system imposed on sterling.181
Labour’s economic diplomacy proved successful in securing repeated rounds of IMF and central bank 
support with which to defend the rate, leveraging the importance of sterling to the system. 
Attempts to impose conditionality on policy were easily evaded, although given the extent of 
Labour’s commitment to Bretton Woods revealed in their domestic retrenchment, these were 
unnecessary in any case. More significantly, external support packages to improve confidence in 
sterling, notably the 1968 Basle deal, were predicated on the continuation of Bretton Woods, 
involving expensive inducements in the form of exchange rate guarantees and high interest rates 
which facilitated a fresh accumulation in the sterling balances rather than their reduction. This 
would eventually need to be resolved during the 1976 IMF crisis.  
181 J. E. Wadworth [ed.] The Banks and the Monetary System in the UK 1959 – 1971 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006) p458 
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From the perspective of 1970 however, the Labour could congratulate themselves on transitioning 
to surplus within a stabilised Bretton Woods that had progressed on important reform in the shape 
of SDR activation. Crucially throughout this period that could rely on American financial support and 
institutional influence. This was based on the Americans’ own political commitment to Bretton 
Woods under President Johnson, and the attempt of Richard Nixon to cool down the domestic US 
economy during his first year in power, which had the simultaneous effect of stabilising the wider 
international monetary system. As the subsequent years would demonstrate, the American 
commitment to Bretton Woods would also have important consequences for resolving the sterling 
overhang.   
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Chapter 5  
Going it Alone 
5.1: Introduction 
One of the most fundamental breaks in international monetary relations occurred on 15th August 
1971. Nearly four years since sterling’s devaluation had begun an existential crisis of the Bretton 
Woods system, President Nixon appeared on television to announce a series of measures that 
proved fatal. Alongside a 90-day freeze on wage and prices and a 10% surcharge on imports, Nixon 
unilaterally suspended the convertibility of dollars into gold. In doing so, he ushered in an 
international monetary system based on fiat, floating currencies that endures to the present day.1
The Nixon Shock also dealt a severe blow to Britain’s sterling strategy. The joint Anglo-American 
commitment to defending and reforming Bretton Woods based on their shared identities as issuers 
of international currencies had formed the basis of British attempts to resolve the sterling balances. 
In a stroke, Nixon had undermined this approach, acting without prior consultation of the British and 
demonstrating that the shared status of the dollar and sterling was a mirage. Rather than reform the 
system’s provision of liquidity, Nixon leveraged the dollar’s status as top currency to enforce 
adjustment on other economies. This new approach was personified by Nixon’s combative Secretary 
of the Treasury John Connally who famously declared “foreigners are out to screw us. Our job is to 
screw them first.”2
The breakdown of Bretton Woods resulted in a reconfiguration of the external constraint. The 
inauguration of floating exchange rates for the first time since the war meant domestic expansion 
1 John S. Odell, US International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982) p267 
2 Gavin, Gold Dollars & Power p194 
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could proceed without concern for defending the parity. With confidence in sterling secure thanks to 
the hard won surpluses and guarantees of the 1968 Basle Deal, Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government could avoid the apparent mistakes of the previous Labour government and prioritise 
domestic expansion. However, the sterling overhang remained, while progress on reform to the 
system’s provision of liquidity was washed away in the flood of unconvertible dollars unleased by 
the Nixon Shock. The British response to the Nixon Shock was complicated by Britain’s third and final 
application to the EEC. Despite a nominal commitment to reduce sterling’s reserve role as part of 
Britain’s accession however, no policies were put into place to bring this about. The exchange 
guarantees of the 1968 Basle deal were extended to stabilise the level of the balances in response to 
the expected return of a current account deficit resulting from Heath’s reflationary policies. Heath 
attempted to secure European backing for sterling as part of an acceleration of plans for monetary 
union, however his reconfiguration of the external constraint prioritised domestic expansion over 
fresh commitments for sterling. His demands for joining the re-pegged European exchange rate 
system (the so-called Snake in the Tunnel) – unconditional and unlimited support – precluded 
Britain’s participation. This facilitated his domestic expansion but at the cost of a widening current 
account deficit just as the OPEC oil shock occurred at the end of 1973.  
Edward Heath’s time in power has not been remembered favourably by historians. He came to 
power promising deliverance from the problems afflicting the British economy in the 1960s – 
excessive government intervention, deteriorating industrial relations, ‘stop-go’ economic growth 
and rising inflation – only to leave in 1974 with these fundamentals in a worse state than ever.3 His 
most significant decision in monetary relations was to float sterling in 1972. Oliver and Hamilton 
argue that the success of the 1968 Basle Arrangements in “making the hitherto volatile sterling 
3 Stewart Politics and Economic Policy in the UK p138; More sympathetic accounts allude to Heath being 
“conspicuously out of luck,” as Alec Cairncross has noted, dealing with crises related to the collapse of Bretton 
Woods, the OPEC oil shock and a return to high inflation that the prevailing Keynesian paradigm was ill 
equipped to deal with, see Martin Holmes The Failure of the Heath Government (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997) p. xiii 
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balances inert” meant that floating could now be considered seriously as a matter of policy that 
would not necessarily require moves as destructive as blocking sterling convertibility.4 For Newton, 
the decision to float the currency implied that the Conservatives were not prepared to follow the 
example of the Wilson government and sacrifice growth in return for balance in external payments 
and stability in the exchange rate, noting “the commitment to expansion seemed absolute.”5
Catherine Schenk argues that the official end of the Sterling Area in 1972 marked a “mere footnote” 
in the realignment of British economic policy towards the EEC.6 Nevertheless, the balances remained 
a threat to sterling’s stability and the extension of the Sterling Agreements and the exchange rate 
guarantee (now applied to a floating rate), meant an ongoing contractual relationship between 
Britain and balance holders aimed at managing diversification.7 However under Heath this 
relationship was initially viewed through the prism of Britain’s role in Europe. Sterling’s position as 
an international currency proved a stumbling block in EEC membership negotiations but the 
Europeans were placated by a British commitment to run down the sterling balances and did not 
insist on action prior to accession. According to Schenk, the subsequent recognition that resolution 
of sterling balance problem was beyond the scope of Europe shifted the management of sterling’s 
decline back towards a global context, requiring both American support and the cooperation of the 
sterling holders themselves.8 Although analysing in detail the role of sterling in Britain’s third 
application to join the EEC, Schenk downplays Heath’s subsequent attempts to secure a European 
solution for the sterling balances, noting only that Heath’s attempts to do so as a quid pro quo for 
joining the new European arrangements on exchange rates were subsequently dashed.9
From the perspective of the thesis, the Heath government forms a bridge between the renewed 
build-up of sterling balances following devaluation with their eventual resolution in 1976/77. 
4 Oliver and Hamilton “Downhill from Devaluation” pp.509-510 
5 Newton The Reinvention of Britain p80 
6 Schenk “The Sterling Area and Economic Disintegration.” pp. 27-28 
7 Schenk “The Shift from Sterling to the Dollar, 1965–76: Evidence from Australia and New Zealand” pp.13-14 
8 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p154 
9 Ibid p346 
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Explanations of the IMF crisis usually look to the deficits that resulted from Heath’s over-
expansionary policies (unfairly coined the ‘Barber Boom’ after his Chancellor) which were then 
exacerbated by the impact of the 1973 OPEC oil shock. The thesis however shows that it was Heath’s 
response to the changes in in the international monetary system rather than domestic policy per se
that left Britain exposed by the end of 1973. This involved an attempt to renegotiate Britain’s 
external constraint imposed by monetary commitments through securing greater flexibility in 
external adjustment combined with European support for the sterling balances. These proved 
incompatible as Heath prioritised domestic expansion.  
Heath was determined not to repeat the experience of Wilson in sacrificing domestic growth to 
defence of the exchange rate. Floating sterling in 1972 was a political choice to prioritise domestic 
growth in response to capital outflow, rather than an economic necessity as Britain possessed more 
than enough reserves to defend the rate. The breakdown in the Bretton Woods commitment to 
pegged exchange rates following the Nixon Shock meant however that it now seemed unnecessary 
to spend reserves or accumulate debt when the exchange rate itself could take the strain.10
Despite this breakdown in systemic provisions of exchange rate adjustment however, the normative 
commitment to cooperation in international monetary relations and open, multilateral trading 
relationships remained.11 Heath was aware that the re-emergence of a current account deficit as his 
domestic measures picked up speed meant the issue of the sterling overhang would soon be raised 
again. The breakdown in monetary reform following Nixon’s benign neglect of the dollar and Heath’s 
own inclinations meant he looked towards Europe. The European response to the monetary turmoil 
afflicting the global economy following the Nixon Shock was an attempt to recreate the stability of 
Bretton Woods along European lines. Against the trend towards greater flexibility, the Europeans 
10 Leland B. Yeager International Monetary Relations: Theory, History and Policy (New York: Joanna Colter 
Books, 1976) p467 
11 Ruggie “International Regimes, Transactions and Change” p384 
116 
looked to establish a pattern of intra-EEC exchange rate pegs based on narrow bands of fluctuation – 
the so-called Snake in the Tunnel.12
Heath’s initial response was enthusiastic, believing that this would require common pooling of 
reserve assets and liabilities and so resolve the sterling overhang. He was reassured by German 
offers of unconditional and unlimited support with which to manage a sterling peg but was 
subsequently disappointed when this did not materialise.  Although his European partners wished to 
see sterling’s international role scaled down (extracting an explicit commitment to this end as part of 
the British application), they had no desire to assume Britain’s liabilities as a means of doing so. 
From the perspective of Paris and Bonn, support for sterling would be forthcoming only once Britain 
adhered to the nascent mechanisms for monetary union, including re-joining the Snake. This was 
intolerable to Heath, who believed the lesson of Wilson’s government was not to let international 
obligations over sterling’s stability stand in the way of domestic expansion and accordingly would 
not commit to re-pegging sterling unless support was first made available, unconditionally and 
without limit. Unsurprisingly, little progress was made. 
Heath’s political commitments therefore secured flexibility in adjustment, allowing domestic 
expansion to proceed without immediate concern for the exchange rate or current account deficit. 
However, in doing so he also isolated sterling from potential European support while making no 
progress on resolving the issue of the sterling overhang. This prioritisation of domestic growth over 
fresh international commitments meant in contrast to Wilson’s claims at devaluation, Heath really 
did try and go it alone.  
Although the attempt to fix European exchange rates in any rate did not long survive the 
accelerating inflation unleashed by the OPEC oil shock at the end of 1973, the discipline imposed by 
the exchange rate commitments did limit participants’ exposure to the fresh economic crises that 
erupted from 1974 onwards. Italy, the other country to drop out of the Snake at an early juncture, 
12 Eichengreen Globalizing Capital pp 149- 152 
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significantly also required IMF support following the oil shock.13 Ultimately Heath’s attempts to 
renegotiate the external constraint did not improve Britain’s position, undermining sources of 
support while at the same time increasing the demand for such support     
5.2: Edward Heath and the Conservatives in Power 
Heath arrived in power in an election characterised by concerns about the economy. Despite the 
comfortable surplus that had been built up by the time of 1970 budget, Jenkins had resisted calls 
within the cabinet for a “sloshing working class budget,” in favour of continuing the post-devaluation 
trajectory in government spending. 14 Labour’s lead in the polls was eroded over the campaign as 
concerns over rising inflation, disappointment with the budget and trade union resentment over 
Labour’s handling of industrial relations legislation combined with a shock external deficit for June 
(caused by the government purchase of two Boeing Jets). The result was a narrow victory for the 
Conservatives, with Heath becoming Prime Minister in June.15
During the campaign, Labour had characterised Heath’s Conservatives as free market radicals. 
Wilson coined the term ‘Selsdon Man’ as shorthand for the Conservatives’ proposed policy reforms 
that included tax cuts, reduced government intervention and trade union reform.16 This however 
backfired on Labour by making Heath appear more dynamic and radical then he was. Like Wilson’s 
‘White Heat’ promises in 1964, ‘Selsdon Man’ offered something new and appealed to the 
individualism of the aspirational suburban working and lower middle class.17 However, as his 
response to the challenges of the early 1970s demonstrated, Heath was very much a continuation of 
the post-war consensus. Despite initially promising a “quiet revolution” in the government’s 
13 de Vries, Cooperation on Trial pp. 439-441 
14 Benn Office Without Power p221; Jenkins A Life at the Centre p291 
15 Sandbrook, White Heat p780 
16 This was a reference to the Selsdon hotel in which the Tories had formulated their policy but also to the 
prehistoric hoax Piltdown Man. The implication was that these policies were unsuitable to modern Britain 
Christian Caryl Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century (New York: Basic Book, 2014) p57 
17 Andy Beckett When the Lights Went Out What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber 
and Faber, 2009) p31 
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economic management, Selsdon Man turned out to be “somewhere between a breathless 
exaggeration and a malicious fiction,” in Andy Beckett’s phrase.18
A brief overview of Heath’s domestic policies demonstrates that, an initial period of innovation 
notwithstanding, Heath responded to economic challenges with the traditional policies of the post-
war consensus. Most notable was the ‘U-turn’ on the commitment to pursue a more laissez-faire 
industrial policy – letting “lame ducks” fail as it was known. With unemployment approaching the 
totemic 1 million mark in 1971 (see Figure 5.1), the Conservative government instead bailed out 
Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders rather than letting them go under.19 Relations with the 
unions were soured by the Industrial Relations Act despite Heath’s genuine commitment to 
establishing a tripartite consensus between unions, employers and government.20 Innovation in 
monetary policy, in the form of Competition & Credit Control which removed quantitative 
restrictions on bank lending, precipitated a surge in the money supply, property speculation and a 
secondary banking crisis in part because Heath’s government failed to abide by its own provisions on 
interest rates. Instead Heath kept rates low in an attempt drive growth and reduce unemployment 
while resorting to fresh controls on bank lending (see Figure 5.2).21
18 Ibid p31 
19 Newton The Reinvention of Britain p83 
20 Ibid p81 
21 Forrest Cappie The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p523 
119 
Source: Bank of England A Millennium of Macro Economic Data Table A.50 “UK labour market quantities 1855-2015, (000s)” 
Source: Bank of England, “Changes in Bank Rate, Minimum Lending Rate, Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate, Repo Rate and Official Bank Rate” 
[Online] https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/monetary-policy/baserate (accessed 13 August 2019); 
A more fundamental change was achieved in foreign policy, namely Britain’s accession to EEC 
membership. Heath was fortunate that the retirement of de Gaulle in 1969 removed one of the 
major obstacles to British membership. Agreement was reached in January 1972 prior to Britain 
becoming a full member on 1 January 1973. The issue of sterling’s reserve role briefly threatened to 
derail negotiations, in particular the danger posed by the sterling balances as well as the favourable 
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discrimination the Sterling Area received in Britain’s system of capital controls.22 However the 
minister in charge of negotiating entry Geoffrey Rippon  gave a commitment to “envisage an orderly 
and gradual run-down of official sterling balances after our accession,” although without any firm 
details on how this was to be brought about.23
The Rippon commitment, as it became known, placated the Europeans in part because sterling was 
stable prior to the Nixon Shock. The external environment in 1970 and the beginning of 1971 was 
benign.24 Sterling had been stabilised thanks to the return to surplus in 1969. Britain was a 
beneficiary of capital inflows in response to a lowering of interest rates in America as Nixon leaned 
on the new Chairman of the Fed Arthur Burns to relax monetary policy.25  £1250m flowed into the 
reserves between October 69 and March 70, as a result of renewed confidence in sterling and tight 
monetary policy.26
There remained however considerable concern in Whitehall about sterling’s future prospects. The 
repayment schedule of previous support rounds was a cause of concern. A memo in January 1970 
noted that the debt burden was likely to be "uncomfortable in spite of continued surplus," with 
£1bn due to the IMF alone due to be repaid in June 1971.27 Wilson’s nemesis, the former Governor 
of the Bank of England Lord Cromer had appeared on Panorama two weeks before the election to 
argue the debt position meant any incoming government would face a more difficult financing 
situation than in 1964.28 This overstated matters somewhat. Debts owed to the IMF and central 
banks had come down from $8bn at the end of 1968 to under $4bn by the time Heath arrived in 
power. By 1971 debts to central banks were paid off, as was the money owed to the IMF the 
22 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p143 
23 Ibid p151 
24 Quoted in James International Monetary Cooperation p214 
25 Allen J. Matusow Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars and Votes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1998) p59 - 60 
26 TNA T318/360 “The inflow of funds" 05 March 1970 
27 TNA T312/2899 "IMF Refinancing" 09 January 1970 
28 David Kynaston The City of London Vol.4 A Club No More 1945-2000 (London: Pimlico, 2002) p414 
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following year.29 Nevertheless, Heath continued Wilson’s policy of engaging with reform of Bretton 
Woods to secure the long-term stability of sterling. This meant there would be no dramatic changes 
in sterling’s status. As a communication sent to finance ministers of the Sterling Area noted, the 
British government was not prepared to run down the reserve role of sterling “without having a 
clear idea of what to put in its place.”30
The Treasury under the new chancellor Anthony Barber was therefore enthusiastic in its adoption of 
the Special Drawing Rights [SDR], which had finally come into operation at the beginning of 1970.31 It 
was hoped that the SDR would become equivalent to gold or foreign exchange in a country’s 
reserves and therefore soften the external constraint faced by countries pursuing expansionary 
policies. Accordingly, Britain was a front runner in its incorporation of the SDR into economic 
policy.32 However other countries were less enthusiastic and by the end of 1970 the Bank of England 
decided to vary its policy of using SDRs to pay IMF charges as the lack of any other meaningful SDR 
activity meant the UK’s transactions were beginning to look rather conspicuous.33
Likewise, Heath continued with the 1968 Sterling Agreements which had stabilised confidence in 
sterling among the OSA, thus reducing one source of pressure on the exchange rate at the cost of a 
build-up in balances themselves from £1.5bn in 1968 to £2.3bn at the end of 1970. SDRs 
complicated the matter as the arrangement had been drawn up before activation and therefore 
made no provision for it, while a number of important sterling holders such as Kuwait and Singapore 
were not participating in the scheme.34 While he was still Chancellor in July 1969, Jenkins had 
written a letter to the OSA countries advising that although the UK intended to treat the SDR as a 
fully-fledged reserve asset, he did not intend to propose altering the Basle agreements until the 
29 Alec Cairncross “The Heath Government and the British Economy” in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon [eds.]
The Heath Government 1970-74 A Reappraisal (London: Longman, 1996) p129 
30 Schenk The Decline of Sterling p144 
31 TNA T312/2919 "Sterling Agreements and SDRs" 12 October 1970  
32 TNA T312/2919 "SDRs and Money Supply." 19 October 1970 
33 TNA T312/2919 "Use of SDR and Gold" 04 November 1970 
34 TNA T312/3410 "Sterling Agreements: SDRs" 02 April 1970 
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1971 review when the option to extend them for another 2 years would be negotiated with 
participating countries.35 Cautious not to rock the boat, the Treasury under the new Conservative 
Chancellor Anthony Barber continued this approach, on the assumption that the general lack of 
response to Jenkins’ proposal indicated acceptance on the part of the OSA.36 In March 1971 the Bank 
of England proposed to renew the exchange rate guarantees for another two years. Despite the 
instability caused by the Nixon Shock, by September 34 of 36 of the original participants had agreed 
terms.37
Heath’s government therefore initially sought to maintain the external framework that had had 
stabilised sterling under Wilson. As events were to prove however, the stability of the framework 
itself was ultimately determined by the attitude of the US government under Nixon towards the 
future of Bretton Woods.  
5.3: Heath, Nixon and the Nixon Shock June 1970 – August 1971
Nixon’s initial reaction to Heath’s election was positive – according to his advisor on national security 
Henry Kissinger, Nixon was “elated” by the news. However, relations quickly deteriorated.38  Despite 
being in favour of British membership of the EEC, Washington found British alignment with the 
French in monetary reform discussions irritating. In his memoirs, Kissinger described Nixon as a 
“jilted lover” in response to Heath downgrading the “special relationship” to merely a “natural 
relationship,” based on historical, cultural and linguistic ties rather than any coordinated economic 
or political approach to policy.39
35 TNA T312/2919 "Sterling Agreements and SDRs" 9 October 1970 
36 TNA T312/2919 "Sterling Agreements and SDRs" 16 October 1970 
37 Cappie The Bank of England p413 
38 Alexander Spelling “Anglo-American Relations During the Nixon Years” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University 
of Nottingham) p 7 
39 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982) p141 
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Historians have tended to agree with this analysis. Alan Dobson has argued that Heath’s European 
orientation and the lack of rapport between the two leaders resulted in a difficult relationship.40
Britain’s influence in monetary negotiations both before and after the Nixon Shock was constrained 
by the need to placate French opinion. Susan Strange argues that the key relationships during this 
period was between the US and Japan and the US and Germany with Britain “powerless even to act 
as intermediary between France and Germany.”41 Catherine Schenk agrees, noting that “throughout 
these discussions the relationship between the UK and US was never very close or influential,” and 
that the US expected British freedom of action to be restricted until the EEC application was 
accepted.42 This weakening of the Anglo-American relationship also reflected a divergence in 
interests. As Stephen George has argued, Heath’s strong support for entry to the EEC was a reaction 
to the changing world context of the early 70s, which was itself partly driven by American policies.43
From the perspective of this thesis, the divergence of interests expressed itself in differing objectives 
for international monetary reform. Both countries expressed concern in 1970 over the growth in 
short term capital flows. The British abandoned the basic balance as a means of calculating the 
deficit or surplus on the external account and adopted instead the total currency flow methodology 
which took into account short term capital movements.44 However while the Americans called for 
wider bands around parity and more frequent changes in exchange rates in response to capital flows 
in order to secure more prompt adjustment, the British, prioritising stability, believed these 
proposals would serve only to encourage greater short term flows.45 This conflict was made public at 
the 1970 IMF Annual Meeting in September at which Barber spoke out against floating exchange 
rates. Delivered to an audience of finance ministers and central bankers it was “like a sermon against 
40 Alan Dobson, Anglo– American Relations in the Twentieth Century: The Policy and Diplomacy of Friendly 
Superpowers (Basingstoke: Routledge, 1995) p. 140. 
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atheism before a convocation of bishops,” according to Robert Solomon of the US Treasury.46 Barber 
also envisaged existing holdings of foreign currencies being converted into SDR “on a considerable 
scale.”47
While the British focused their efforts on securing reform to Bretton Woods’ provision of liquidity 
with which to manage the sterling overhang, the Americans were more concerned with adjustment. 
Like sterling, the dollar suffered from what Harold James has described as “the clash of national 
economic regulation with the logic of internationalism.”48 However the systemic importance of the 
dollar to Bretton Woods meant that this clash was to have global implications. Under the n-1 pattern 
of parities in which exchange rates were pegged to the dollar, it was believed the dollar was unable 
to devalue to restore competitiveness. Their top concern was therefore effecting adjustment on 
surplus economies like Germany and Japan.  
The major card in their hand was the convertibility of the dollar. If the dollar-gold link was broken, 
the holdings of dollars that surplus economies had accumulated rather than appreciate their 
currencies would no longer have any claim on American reserves.49 The idea of ending dollar-gold 
convertibility was not a new one. Paul Volcker, the Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs at the US 
Treasury, had first raised the issue upon Nixon’s inauguration in 1969. By 1971 the sustained 
American deficit meant the problem had become even more pressing and Volcker took the 
opportunity of briefing his new boss John Connally to raise the issue again. In the paper 
“Contingency Planning: Operations for the International Monetary Problem,” Volcker pointed out 
foreign holdings of dollars now amounted to $24bn while US assets had dropped to $14bn - of which 
$11bn was gold. Volcker knew that a rise in interest rates to shore up confidence in the dollar would 
be unacceptable due to the upcoming election, so proposed a realignment of 15% for the 
46 Robert Solomon The International Monetary System 1945 – 1976 An Insider’s View (New York: Harper & 
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deutschmark and yen. To bring this about Volcker proposed a “cold blooded” suspension of 
convertibility.50 This position was supported by the NY Fed which saw it as preferable to long, drawn 
out negotiations over currency realignments.51
The prospects for the dollar were unlikely to be boosted by the administration’s domestic policies. 
Nixon’s 1971 $11.6bn budget deficit was compounded by leaning on the Fed to lower interest rates. 
Burns responded by pumping up money growth to the fastest rate since the war.52 The decline in 
American rates coincided with a rise in Germany and although rates moved closer in April, by this 
time speculators had read the writing on the wall and were betting on further currency 
realignments.53
For those speculating against the dollar, the deutschmark was the key currency. The German 
government was reluctant to re-value the currency as it would undermine the vital export sector. 
Nor, given the rise in wages and prices and deficit in the basic balance (i.e. excluding short term 
capital flows), did they believe it was justified. 54 However, capital inflows masked the ‘correct’ 
exchange rate based on German’s external position and created a self-fulfilling prophecy in favour of 
revaluation.  By the beginning of May the situation had become untenable for the Germans. $2bn 
was taken in the first forty minutes of trading on 5 May prompting the closure of foreign exchange 
markets.55 The Germans appealed to the EEC to take joint action on the basis of “community spirit” 
but their proposal that all members cease intervention against the dollar sat uncomfortably with the 
existing agreement to narrow margins of fluctuations within Europe – currently planned to take 
place on 15 June – as a prelude to monetary union.56 In particular, the French resisted the German 
proposals, fearing that the franc would be dragged up by speculative flows into the Deutschmark, 
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damaging attempts to restore a current account surplus and reduce unemployment.57 In the 
meeting of EEC Council on the 9 June only the Dutch sided with the Germans. Instead of jointly 
floating, the meeting came to an uneasy agreement that the Deutschmark would float alone for a 
limited time until the crisis passed.58
According to James, the capital flows of 1971 imposed a stark contrast on countries: float the 
currency or impose capital controls along the French lines. The unhappy American experience of 
controls under Johnson in the 1960s, and Nixon’s campaign commitments to liberalisation meant 
floating emerged “as the only answer to systemic crises.”59 At this point however, floating was only 
envisaged as a transitional method of adjustment. When French Finance minister Giscard D’Estaing 
met Connally and Volcker towards the end of May, the Americans stressed their endorsement of 
greater flexibility did not imply full floating and envisaged a return to more stable rates once the 
crisis had passed.60
While the Europeans were deliberating their joint float, a Volcker paper argued the present crisis 
offered an opportunity for the Americans to secure a turnaround their balance of payments and 
long-term reform of the international monetary system. According to the paper, US defence and aid 
spending meant the external account was in fundamental disequilibrium at the present pattern of 
exchange rates. The paper argued for a more equitable division of defence and aid spending 
between America and its allies, phasing out gold from international payments and multilateral 
realignment of exchange rates. These had been the key American objectives for several years; the 
Volcker group argued that they could now be achieved if the US was willing to exploit such crises to 
its advantage.  
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Tactically, the Volcker group endorsed a policy of ‘benign neglect.’ The US would allow foreign 
exchange crises to develop without intervention, forcing the Europeans to choose between dollar 
inflows or allowing their currencies to appreciate. At “an appropriate time” the US would indicate its 
own solution, potentially suspending gold convertibility and/or instigating trade restrictions to gain 
leverage in negotiations. Floating could be tolerated “indefinitely,” although at this stage such an 
idea was a bargaining tactic to force concessions from the Europeans rather than a definitive 
American policy.61 The US would resist pressure to raise the price of gold, with Connally comparing it 
to the Munich Settlement. The American’s preferred solution to Bretton Woods’ liquidity problem 
remained SDRs, into which they proposed to convert excess foreign holdings of dollars.62
Fittingly, Connally made a speech on the future of Bretton Woods in Munich on 12 May, lobbying for 
greater burden sharing between the US and her allies:  
No longer can considerations of friendship, or need, or capacity justify the United 
States carrying so heavy a share of the common burdens.63
Volcker pushed for a paragraph on introducing greater flexibility into Breton Woods, but Connally 
amended it to “make it abundantly clear that we are not going to devalue, we are not going to 
change the price of gold, we are going to control inflation.” When Volcker asked his boss whether 
Connally wanted to make the point so strongly, given that America might have to pursue such a 
policy before too long, he replied “That’s my unalterable position today. I don’t know what it will be 
this summer.”64
Connally’s views indeed evolved over the summer of 1971. After reading a report stressing the job 
benefits of a dollar devaluation, he submitted a memo to Nixon on 2 August proposing wage and 
price controls, tax cuts and – most significantly for the global economy – closing the gold window, 
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the first time a Secretary of the Treasury had endorsed such a policy. Nixon agreed, looking for a 
bold and decisive policy in the economic field and set the date for 8 September, the day Congress 
returned from summer recess.65
Events in foreign exchange markets were to force Nixon’s hand. A Congressional sub-committee on 
international payments had released a report on 6 August that concluded the dollar was over-valued 
and that the US would soon have to suspend gold convertibility, provoking movement out of the 
dollar despite a Treasury statement that the report did not reflect Congressional opinion, or that of 
the administration.66 Volcker warned that in response to the renewed speculation against the dollar 
any initiative involving suspending gold convertibility as part of a considered and constructive reform 
package could not wait until September. Connally forwarded the message onto Nixon who decided 
on a “big, bold” approach and decided to repair to Camp David to thrash out the details. 67
The British were not considered throughout these decisions, but one action was to have an impact 
on American policy. A British request for cover on some of its dollar holdings was misconstrued by 
the Americans who thought they were being asked to find $3bn rather than $750m.68 Solomon 
argues that the British request was “no more than an irritant.”69 Volcker affirmed that the decision 
to close the gold window had been taken prior to the British request, but noted the symbolism: 
If the British, who had founded the system with us, and who had fought so hard to 
defend their own currency, were going to take gold for their dollars, it was clear the 
game was indeed over.70
This was a complete misreading of the situation; Britain remained committed to cooperative 
defence and reform of Bretton Woods, while it was the Americans who were preparing to depart 
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from this established practice. As Harold James described Nixon’s announcement of the measures 
on 15 August 1971, “Richard Nixon spoke exclusively the language of national power and national 
advantage.  International cooperation appeared suspect; international agencies futile.”71 Nixon’s 
announcement of the measures stressed the America-first nature of the policy:  
If you want to buy a foreign car or take a trip abroad, market conditions may cause 
your dollar to buy slightly less. But if you are among the overwhelming majority of 
Americans who buy American-made products in America, your dollar will be worth 
just as much tomorrow as it is today.72
Nixon’s comments were remarkably like Wilson’s over devaluation in 1967, however the reaction he 
received was very different. A New York Times editorial congratulated the President for his 
“boldness,” while the Dow Jones Index rose 33 points.73  Nixon’s move had shored up support for his 
economic policies at home, while firmly knocking the ball of international monetary reform into the 
Europeans’ court.  
5.4: The British Response - August 1971 – September 1971 
The Nixon Shock posed a dilemma for the British. The unilateral nature of the American move as well 
as Heath’s determination that Britain should respond as a European power, particularly while the 
third application for membership of the EEC was underway, meant that Britain would align with 
France during the contentious debates that followed. On the other hand, Britain’s interests in 
monetary reform, most notably the liquidity question and the future of foreign currencies as 
reserves, meant Britain believed the crisis unleashed by the Nixon Shock could also prove cathartic 
in achieving meaningful change.  
Britain’s own national interest was also in preserving the competitiveness of sterling. With the 
current account in surplus, it was likely the US would seek some form of revaluation with respect to 
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the dollar. However, Heath and his government were aware that the prospect of sterling over the 
medium term was less rosy. The domestic economy was in the doldrums, although the extent of 
recession in 1970 was overstated in initial output data. In his 1971 budget Barber unveiled further 
tax cuts and easier credit with the aim of driving up consumption. A prescient Samuel Brittan noted 
the likely outcome of the budget was a balance of payments crisis between 1972 and 73.74
The progress of the Barber Boom (as it became known) highlights one of the central arguments of 
this study, namely that the external constraints imposed on the operation of the British economy 
shifted with the evolution of the world’s monetary system and the terms of Britain’s engagement 
with it. The experience of the previous decade in which ‘stop-go’ economics had supposedly 
sacrificed domestic expansion to the need of defending the parity (and Bretton Woods) meant 
interest in floating exchange rates had spread from academia to both sides of the political spectrum. 
The Nixon Shock had undermined the normative commitment of Bretton Woods towards pegged 
exchange rates and had opened policy space for floating rates, as demonstrated by the experience 
of the DM since 1969. Rates were floating in the immediate period following the Nixon Shock, before 
a new system of parities was patched up at the Smithsonian Agreement in December. However, 
Nixon had fatally undermined the commitment towards parities and Britain became reluctant to 
impinge on the progress of domestic growth in the name of exchange rate stability. 
Nevertheless, the problem of the sterling overhang remained. The danger was diversification on the 
part of the holders could effectively sink the floating rate, requiring extreme measures such as 
blocking the balances and retreating behind a wall of controls. While floating sterling could evade 
the rigid distortions of Bretton Woods adjustment, managing confidence in sterling balances 
continued to be a priority in shaping the external constraint. While the Basle guarantees stabilised 
these in the short term, resolving them definitively required financial firepower. With the turn to 
unilateralism on the part of the Americans, Europe now looked the best bet. This was the opinion of 
74 Quoted in Stewart Politics and Economic Policy in the UK Since 1964 p132 
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Lord Cromer, now ambassador to the US, who counselled perspective on the unilateralism of the 
Nixon Shock - “I would think it would be a mistake to react too tragically to the lack of prior 
consultation. No major power has an immaculate record in this respect,” but went on to make an 
objective assessment for moving the UK closer to Europe:  
[The] Americans no longer consider it necessary to consult with the UK as an 
imperial or World power. They consult with us when it is useful to them and not 
because they have to. Secondly it would appear that the old concept that the dollar 
and sterling should stand together as the two major world trading currencies is now 
obsolete. Sterling is not of the importance that it used to be; the dollar alone really 
matters. With the dissolution of the Sterling area, the power and the influence which 
went with being the centre of it has disappeared. It is perhaps a back handed 
compliment to HMG that Sterling is currently so strong that the Americans evidently 
had no fear of precipitating a Sterling crisis by their measures.  All this contributes 
powerfully to the argument of a need of a European monetary bloc on a scale that 
signifies.75
The major challenge facing Europe was that the breakdown of Bretton Woods introduced a paradox 
into European monetary relations. On the one hand, the large volumes of liquidity moving around 
the world called for more exchange rate flexibility to cope – either wider margins around pegs or 
floating exchange rates. However, the drive to European integration called for restricting exchange 
movements between European currencies, both as a basis for monetary integration and for 
management of the Central Agricultural Policy [CAP].76
The two objectives – reduced flexibility between European currencies and greater flexibility with the 
rest of the world – were not necessarily irreconcilable. They would however require commitment of 
the stronger currencies to provide resources to support weaker currencies. This would not be 
forthcoming until the 1990s with what Harold James has called the “Europeanisation” of the 
Bundesbank – the widespread acceptance of the German model of central banking in which the 
over-riding objective was price stability. With most central banks of the 1970s focused on full 
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employment, this meant no such support would be forthcoming from the Germans on the scale 
required to stabilise fluctuations between European currencies.77 The implication for the British over 
the medium term was, as we shall see, a return to America as the major source of funding for 
sterling, albeit less easily obtained than in the 1960s as changes in the international monetary 
system that began with the Nixon Shock enabled the US to more effectively insulate both itself and 
the global economy from sterling crises.  
The first Anglo-American contact following the Nixon Shock took place on a tour made by Paul 
Volcker in August of European capitals and Japan. Prior to this, Heath and Barber had met with 
senior Treasury officials to discuss the British response to the crisis. In the short term, the British 
would seek to mitigate any rise in sterling during the anticipated realignments in currencies. In the 
longer term, they would throw their weight behind reforms of Bretton Woods that would reduce the 
role played by reserve currencies in providing liquidity. Now that the dollar was unconvertible 
(except, like sterling, into other currencies), it seemed a propitious time to consider how to phase 
out the sterling balances via international reform. However, it was also decided that British policy 
was to be formulated in concert with the Europeans as British entry to the EEC remaining the 
primary objective throughout the crisis.78 The contradiction between these last two objectives 
hindered the effectiveness of British influence over reform and positioned the French as America’s 
principal partners in reform discussions. 
The meeting with Volcker was also attended by representatives of the major European treasuries 
and central banks. Volcker opened by outlining the American reasons for the dramatic change in 
policy. Domestically, Nixon had been prompted by rising unemployment and the disappointing 
record on inflation. On the external front, the persistent deterioration of the balance of payments 
demanded radical action. Volker acknowledged that the domestic measures alone might have 
77 See Harold James Making the European Monetary Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) 
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“stopped the rot” for a few months while gold convertibility remained in place (a position that had 
been favoured within the administration by Burns) but denied this could have succeeded in the long 
run. Volcker explained the US expected a turnaround in its balance of payments in addition to long 
term reform of Bretton Woods but was remained adamant at this stage that there could be no 
change in the official price of gold.79
The British delegation had been briefed by Heath to push for an early meeting of the Group of Ten, 
but Volcker poured cold water on the idea by arguing that such a meeting should not occur until the 
ground had been thoroughly prepared. Morse of the Bank of England queried the American 
timetable for reform, noting that Volcker seemed to envisage a period of weeks or even months 
before a return to fixed parities, raising the threat of a return to generalised floating for the first 
time since the war. Volcker replied that the credibility problem currently undermining Bretton 
Woods meant that markets did not trust the established parities as they stood – in which case a 
period of market determination might not be a bad thing. Volcker was concerned that an early 
announcement on realignment would not last. Kirbyshire of the Bank retorted that market 
determination was undermined by the amount of dollars circulating the world’s financial system.80
With no American concessions forthcoming, Heath formulated his response. The American plan had 
been left deliberately opaque but the general thrust of their demands – a realignment of currencies 
in which liquidity and convertibility would be based on the SDR – was not unwelcome to Britain, 
providing the terms could be settled favourably. However, the need to deal in concert with the 
Europeans remained paramount. Accordingly, the Heath government aimed for a joint float of 
European currencies against the dollar – thereby maintaining some stability in exchange rates while 
securing a commitment of European responsibility for the fate of sterling – but with the stronger 
German and Dutch currencies revalued first.81  Meeting with the EEC finance ministers towards the 
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end of August, Barber impressed on the Europeans the British desire to find a common solution to 
the crisis. However, the Six failed to agree a common approach between themselves, with Barber 
reporting disagreement over the level of “anti-Americanness” that should be adopted in the 
response.82
The deputy finance ministers of the G10 met in Paris at the beginning of September, but no solution 
to the crisis was forthcoming. The British, mindful of their third EEC application, were careful to line 
up with her future European partners in pressing for a rise in the price of gold.83  Volcker firmly 
resisted any such reform, while presenting the Europeans with the American objectives for 
realignment: a swing of $13bn in the American balance of payments, to eliminate controls on capital 
outflow while still turning a small surplus. According to Volcker his European counterparts were 
“appalled,” as they realised the magnitude of realignment that would be required of their currencies 
to bring about such a turnaround.84
Prior to the Paris Group of Ten meeting, Barber had met his EEC counterparts in Brussels in which he 
committed himself to a European solution, although differences between the Germans and French 
continued to preclude a common float. The French, for whom the CAP was the cornerstone of the 
European project, were generally opposed to floating, preferring elaborate exchange controls to 
deal with the crisis. The Germans, who had endured the worst of speculative inflows, advocated 
greater flexibility in dealing with the wider world. Barber followed by meeting with Giscard d’ Estaing 
in Paris on 7 September at which they agreed that an early return to fixed parities (sterling had been 
floating since exchange markets had re-opened on 23 August) was unlikely, as was fixing parities 
between European currencies. Barber agreed to join the French led push for a rise in the price of 
82 TNA PREM 15/309 "Note for the Record" Chancellor meets EEC finance ministers for consultations in 
Brussels. 19 August 1971 
83 Strange “The Dollar Crisis 1971” p205 
84 Volcker Changing Fortunes p81 
135 
gold, despite believing the chance of success to be low, given how much political capital Nixon had 
staked on the issue.85
Heath’s prioritisation of the EEC application is understandable given the importance membership 
had to British trade. However, this meant alignment with French in proposals for monetary reform 
to the detriment of British interests in this area, namely the issue of reserve currencies in 
international payments. As such the negotiation of an end to crisis and the prospect of a re-
establishing Bretton Woods took place in the forum of Franco-American discussions revolving 
around French demands for a rise in the price of gold. This marked a dramatic loss of influence since 
the original Bretton Woods conference and meant Britain was unable to secure progress on reform 
that would resolve the sterling balance problem. 
5.5 Negotiating a Return – September 1971 – December 1971 
As negotiations moved into the autumn, the issue on both sides was whether progress would be 
secured as part of a grand bargain or a quick fix followed by a return to the incremental reform 
process that had characterised the period prior to the Nixon Shock. For the Americans, securing 
greater flexibility in adjustment as well as fairer burden sharing in aid and security took priority. 
Britain on the other hand remained concerned about the role of reserve currencies providing 
international liquidity. However American isolation over the impact of the import surcharge meant a 
softening of their position, initially behind closed doors. George Schultz, then director of the Office 
of Management and Budget and a friend of Milton Friedman, advocated making a bold stand on 
reform, rewriting Connally’s IMF speech to back a system based on floating exchange rates although 
he was subsequently overruled.86 Opposing this view was Arthur Burns, who wished to restore as 
much of Bretton Woods as possible. Burns advocated dollar devaluation through a change in the 
price of gold, and the restoration of gold convertibility based on a new alignment of currencies. 
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Nixon was critical of Burns, believing him to be too conciliatory towards the Europeans and sought 
to enlist Kissinger to prevent the formation of an anti-Connally faction, noting “Arthur wants to give 
away the store. Connally’s standing firm.” Kissinger however was increasingly concerned that bad 
feeling over the Nixon Shock was jeopardising America’s other foreign objectives and sided with 
Burns. Confronting Nixon in November about the Secretary of the Treasury, Kissinger complained 
Connally was “like all Texans… just basically antiforeigner” and put his weight behind reaching a 
quick settlement.87  As a result, the American position had softened by the time of the IMF Annual 
Meeting in September. Connally denounced gold once more but offered to remove the hated 
surcharge if other countries agreed to use floating as a transitional method to establish revalued 
parities against the dollar.88
The British had some sympathy for this position but urged the Americans to go further. In his speech 
at the IMF, Barber recalled with gratitude the previous support the US had provided for Bretton 
Woods. On practical issues, he called for wider margins as a means of dealing with increased capital 
flows (contradicting the position he had taken the year before) and for a system of liquidity provision 
based on the SDR, arguing that the experience of the past few years had demonstrated the future 
did not lie with national currencies.89
Barber’s speech indicated that the British were favour of using the crisis to secure a wide-ranging 
reform, particularly one that involved resolution of the overhang that continued to threaten Heath 
despite the present stability of sterling. Nevertheless, there was a corresponding internal debate in 
Whitehall as to whether the best approach to the crisis would be to deal with exchange parities first 
before considering other issues or attempt to deal with all outstanding problems together in one 
grand reform. The Bank of England was in favour of focusing on exchange rates in the short run, 
believing any attempt to secure a grand deal in which all questions were settled simultaneously 
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would fail, provoking uncertainty in international trade and payments. This interpretation was 
challenged by Heath’s economic advisor Brian Reading, who portrayed proponents of such a ‘narrow 
front’ approach as Cassandras who exaggerated the challenges of negotiating a wider deal. 
According to Reading, an early restoration of fixed parities could not restore order to the monetary 
system since it was the fixed parities that were the problem in the first place. In Reading’s opinion, 
only once a new and sustainable system of liquidity provision had been achieved could rates be 
restored to fixed parities.90
The Treasury however sided with the Bank in its preference for an early deal on parities. Neale of the 
Treasury lambasted Reading’s portrayal of narrow front proponents as a straw man, arguing those in 
favour of moving first on a realignment were only setting out the stages in which reforms were to be 
achieved91 Replying to Neale, Reading said he had in mind the Bank of England rather than the 
Treasury and conceded the possibility of an agreement on realignment that preceded a wider reform 
but judged it unlikely to succeed.92
In hindsight, we can see the merits of both points of view. Reading was correct that fixed rates had 
become untenable given that the growth in short term capital flows, differential rates of inflation 
and size of the US deficit. However, the scale of the reform that the US had in mind, taking in not 
just a complete revision of Bretton Woods’ adjustment, liquidity and confidence, but also trade, aid 
and security meant it was unrealistic to expect such a deal to be negotiated at once. Moreover, the 
need to prioritise Britain’s application to the EEC meant Britain was unable to act as a constructive 
partner in securing such a reform. Barber was concerned that a global reform would be too difficult 
in the present circumstances and hoped for a coordinated European response. The key issue for 
Heath was where Britain wanted to be on 1 January 1973 (the date of its accession to the EEC). In an 
ideal outcome Heath envisaged a stable but competitive exchange rate and the sterling balances run 
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down to an extent where it was not necessary to discriminate between capital movements from the 
Sterling Area and Europe.93
This confused debate – whether to proceed on a wide or narrow front regarding international 
reform, coupled with the need to consider the EEC application in formulating policy – meant Britain 
had little influence on the emerging agreement to restore parities at a revised gold price. Events 
were moving forward without British input. At the end of November, pressure was building within 
the White House to come to some form of settlement. After discussing with Schultz, Kissinger and 
Burns, Nixon agreed that Connally should now look for the best possible deal in return for removing 
the surcharge. The shift in American policy was first revealed during a ministerial meeting of the 
Group of Ten at the beginning of December. In response to a question on the price of gold during a 
discussion on exchange realignments, Volcker replied that such a change was not excluded, but 
dependent on the whole package of reforms. Connally jumped in impatiently: “All right, assume a 
10% devaluation of the dollar against gold. What would you do?" which preceded a long silence.94
Once the Europeans finally found their voices, the Germans expressed willingness to agree to a 
realignment of 12% while the Italians protested they could not take part in any realignment.95 The 
British looked to secure the best deal for sterling, which they believed could extend to matching the 
dollar’s devaluation. However, they were forced to concede some form of change in parity regarding 
the dollar. Meeting with Heath after the Group of Ten meeting, O’Brien told the Prime Minister that 
the US would require at least a 7.5% devaluation of the dollar if it were to move on gold – the best 
the British could hope for was that sterling’s gold price would be unchanged. 96
It was decided a bilateral summit between Nixon and President Pompidou of France would be the 
best method of resolving the issues, meaning British proposals for liquidity reform were unlikely to 
93 TNA PREM 15/310 "International Monetary Situation" 03 November 1971 
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be given much attention.97 Prior to the meeting, Heath sent a message to the French President in 
which he stated his support for a change in the dollar price of gold, new removals of tariff and non-
tariff barriers and long term reform to reduce the use of national currencies in international 
payments. Heath however considered it unlikely Nixon would push for a large reform prior to his re-
election in 1972 and therefore recommended opting for the quick fix: realignment of currencies in 
return for removal of the surcharge.98
The summit itself at the Azores between Nixon and Pompidou saw agreement on the value of gold 
being changed from $35 to $38 per ounce (although dollar-gold convertibility was not restored). 
while committing to work towards a realignment of currencies. Pompidou lectured Nixon on the 
evils of the dollar standard while Volcker, Connally and Giscard d’Estaing sat in another room 
working out the main issues.99 These realignments were agreed at a meeting of the G10 at the 
Smithsonian Institute in Washington the following week; by maintaining their gold parities, sterling 
and the franc effectively appreciated by 8.57% due to the increase in the price of gold. In addition, 
exchange rate margins were increased to 2.25% either side of parity to increase the flexibility of the 
system.100 Nixon appeared unannounced on 18 December to hail “the conclusion of the most 
significant monetary agreement in the history of the world.” Volcker was heard to retort “I hope it 
lasts three months.”101
Volcker’s concern was to prove justified. As Barry Eichengreen argues, the agreement failed to 
resolve the Triffin dilemma and brought only temporary relief to the dollar’s competitiveness.102 The 
breakdown of the Smithsonian agreement began almost immediately. According to James, the 
continued weakness of the dollar due to the Fed’s expansive monetary policy demonstrated the 
determination of the Nixon administration “not to let international considerations stand in the way 
97 Allen Matusow Nixon’s Economy p175 
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of domestic economic objectives.”103 To Gavin, this heralded the end of Bretton Woods, as the 
Smithsonian marked the last time that the US demonstrated commitment to fixed exchange rates 
and willingness to act as “caretaker of the global payments system.”104
The most notable change was the American attitude towards international cooperation. Throughout 
the Bretton Woods period, America had judged its wider geopolitical interests (namely containing 
the Soviet threat) best served economically through the cooperative framework of institutional 
based intermediation in adjustment and liquidity. While the IMF continued to play an important role 
(as would be demonstrated in 1976), influential voices within the Nixon and Ford administrations, 
now took a more confrontational approach towards the reconstructed European and Japanese 
economies they believed were not pulling their weight in matters of trade, aid and security. They 
accordingly looked to more market-led intermediation in which floating exchange rates and an 
unconvertible dollar standard helped finance American hegemony and restored the dollar’s 
competitiveness.  
5.6 Attempts at Reform January 1972 – May 1972
These developments were of course not immediately apparent. The realignment of parities agreed 
at the Smithsonian was intended as a short run solution that would buy time while more intractable 
problems involving adjustment, liquidity and confidence were dealt with. The British looked to 
engage the Americans at the beginning of 1972 on questions of reform that, it was hoped, would 
resolve the problem of the sterling balances. Meanwhile, Heath’s expansionary domestic policies 
(see below) raised the prospect of a return to sterling instability. It was the failure of any meaningful 
progress in Anglo-American discussions that prompted Heath looked to Europe as a surrogate 
system of support, although his refusal to accept any discipline or conditionality meant little was 
forthcoming.  
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Undoubtedly Anglo-American relations had been strained during the period following the Nixon 
Shock as American unilateralism was exacerbated by Heath’s pro-European response. In an attempt 
to rebuild bridges, Cromer was instructed to inform Kissinger that UK entry into Europe did not 
mean “off with the old and on with new” regarding America, merely that it was “essential for us at 
this time not to get out of step with our future European partners.”105
Both nations had a continued interest in monetary reform, although in the long run the end of the 
gold-dollar link removed a lot of the pressure on the US. While the Smithsonian agreement had seen 
progress on the issue of adjustment by re-establishing parities and widening the bands in which they 
fluctuated there had been little progress on liquidity. Britain’s most important objective was to 
secure international control over liquidity via a modified SDR scheme so that foreign holdings of 
sterling could be consolidated on reasonable terms.106 The strategy to achieve this, outlined by 
Cromer and agreed to by Heath, lay in confronting French “extremism,” without openly siding with 
the Americans against the Europeans.107 The French wanted greater controls on capital outflows, 
restored gold convertibility to instil discipline on the dollar and fixed exchange rates, at least 
between European currencies, in order to safeguard the CAP. They were suspicious of schemes to 
consolidate reserve currencies into SDRs believing they involved the international community 
assuming the debts of individual countries.108 According to the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir 
Christopher Soames, they were cynical that the Americans would ever accept the disciplines and 
responsibilities of a “one world” system and accordingly looked to European monetary union in 
which to insulate the community from the storms raging outside.109
The French position was diametrically opposed to the increasingly liberal position of the US, which 
favoured removals of restrictions on investment and capital flows, particularly after George Schultz 
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took over as Secretary of the Treasury in 1972.110 From the American point of view, the US deficit 
was the result of other countries’ refusal to let them return to balance by running sustained 
surpluses while protecting their own markets from US competition. Accordingly, they looked to 
reform the monetary system to bring adjustment pressures onto surplus countries. This meant that 
once the dollar had achieved a greater degree of competitiveness following successive devaluations 
in 1973, US would lose interest liquidity reform as they continued to enjoy the benefits of issuing a 
reserve currency. Anglo-American interests also diverged due to the application for EEC membership 
which would place the British economy behind the EEC’s common external tariff, effectively 
discriminating against US trade.111
Although these diverging interests placed Britain in a difficult position, when Heath and Nixon met at 
the end of 1971 at Bermuda there was however optimism within some quarters of the British press 
that a rapprochement might be at hand. One article in The Guardian claimed the Bermuda summit 
represented a new chapter in Anglo-American relations and an end to the ‘uneasy client status’ to 
which the ‘special relationship’ had degenerated.112  In monetary relations however there was little 
progress. Heath complained to Nixon that the IMF was too slow in facing up to the issue of monetary 
reform, which was of interest to the UK as it tried to mitigate its obligations as a reserve currency.113
With the short-term question of alignment supposedly settled by the Smithsonian agreement, 
Barber took the opportunity to press for progress on wider ranging reform, particularly on the 
question of liquidity and reserve assets. Connally however was not impressed, expressing doubt 
whether the SDR could command the support required for it to form the basis of the world 
monetary system.114
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Lack of enthusiasm on the part of the US towards British objectives in reform meant Heath 
increasingly looked to Europe as a surrogate source of support. With British membership agreed in 
February 1972, hopes were raised that prospective European monetary union might be able to 
secure the long-term viability of sterling.115  As Brian Reading argued, the Smithsonian agreement, 
including the price at which America “might refuse to buy and sell gold” were “mere palliatives,” 
while dollars continued to flood the world. Only lasting reform on liquidity would restore security to 
the system and for sterling.116 The British attempted to impress on their new European partners the 
need for urgency. Courting the traditional French desire to play an independent role in world affairs, 
Heath argued that the effective American “abdication” from the position of leadership in monetary 
reform presented the EEC with the initiative. The French however were more concerned with 
stability in exchange rates and therefore urged the Americans to intervene in support of the dollar as 
a first step before restoring convertibility, neither of which had much attraction to Washington.117
For their part, the Americans were reluctant to state definite proposals prior to the 1972 Presidential 
election, in case it sparked instability in the world economy or engaged Nixon in protracted debates 
with his European counterparts.118 At a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in March, Connally 
justified holding back on American proposals for reform until agreement had been reached on the 
desired world economic order. Connally used his speech to challenge the Europeans to announce 
their own vision, in particular whether Europe itself would become a “liberalising and stabilising 
force” or descend into an “inward looking, defensive bloc.”119 Despite the challenging tone, a 
telegram from the British embassy in Washington assured the Treasury that it was an “epitome of 
reasonableness” compared to a first draft which proposed to lambast Cromer and Giscard d’Estaing 
for recent references to dollar convertibility.120
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Instead of meaningful progress, debate centred over the correct forum for discussions on reform. 
Traditionally the Group of Ten had been used to agree reforms such as the General Agreement to 
Borrow, but the US were concerned the Europeans were over-represented and pushed for less 
developed countries [LDCs] to be included in order to mitigate the anti-American tone.121 The logical 
choice was the IMF but the US also distrusted the Fund’s supposed institutional bias (since the 
Managing Director is traditionally European) and doubted whether they would be able to link trade 
and monetary questions under the aegis of the Fund.122 The Americans therefore proposed a new 
grouping – the Group of Twenty – that corresponded to the regional composition of the Fund. The 
group was established at conference in London in April, despite the objections of Cromer who 
argued that the group would undermine the Fund by interposing between the Managing Director 
and his staff a new committee with its own chairman.123
In the meantime, the US policy towards the dollar remained one of benign neglect. Naturally such a 
strategy did nothing to endear the Americans to the French. So concerned was Pompidou with the 
effect loose American monetary policy was having on international exchange rates that he wrote to 
Nixon personally, urging him to adopt more appropriate policies.124 As a Foreign Office official noted, 
while the main concern for the British was restoring a viable system of trade and payments, with due 
regard to stability, the French had it the other way round.125 In return, the French viewed British 
proposals for liquidity reform as suspicious, coinciding as it did with American interests. Pompidou’s 
support for an SDR order was conditional on some form of gold link without which he claimed it 
would have no intrinsic value.126
The British were unable to stimulate American thinking on monetary reform. At a meeting between 
representatives of both countries’ Treasuries in Washington at the beginning of March the British 
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outlined their tentative reforms to their American counterparts. The heart of the British proposals 
was an improved version of the SDR which would act as the numeraire of the system on which all 
exchange parities would be fixed. Foreign holdings of currency would be consolidated into SDRs and 
all currencies would be convertible in this manner.127 The American response was critical but they 
refrained from offering any constructive suggestions. Their focus was bringing adjustment pressures 
to bear on surplus countries as well as restricting other countries’ unfair trading practices. They were 
also interested in the development of private capital flows, areas in which the British admitted they 
were lacking detail.128
Lack of progress on reform undermined the commitment to the Smithsonian agreement. As we have 
seen, devaluation reinforced rather than weakened the commitment to the exchange rate peg. 
Floating had only been considered as a last resort in the Treasury’s contingency plans (although 
opinion in parts of the Bank of England had been more favourable). This had been based on the 
understanding that Bretton Woods provided the best framework for stability in trade upon which 
British growth depended, while general reform offered the potential for easing the constraint 
imposed by the sterling balances. Despite the Nixon Shock, and the period of general floating it 
inaugurated, the attempt to re-establish parities at the Smithsonian reflected that the desire the 
continue with the process of reform had not vanished. However, the lack of any American initiative 
in this area undermined British commitment to the sterling peg. Domestic considerations as Heath 
attempted to expand the economy now took priority over international obligations. 
5.7 The Sterling Float – April 1972 – June 1972 
The floating of sterling in June 1972 took place within a reappraisal of British foreign economic 
strategy. On the one hand, the breakdown of Bretton Woods and with it the normative commitment 
to pegged exchange rates, coupled with the experience of ‘stop-go’ rounds of deflation over the 
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previous ten years implied it would be better for the exchange rate itself ‘to take the strain.’ Floating 
exchange rates had attracted growing interest, initially in academic circles before spreading to the 
commentariat. There was appeal both to the right, who favoured market based determination of the 
rate, and the left who conversely believed it would free management of the domestic economy from 
placating market opinion, the famous ‘gnomes of Zurich.’ In contrast to his perception as ‘Selsdon 
Man,’ it was in fact this later motivation that drove the Heath government. With unemployment 
climbing, Heath was not prepared to see the economic boom initiated by the 1972 and 1973 budgets 
choked off by the need to defend the rate.129 Thus by June 1972 there existed both the opportunity 
and motive to float the rate, in contrast to 1967.  
Nevertheless, the problem of the sterling balances remained, and would continue to constrain 
economic policy even with a floating exchange rate. The lack of progress on general reform involving 
substitution through the SDR prompted Heath to seek alternative policies that would stabilise the 
balances and therefore reduce the constraint these imposed on sterling. As Cromer had suggested in 
his immediate response to the Nixon Shock, a common European monetary bloc now offered the 
most obvious source of support for sterling. Heath hoped that by committing to European monetary 
integration, sterling would secure a new source of unconditional support as part of a process of 
jointly pooling assets and liabilities. However, Heath’s approach to national and international 
economic management was “highly inconsistent” according to James.130 At the same time as making 
grandiose commitments to European monetary union, his domestic policies undermined the 
prospects of British participation. Ultimately Heath, unlike Wilson, truly went it alone, prioritising the 
growth of the domestic economy over all external considerations. These political commitments 
shaped the nature of Britain’s external constraint, both permitting a more expansionary domestic 
policy though a floating rate but isolating sterling from sources of support.  
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According to the Werner Report published in 1970, the first stage of European Monetary Union 
would require reducing exchange fluctuation between European currencies. However, under the 
Smithsonian agreement, parities had been widened to 4.5%. Since these were expressed in dollars, 
this meant two European currencies could move 9% in respect of each other, if one was at the top of 
its dollar parity and the other at the bottom. This was an unacceptable level of fluctuation, 
particularly to the French, for whom the CAP was a cornerstone of the European project and which 
would be jeopardised by large swings in European currencies. An agreement in Basle in April 1972 
committed both the six existing members of the EEC and the three prospective members, including 
the UK, to limit currency fluctuations between them to +/- 2.25% either side of parity. This narrower 
band of fluctuation, operating as it did within the larger Smithsonian band became known as the 
‘Snake in the Tunnel.’ As part of his European response to the breakdown of Bretton Woods, Heath 
committed sterling to joining within two months of the April deal.131
At the same time however, Heath was undermining the stability of sterling through domestic pump 
priming. The so-called ‘Barber Boom’ witnessed an unprecedented expansion of demand, followed 
in short order by an unprecedented balance of payments deficit. The boom had its roots in the 
unemployment figure hitting the emotional level of 1 million at the beginning of 1972. Heath also 
felt the economy needed stimulation to prepare it for the increased competition it would face 
following accession to the EEC on 1 January 1973. In his 1972 budget, Barber cut £1bn off income 
taxes, another £1.3bn from purchase tax, increased social benefits and pensions and unveiled a 
package aimed at encouraging investment, including regional investment grants and “free 
depreciation” for new investment in plant and machinery.132 The result was a predictable consumer 
boom, criticised by Edmund Dell for over-stimulating the economy and using up spare capacity that 
might otherwise be used in exports to countries that were themselves reflating.133 However at the 
131 Catherine Schenk International Economic Relations Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2011) p53  
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time the action was endorsed from all sides, with a whole spectrum of opinion from the TUC to The 
Economist magazine urging the government on.134
Most notable in his budget speech was Barber’s refusal to make a ritual declaration of commitment 
towards the sterling parity: 
I am sure that all hon. Members in this house agree that the lesson of the 
international balance of payments upsets of the last few years is that it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in 
order to maintain unrealistic exchange rates, whether they are too high or too 
low.135
 Although other fundamental factors also had responsibility for the sterling crisis that developed in 
June – notably a dock strike resulting from union discontent over government’s Industrial Relations 
Act – this statement was symbolic in that it represented the view that managing sterling’s external 
value would no longer be a constraint on domestic policy. A comment by Shadow Chancellor Denis 
Healey that sterling would soon be devalued exacerbated the situation, initiating the first sterling 
crisis since 1969.136 The crisis was driven by movements in the sterling balances, particularly the 
Persian Gulf territories which had accumulated sterling assets exceeding their Minimum Sterling 
Proportion [MSPs] as a result of rising oil revenues.137
As capital flowed out in June, the Cabinet discussed options for sterling. Devaluation was considered 
but rejected on the grounds that a small one would be ineffective while a large one would wreck the 
Smithsonian parities. Heath was reluctant to raise interest rates due to the effect this would have on 
his domestic boom. The decision to float therefore reflected the extent to which opinion had moved 
on since 1967.138 But 1972 was not 1967. As Yeager noted, in a way the float was unprecedented - 
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never before had a country abandoned support of its currency with such large reserves as Britain.”139
This was a point raised at the time by Barber, who himself denied the situation was like 1967; the 
current account was in surplus and the Bank of England had substantial reserves (see Figure 5.3). 
Rather, having just paid off its debt incurred from the previous bout of sterling instability, the British 
not want to incur fresh liabilities to defeat speculation for which they saw no objective basis. Heath 
put the point in these terms in his messages to President Pompidou and German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt justifying the decision, arguing: 
We do not think it right indefinitely to spend our reserves, or to build up new 
international borrowing in order to finance these short-term swings of capital 
movements for which there is no justification.140
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1975 Q1 “Table 21: Reserves and related Items” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1977 Q1, 
Table 23: Reserves and related items”; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1979 Q1 “Table 16: Reserves and related items,” 
The decision to float was taken on 23 June. O’Brien, who was on holiday in Cannes at the time, was 
not consulted and awoke to the news that sterling had been floated.141 The immediate impact was 
5.8% a depreciation in the rate to $2.46 from $2.61 on 12 June where it settled for most of the rest 
of the year, dipping slightly further to $2.35 by the end of the year before rallying in response to a 
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new dollar crisis (see Figure 5.4). While the economic impact was therefore initially rather modest, 
floating did have significant implications for Britain’s relationship with its economic partners. Heath 
had prioritised domestic autonomy over its international obligations, despite the unsettled nature of 
its relationship with America, Europe and the Sterling Area as well as the dubious prospects for 
reform. This was part of an attempt to manage the external constraint, securing greater flexibility in 
adjustment to facilitate more expansionary domestic policies while relying on economic diplomacy 
to secure the long-term stability of the sterling balances.  
Federal Reserve, “G.5/H.10 – Foreign Exchange Rates” [Online] https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload (accessed 13 August 2019) 
The decision to float sterling resulted in a transformation of the Sterling Area but took place without 
any plan for a corresponding transformation regarding the sterling balances. The breakdown of 
Bretton Woods had already weakened the links between the OSA and the UK. At the Smithsonian, 
several members including Australia, New Zealand as well as some developing countries had already 
ceased to peg to sterling. After sterling’s float, most Sterling Area countries followed suit.142 During 
its application for membership of the EEC, Britain had eased controls over direct investment outside 
the sterling area as part of its commitment to end the sterling balances and facilitate intra-European 
investment. Now as part of the measures supporting the float of sterling, the British took the 
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opportunity to extend its system of exchange control to the entire OSA (excluding Ireland), 
effectively ending the Sterling Area.143 The gradual erosion of the area’s relation to the metropole 
meant its end became a “footnote to the retreat of sterling rather than a crucial element” in 
Schenk’s phrase.144
The sterling balances however remained a problem and were likely to become more so now that 
another bond had been broken with the holders, following on from Britain’s military withdrawal east 
of Suez. The exchange guarantees under the 1968 Sterling Agreements had been renewed for 2 
years in August 1971, with the Treasury arguing that had they not been in place diversification of 
OSA holders could have sunk the pound, with disastrous consequences for the government’s 
inflation policy. However due to the attractive terms of the agreement, £800m was currently being 
held in excess of MSP and could be switched into other currencies. Floating complicated the matter 
as fluctuations in the rate could temporarily bring sterling’s value underneath the guaranteed rate 
and raised prospect of having to make compensation payments on top of the high interest rates.145
Therefore Britain ended its commitment to the sterling area without any final resolution of its 
liabilities, leaving it dangerously exposed in the years to come. Nevertheless, the balances 
themselves would not become a problem until 1975, following a further build up resulting from the 
OPEC oil shock. 
Within Europe, the French were particularly affronted by the decision to float sterling. According to 
the British ambassador in Paris, they took a “rough attitude” to the decision, believing Heath had 
reneged on his commitment to Europe in joining the Snake.146 Pompidou’s response to Heath’s initial 
notification was coldly civil in which the French President “took note” of the British intention to 
return to a fixed parity which he then went on to extoll as one of the “essential conditions for the 
proper functioning of the Common Market.” He subsequently let it be known through the British 
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Embassy that it was important sterling was re-pegged by the time Britain joined the EEC on 1 
January 1973.147 Floating of sterling also added to the European frustration with the breakdown of 
the Smithsonian agreement. Between sterling’s float and 17 July European central banks took in 
$4.9bn as speculators moved against the dollar, highlighting the problem of benign neglect.148
Therefore Heath’s decision undermined any prospect of French cooperation on the sterling balances 
as part of a European response to the breakdown of Bretton Woods. 
The American response was more nuanced. The impact on the dollar was likely to be minimal, as 
European central banks had a strong interest in not letting the dollar decline and would likely 
continue to support it until the crisis passed. The failure of the Snake vindicated the American 
refusal to restore convertibility until a more stable system had been established.149 In hindsight we 
can see a certain inevitability to floating, as changes in the global economy, particularly the growth 
of capital flows and differential rates of inflation raised the cost of commitment to fixed rates. The 
experience of previous years and a growing academic consensus also testified in floating’s favour. 
However, the way Heath decided to float was handled poorly, given that it upset the French at the 
same time that a lack of global reform meant Heath now looked upon Europe as a means of support 
for the sterling balances. 
5.8 Post-Bretton Woods Reform – July 1972 – December 1972 
The float of sterling marked the definitive breakdown of Smithsonian agreement. The question now 
turned to what would come next. Britain continued to hope for a general reform to the world’s 
provision of liquidity that would take in sterling’s role as an international currency. However, the glut 
of dollars following the Nixon Shock had undermined concern about a liquidity shortage. As Harold 
James puts it, “the demand for international reserves was more than filled in a technical sense…but 
147 TNA PREM 15/813 "Letter from Pompidou to Heath" 7 July 1972 
148 Schenk Decline of Sterling p327 
149 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 3 “Nixon Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs 
(Flanigan) to President Nixon” 23 June 1972 
153 
perhaps not a spiritual sense.”150 Although the dollar’s gold price had been revalued at the 
Smithsonian, this was somewhat academic given that it remained unconvertible. This gave rise to 
the unprecedented situation of international payments being conducted based on fiat currencies. 
This meant continued interest in reform but ultimately little progress as ‘benign neglect’ stoked 
European resentment before being fatally undermined by the OPEC oil shock which ushered in a 
new era of international monetary relations.   
Britain hoped that the floating of sterling might prompt movement on a grand reform of the system. 
In a letter written to Heath in the week following sterling’s float, Cromer expressed the belief that 
the decision might “start to wean the Treasury off the belief that ‘patching up’ Bretton Woods might 
suffice to meet future needs.” Cromer submitted a paper in which he warned of the danger of a 
return to the competitive devaluations of the 1930s and claimed the inconvertibility of the dollar 
since the Nixon Shock marked the beginning of its end as a “serviceable reserve currency.” While 
this was far off the mark he was more astute in deriding the SDR as an “extraordinarily 
uncharismatic” and unsuited to the role of the system’s numeraire in that as a “right to contract a 
loan” it could not compare to “ownership of an asset,” be it gold or dollars. Instead Cromer 
proposed the creation of a Vehicular Currency Unit [VCU] through which all international payments, 
both private and public, would be compulsory. The value of this unit could be based either on gold 
or a basket of commodities or currencies, like the SDR. The main difference was that it would be 
enshrined under the rules of the system as the only reserve asset for both public and private 
transactions. No bank would be permitted to maintain an account for a non-resident in local 
currency, nor would a non-resident’s disposal of assets be bankable in local currency but only in 
VCUs which would then be converted into the resident’s home currency. Speculative capital flows 
motivated by interest rate differentials would be eliminated as non-residents would not be able to 
deposit money in foreign currencies, allowing governments to pursue more expansionary domestic 
150 James International Monetary Cooperation pp.229-230 
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policies, while liquidity growth would depend on the IMF rather than gold or reserve currencies’ 
deficits.151 Although Heath recorded himself in a “good deal of sympathy” with Cromer’s ideas, they 
did not form the basis of the British position. However, Heath agreed that the “mere patching up of 
Bretton Woods will not be enough” and sought to initiate a lasting change.152 In his message to 
Nixon informing the President of the decision to float sterling he argued it was time “to think in 
terms of much more radical changes than we have as yet envisaged.”153 Nixon himself was too 
preoccupied by Watergate to give it much attention, but the reply drafted by Volcker indicated this 
type of thinking found a reception in the White House:  
We should no longer be inhibited by the fear that certain approaches can be 
unthinkingly damned by some as too “radical” a departure from the past.154
However, unlike in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, America no longer had the power to 
unilaterally impose its vision of international monetary relations on the rest of world. They faced 
determined opposition from the French. A meeting between EEC finance ministers and those of 
joining states held in London in July outlined the main areas of contention. For the French, the main 
issue was the role of the numeraire in the system. When convertibility was restored, the French 
demanded to know, into what and with respect to what? The SDR was the natural choice but how 
would this be constituted in a world awash with liquidity? The French worried that foreign exchange 
balances would be consolidated in a weak SDR paying a low interest rate and with no intrinsic value, 
in effect swapping one piece of paper for another. There was deep cynicism that the US would 
accept the obligations of an SDR standard in which the dollar was convertible and adjusted like any 
other currency and therefore looked to European monetary union to secure “maximum security of 
parities with minimum loss of sovereignty.” Accordingly, they were supportive of capital controls 
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that protected this sovereignty.155 The sterling balances meant the British were sympathetic to the 
idea of consolidation through the SDR scheme but American unilateralism meant that Heath placed 
his hopes in a European initiative and moderated his language accordingly in line with placating 
French concerns.156
Within the US Treasury reform proposals were coalescing around ‘Plan X’ which was due to be 
unveiled to the world at the IMF annual meeting in the autumn. Under Plan X the SDR would form 
the numeraire of the system. Exchange rates would be pegged to SDR with margins 3-4% either side 
but with provision for temporary floating in order to secure adjustment to a new parity. Primary 
reserves would consist of gold, SDRs and IMF gold tranches while dollars and other foreign exchange 
reserves would be converted into SDRs during a limited “open season.” General convertibility would 
be in operation, so that a country acquiring foreign exchange reserves would be permitted to 
present it to the country of origin in return for primary reserves. 
The major American innovation was their adoption of objective indicators to facilitate adjustment 
for both surplus and deficit countries. Although foreign exchange holdings would not be prohibited, 
once total reserves reached a certain threshold of “normal levels” it would be assumed that 
adjustment was necessary. At this point convertibility would be suspended, surcharges against 
exports authorised and pressure to expand aid and liberalise trade and payments applied.157
Schultz revealed the plan to the world at the IMF meeting. The reaction was generally favourable. A 
briefing for Kissinger noted a “widespread feeling of relief that the US had resumed position of 
leadership in monetary affairs.” With Schultz talking about dollar convertibility it appeared that 
more conciliatory relationship with the French was possible.158 Although holding some doubts about 
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the actual operation of reserve indicators, Heath was pleased by the growing consensus in favour of 
an SDR based scheme.159
However, this progress was undermined when Volcker argued in a speech in New York that in order 
to achieve the objective of a ‘one world’ system laid out by Schultz at the IMF, progress was needed 
on removing trade and investment restrictions. In particular Volcker argued that reform to trade and 
monetary arrangements should proceed in tandem so that incentives involving trade liberalisation 
could be built into the adjustment process.160 The renewed focus on the indivisibility of the American 
proposals disappointed the British Treasury who felt it conflicted with recent affirmations that the 
American position was a flexible one.161 This confusion over American priorities and execution 
meant that progress on global international reform made little progress throughout 1972 and was 
soon overtaken by another exchange crisis, this time concerning the dollar. Once again, despite 
innate sympathy for the American position, Britain found itself alongside the Europeans but with 
policies unaligned.  
5.9: A European Solution? – January 1973 – September 1973
International reform discussions were derailed by series of dollar crises at the beginning of 1973 that 
demonstrated the limits of benign neglect, but also the scope of American commitment to reform 
beyond securing greater flexibility in adjustment. The Americans were forced to reappraise their 
policy for the dollar but were still unable to enforce their vision of a reformed monetary system 
against European resistance. Instead a compromise involving a managed float of the dollar restored 
competitiveness to the American currency while also fatally undermining the desire to proceed with 
general liquidity reform. 
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The year began with what Burns described as a “jittery atmosphere” prevailing in the market in 
response to the Italian decision to establish a dual-exchange system and the floating of the Swiss 
franc at the end of January. More fundamental problems, according to Burns, lay in uncertainty over 
the future prospect of the monetary system, given the continued American deficit and the lack of 
progress over meaningful reform. The danger was that rather than leading to a liberalised 
multilateral system of trade and payments, American benign neglect might instead prompt a return 
to the nationalism and bilateralism of the pre-war period.162
Burns proposed Nixon pressure Heath to take the initiative in Europe and speed up the progress of 
reform. Opposing this view was Schultz who denied the need for any precipitate action and was 
concerned that a short-term fix would prevent more meaningful reform further down the line.163
Since 22 January, $4.3bn had flowed out of dollars, with $2.6bn going into deutschmarks. When 
asked what they should do about it, Schultz shrugged that the speculation was “based on reality.” 
With a $6bn deficit projected for the year, Schultz argued that the Smithsonian agreement had failed 
to offer the correction required for US competitiveness, noting that some countries –particularly 
Britain – had restored their competitiveness by exchange rate changes since then. Schultz argued for 
a US devaluation of 6.5% and a Japanese revaluation of similar magnitude while inducing the 
Europeans to hold the line and not follow the dollar down.164
Within the administration Schultz continued to endorse floating as a means of adjustment, noting 
the British experience indicated it was more successful than successive devaluations by providing 
some form of insulation against speculative movements. However, Nixon was resistant to applying 
this lesson to the dollar, worrying that while it was applicable for sterling, for America it would be 
too much of a “to hell with the rest of the world” policy.165  Burns eagerly agreed. Explicitly floating 
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the dollar would be considered an act of “economic belligerency.166 Instead Paul Volcker was 
dispatched on a tour of Japan and the European capitals to thrash out a fresh realignment of 
parities.167
The dollar crisis compounded the difficult position Heath found himself in regarding his European 
partners in 1973. The UK had formally become a member of the EEC on New Year’s Day, at which 
point the French expected sterling to re-join the Snake. However, both the Treasury and Bank of 
England expressed doubts about maintaining fixed rates in Europe at the current time, given the 
differing success in controlling inflation and the time needed to align economic performance. 
Although loath to disappoint the French by floating after 1 January, it was agreed it would be worse 
to re-fix only to be pushed off parity shortly after.168 Concerned about the prospects of talks with the 
CBI and TUC as part of the government’s anti-inflation policy, Heath wrote to Pompidou committing 
himself to fixed rates in principle but proposing instead to do so by 1 April. At this point a European 
Monetary Co-Operation Fund [EMCF] was due to be set up that Heath believed would be able to 
support sterling and prevent it dropping out again.169 Heath was reluctant to engage in fresh 
commitment for sterling without a corresponding degree of support, placing him in direct opposition 
to the French who were adamant that support would only be forthcoming once sterling had re-
engaged with the Snake system of parities. In doing so, Heath traded flexibility for support.  
Heath’s reluctance to commit to fresh external obligations was down to the unstable situation in the 
domestic economy. O’Brien was warning that prospects for domestic growth were dependent on 
success in controlling inflation and improving investment. With monetary policy having tightened 
since the beginning of the year, O’Brien felt that fiscal policy must now be brought into line, with the 
£4bn Public Sector Borrowing Requirement indicating an “an excessively expansionary stance” that 
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would further exacerbate inflation.170 The rise in the value of sterling as capital flowed out of the 
dollar and into European currencies raised fears in Britain that there would be renewed European 
pressure to fix the currency within the Snake.171 However Heath also spied an opportunity in the 
dollar crisis, believing the time was right for decisive European action on monetary integration 
including British involvement in return for European commitment on the sterling balances.  
Speaking with Brandt on the 9 February, Heath sympathised with the plight of the Germans who 
were taking in unprecedented amounts of dollars because of the crisis and agreed to a meeting of 
European finance ministers to be held that weekend in Paris.172 Conferring with his Treasury 
advisers, Heath was told that outcome of the crisis likely involved three possibilities: a US 
devaluation, a collective European float or universal adoption of two tier exchange markets.173
The German position had by this time become critical. In a defensive letter to Nixon, Brandt argued 
that his government had fulfilled its obligations towards the Smithsonian in both letter and spirit. 
The two previous revaluations of the Deutschmark had demonstrated German commitment to 
international solidarity but felt that a further revaluation would be inappropriate given domestic 
circumstances and called on the Americans to do “everything in their power” to support the 
dollar.174 In reply Nixon stated that the US had in fact undertaken intervention in support of the 
dollar, despite making no such commitment to do so at the Smithsonian. He agreed that the time 
was right for urgent action and referred to his dispatch of Paul Volcker to facilitate multilateral 
agreement.175
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Speaking to Heath the following day, Brandt warned that if the Germans were forced into unilateral 
action by lack of American support it would mean the postponement of European plans for 
economic and monetary union for some time.176 Barber reported that his opposite number Helmut 
Schmidt had said a two-tier market was not possible and the DM would have to float if no other 
solution was forthcoming. Discussion at the European meeting had turned to the chances of a joint 
European float. The French were in favour to which Barber had reiterated the British desire not to 
re-fix prematurely. Schmidt had then spoken of the support the Germans could provide towards 
maintaining a common float. After Barber had reported this discussion back to Heath, the Prime 
Minister suggested outflanking the Community float with a more ambitious solution involving 
complete monetary union and joint pooling of reserves.177
Meanwhile Paul Volcker had arrived in Germany from Japan and outlined three alternatives to 
Brandt: a joint float, no action, or the US favoured proposal of devaluation. Under the third proposal, 
Volcker emphasised the German responsibility to hold their current rate and looked for them to 
influence Europe on capital controls and gold.178 The next day, on the 11th, Volcker report back to 
Washington after a “long, rough and tough” session with Giscard d’Estaing in which he had outlined 
the same choices.  Giscard accused the US of not doing enough to maintain the existing system of 
parities and talked about the European joint float which he explained as a European effort to 
construct its own monetary system.179 Volcker moved onto London, where Heath – who had been 
forewarned about the 3 options by Brandt – had already decided that a US devaluation of 10% and a 
Japanese float were the most agreeable outcomes from the British point of view.180
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Barber called Schultz at 3pm on the 11th to inform him that Volcker’s 3rd option was agreeable, while 
sterling would continue to float. On the evening of the 12th Schultz announced the devaluation of 
the US dollar.181 Speaking to the press the next day, Giscard stated that the main French concern was 
to find a European solution. The calm restored by the dollar’s devaluation was short lived and by the 
end of the month speculation had built to the extent that Nixon appeared at a press conference to 
announce the US would “survive” the international attack on the dollar made by speculators and 
stated categorically that there would be no further devaluation.182
The renewed speculation and American reluctance to move again so shortly after the previous 
devaluation meant the initiative moved once more into the European court. For the British, this 
meant another opportunity to press for consolidation of the sterling balances. Meeting with Brandt 
in Bonn on 1 March, Heath argued for a substantial acceleration in the timings towards monetary 
union laid out in the Werner report. According to Heath, the current crisis meant that Europe 
needed to contain the dollar flow and establish a European solution, involving reserve pooling and 
economic and monetary union.183
Outlining the German position, Pohl of the Bundesbank remarked that while floating of DM was 
attractive from a purely national viewpoint, it would come as great shock to the EEC and end the 
current progress towards European monetary union. Prior to Volcker’s mission the Germans had 
been in favour of a joint float but the recent dollar devaluation had prevented this. Now with the 
Americans ruling out any further action on the dollar, it seemed an idea whose time had come. From 
a technical standpoint, as an initial step it would only require non-intervention with regards to 
dollars, while intervening within the EEC to maintain fixed parities. This however would then be 
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followed by pooling of national reserves, a European central bank and possibly even a European 
treasury.184
To Brandt, the main question was how the Community would respond. Following the disastrous 
1968 Bonn conference 1968, as well as criticism of his Ostpolitik policy of engaging the eastern bloc,
there was concern among other western countries about increasing German autonomy. Brandt 
therefore wished to respond in conjunction with Europe.185 This could take place without sterling or 
with special measures in place to support it. Based on O’Brien’s conversations with Emminger of the 
Bundesbank in Basle three weeks earlier, Heath was not convinced the EEC had the machinery to 
make a joint float work with sterling included.186 However, Brandt recognised these concerns and 
expressed willingness to make the required funds available without interest and obligation to repay 
in order to facilitate British participation. Accordingly, the two leaders agreed to use the present 
crisis as a “springboard” for a major advance towards economic and monetary union.187
The idea that the crisis might provide some form of final resolution of the overhang, and hence 
remove a major source of instability for sterling, was naturally one that Heath jumped at. As Heath 
noted back in London, the Germans had made it clear they were willing to pay a high price for a 
Community solution. Reporting on his own discussions, Barber claimed Schmidt had previously said 
the British could count on as much support as they liked in return for British participation in the joint 
float.188 The Anglo-German initiative even caused a minor spat with Washington, after Brandt sent 
what was described by Burns as a “bombastically arrogant” message to Nixon in which he claimed 
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that any solution must further European integration and would be decided in the EEC Finance 
ministers meeting.189
The solution did not however materialise as it was unacceptable to the French, causing the Germans 
to row back from their previous commitment to the British. For the French, the point of European 
monetary union was to reassert national sovereignty against international capital markets. However, 
this did not extend to pooling sovereignty in monetary affairs if that meant assuming the liabilities of 
sterling.190 At the meeting of finance ministers, Barber laid out his conditions for British participation 
in the joint float: unconditional mutual financial support without limits and without specific 
obligations. Robert Solomon, a US participant in the reform debates, did not think it was a serious 
demand, later commenting “to say it lacked subtlety is to treat it kindly.”191 However, behind the 
scenes Heath continued to push Brandt on his previous commitment to support sterling as a part of 
a mutual European response to the dollar crisis. In a letter to the German chancellor, Heath noted:  
[I was] greatly heartened when you indicated to me that you were thinking on these 
lines, because it seemed to me that we might have within the Community’s grasp a 
possibility that would constitute, not only a significant new development in 
international defences against short term capital flows, but also a major step 
forward in the progress of cooperation within the enlarged community…I should be 
very interested to know whether your thinking continues to correspond with mine as 
closely as it clearly did when we met.192
In his reply Brandt claimed his opinion was unchanged but found the French to be more reluctant 
that he had anticipated.193 He also felt that support without conditions would speed up inflationary 
process by financing unsustainable deficits and, on the question of sterling balances, provoke 
movements out of sterling.194 Meeting with a French counterpart, Tomkins of the Treasury was told 
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that no-one in the EEC accepted Barber’s conditions and in the view of the French there was no 
possibility of sterling joining the joint float on this basis.195
At a meeting of the EEC Monetary Committee on 7 March a majority was in favour of a joint float 
with parities fixed within 2.25% bands. The Committee recognised that not all countries would be 
able to participate right away but decided support facilities “could in no case serve to finance 
deficits” which should be dealt with by policies aimed at re-establishing internal equilibrium.196
However outside the committee, Barber and O’Brien were warned by Le Clerq, the President of the 
EEC Council, that if Britain did not join the joint float it could prove a mortal blow to the community. 
Noting the British proposals had found little support, Le Clerq asked whether they were unalterable. 
Barber denied the proposals had represented a negotiating position from which to haggle but rather 
were essential conditions for sterling to participate in a joint float without being forced off parity 
soon after fixing it.197
The hardening of European opinion prompted Heath to reconsider, warning Barber that the British 
objective was to find grounds on which Britain could participate in the float or at least to avoid the 
blame for not participating. As Barber’s conditions had been received on a “take it or leave it” basis, 
Heath now urged consideration as to whether any concessions could in fact be made for British 
participation.198 In a telegram from the Foreign Office to all EEC posts, British diplomats were briefed 
that Barber’s conditions were not a debating point or attempts to find a solution to only Britain’s 
problems but rather to take a “very big stride towards the goal of monetary union.”199
Discussing the situation prior to a meeting of EEC finance ministers with Barber on 11 March, 
Schmidt outlined the likely outcome as a joint float between Germany, France, Benelux and 
Denmark. At the meeting itself, the fixing of parities with a 2.25% margin and establishment of a 
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reserve currency fund by 1 July was used as a basis for discussion. Barber defended his proposals as 
acting within the spirit of the community and reiterated his position that it would be impractical for 
sterling to fix now but that Britain would do so when the time was right.200 The decision was taken 
for a joint float by Germany, France, the Benelux countries and Denmark as well as non-members 
Norway and Sweden. Lacking a system of support to maintain cohesion within the joint float it did 
survive the impact of the OPEC crisis.201 Notably however, another nonparticipating country Italy, 
was the other European country to request IMF support following the oil crisis, suggesting the 
discipline of maintaining a currency peg moderated the expansion of external deficits.  
Assessing the outcome, Heath conceded it was the best that could have been expected given the 
nature of French opposition to British proposals. However, British credibility and standing within the 
Community had been damaged. Heath believed the Bank of England and Treasury did not 
understand the implications of this outcome and while he accepted no one wanted to see a repeat 
of the years between 1964 and 1967, “we did not join the Community to behave like little 
Englanders.” Heath’s major concern was that being detached from a key European policy would 
result in a lack of British influence and a lack of opportunity to benefit from the advantageous terms 
the Germans were prepared to offer.202
As Dyson and Featherstone note in their history on European monetary union, “Heath’s European 
ambitions were ahead of Britain’s ability to deliver.” 203 According to Harold James, the British 
experience in the Snake demonstrated the limits of European cooperation in monetary relations: 
there was no financial assistance for sterling, nor did European central banks intervene to support 
the currency beyond 4pm Central European Time, leading to shifts in value of sterling while the UK 
and US markets were still open.204 However this also reflected the reluctance of Heath to assume 
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fresh commitments for sterling to replace those of Bretton Woods. This political decision removed 
the constraint of a pegged exchange rate but at the cost of isolating sterling from a potential source 
of support.  
The joint float did not take pressure off the dollar for long. Worsening inflation and reports that 
Nixon would resign in response to the developing Watergate scandal led to a free fall in the dollar.205
At the end of June, Cromer warned Heath that a collapse of the dollar could take on its own 
momentum with direct consequences for the British economy. 206 Consulting with Pohl of the 
Bundesbank, Heath was told that while the American balance of payments was improving, 
nervousness on Wall Street and repercussions over Watergate were harming the dollar. 207 As 
Cromer had warned, the dollar’s fall had repercussions for the pound which was 16% down on its 
Smithsonian parity, undermining the government’s anti-inflation policy as higher import prices fed 
through into the economy.208 Heath was reluctant to raise interest rates for its effect on domestic 
growth but authorised a rise in the Minimum Lending Rate [MLR] by 1 ppt. on the 25th July.209 In a 
letter to Brandt at the end of the month, Heath blamed “exceptionally high interest rates” which 
prevailed in Germany for drawing funds away from Britain. As a result, the MLR rose a further 2 ppt. 
to 11.5% which in Heath’s view was intolerable given the level of unemployment and slackening of 
consumer demand.210
The decline of the dollar caused consternation in Europe for its effect on the pegged parities within 
the joint float.211 The Europeans wanted the Americans to intervene in support of the dollar, helping 
to make a commitment to stability in foreign exchange. The new Governor of the Bank of England 
Gordon Richardson (who had taken over from O’Brien in July 1973) reported back from a “long and 
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barbarous” discussion in Basle on the possibility of American intervention in which the President of 
the BIS, Dr Ziljstra indicated he thought they were on the edge of a major exchange crisis. The US 
representative expressed agreement on the principle of intervention, using European swap 
networks, but after he had spoken Volcker on an open line it became clear that the Americans were 
reluctant to commit themselves.212
Within Washington, the State department was in favour of intervention, arguing that until the US 
demonstrated a willingness to support the dollar, speculators had a one-way bet. It would also help 
Europe alleviate what was becoming a major problem, strengthening the hand of those in Europe 
who opposed unilateral and restrictive practices, while building support for the more flexible system 
the Americans wanted.213 Burns was in favour, but Schultz only agreed to minor intervention. As it 
turned out this was enough. After announcing an increase in its swap credit line on 10 July, the dollar 
stabilised before rising in August in response to improving trade balance and tighter interest rates in 
the US.214
Reform discussions continued following stabilisation of the dollar, but Britain continued to struggle 
to find partners for a new international form of liquidity into which the sterling balances could be 
consolidated. As before, Britain’s influence was constrained by needing to align with European 
countries which were deeply suspicious of what they perceived as American proposals for liquidity 
reform that would let deficit countries off the hook. In a letter to Pompidou, Heath agreed that the 
recent crisis had demonstrated the danger of large flows of unrestricted capital, destabilising 
currencies and enforcing inappropriate domestic policies. However, Pompidou was not impressed by 
Heath’s argument that the fundamental cause was the lack of a credible international reserve credit. 
Pompidou envisaged convertibility would be restored in a two-stage process whereby first the dollar 
would become convertible before general convertibility of all currencies into a new reserve asset, 
212 TNA PREM 15/1461 "Foreign Exchange Markets" 09 July 1973 
213 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Charles Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)” 11 July 1973 
214 Matusow Nixon’s Economy p237 
168 
abolishing the role of reserve currencies. However, he was suspicious of the SDR, believing it to be a 
paper asset with no intrinsic value, at the disposal of an institution based in the US and dominated 
by the US Treasury. It would establish a system based on permanent inflation due to excessive US 
credit growth.215
Pompidou was also disappointed by the continued float of sterling, having been led to believe it 
would be re-fixed on 1 April. Now he realised this would not be the case. In an upset for Heath’s 
plans for European monetary union he warned the British Ambassador Soames there would be no 
EMCF if sterling floated apart from the European currencies. This was the reversed order of how 
Heath envisaged proceeding, with sterling able to re-fix once the appropriate institutional machinery 
was in place to support it.216 Heath’s domestic expansion had undermined any chances of French 
support for liquidity reform, either at a European or global level, by prioritising the domestic growth 
over stability of the currency. 
Meanwhile with the dollar stabilised at a newly competitive rate, American support for such reform 
was also lower. Speaking with Volcker in June, Rawlinson conveyed Barber’s wish to agree the shape 
of reform by the IMF Annual Meeting in September, suggesting that now the US had gained general 
agreement on adjustment they might cooperate on convertibility and consolidation. Volcker 
however saw no prospect that Congress would agree to consolidation that meant paying more than 
on the existing holdings of dollars, which meant European demands for an SDR carrying a high 
interest rate would go nowhere.217
Accordingly, expectations were low for the 1973 IMF General Meeting, held in Nairobi. No major 
initiative was made on the three outstanding issues of reform: gold, the dollar overhang or 
convertibility. Testifying before Congress, Volcker argued the major developments at Nairobi had 
been agreement on need to establish clear symmetrical disciplines operating on both surplus and 
215 TNA PREM 15/1460 "Note for the Record" 22 May 1973 
216 TNA PREM 15/1460 "Tel No 1513" 20 March 1973 
217 T354/385 "International Monetary Reform: Conversation with Mr Volcker" 14 June 1973 
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deficit countries. The detail that needed to be clarified was how reserve indicators, consultations 
and disciplines would work in practices in effecting adjustment.218 However any movement towards 
a grand reform of Bretton Woods was about to be undermined by the OPEC oil shock. This was to 
fundamentally end any prospect of European monetary union or a wider reform to liquidity.  
5.10: Conclusion  
The period of Edward Heath’s premiership between 1970 and the end of 1973 witnesses a dramatic 
change in the international monetary relations. The Bretton Woods system fell apart as a result of 
American unilateralism and was gradually replaced with a fiat floating standard. These changes 
resulted in a reappraisal of sterling’s international obligations and an attempt by Heath to 
renegotiate the external constraint these commitments implied.  
Heath took advantage of greater flexibility in adjustment to remove external restrictions on his 
domestic expansion, floating sterling rather than assuming debt or spending Britain’s considerable 
reserves to defend the rate. Confidence in sterling was maintained through continuation of the 1968 
Basle guarantees. Collectively these choices eased the external constraint in the short term, allowing 
expansion to proceed and with less regard to current account deficits than had occurred under 
Bretton Woods.  
Heath was unable however to secure any long-term reform of sterling’s overhang, as interest in 
liquidity reform evaporated in the face of an increasingly conflictual American approach to economic 
diplomacy, as well as the expansion of liquidity as a result of benign neglect. Heath’s priorities were 
made clear during negotiations over European monetary union. He traded flexibility for support, 
refusing to accept any fresh commitments for sterling that might act as a new constraint on 
domestic growth. This was the apparent lesson of the previous Labour government’s struggle to 
defend the rate.  
218 TNA T312/3003 "Current Status of International Monetary Reform" 13 November 1973 
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This renegotiation of the external constraint therefore removed any discipline on domestic 
expansion resulting in a high external deficit just as the global economy was about to suffer another 
shock in the form of the OPEC crisis. Although European plans for monetary union were immature 
and would not survive this next crisis, they did act as a source of discipline on current account 
expansion, leaving participants less exposed when the OPEC crisis decisively turned the terms of 
trade against developed economies. Heath’s refusal to participate demonstrated that despite his 
pro-European inclinations, he prioritised his domestic objective of growth. In going it alone, he 
secured flexibility and temporary confidence in sterling at the cost of isolating Britain from sources 
of support. 
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Chapter 6 
What Crisis?  
6.1: Introduction  
The final resolution of the sterling overhang took place against the backdrop of seismic change in the 
global economy. The OPEC oil shock in December 1973 proved to be the final nail in the Bretton 
Woods coffin, while the resulting stagflation marked the end of the long post-war boom. Economic 
policy across the industrialised world began to focus on controlling inflation rather than maintaining 
output. Monetarism gained ground at the expense of Keynesianism by offering policy prescriptions 
tailored to these new concerns.1 The differing levels of success across countries in controlling 
inflation meant pegged exchange rates became untenable. In response, the long-term process of 
international monetary reform culminated in formalising floating rates and demonetising gold.2
For the Labour government that had replaced Heath’s Conservatives in 1974, adapting to these new 
conditions proved a challenge. Struggling on a wafer-thin majority and attempting to placate an 
increasingly militant trade union movement, Labour’s initial response to the OPEC crisis was to 
maintain demand and finance the external deficit inherited from Heath by building up the sterling 
balances among the newly enriched Middle East holders.3 A change in market sentiment from July 
1975 meant despite the subsequent shift in policy on government spending and control of the 
money supply, recourse to the IMF was required in 1976 before market confidence was restored.4
1 Peter A. Hall “The Movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic 
Policy in the 1970s” in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, & F. Longstreth (Eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp 90 -92 
2 Eichengreen Globalizing Capital p137 
3 Robert Skidelsky Britain Since 1900 A Success Story? (London: Vintage Books, 2014) pp.314-316 
4 Wass Decline to Fall pp. 44-45 
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The IMF crisis has generated voluminous historical analysis seeking to understand events of 1974-76. 
The historical record has sought to understand Labour’s motivations for seeking a settlement with 
the Fund and what consequences this had for Britain’s system of economic management. Debate 
has largely turned on whether policy change was imposed on Britain from outside and the extent to 
which this change in policy was ideologically informed by the monetarist and neo-liberal ideas then 
in the ascendancy and represented in the post-war consensus of policy.  
For Kathleen Burk & Alec Cairncross, the crisis witnessed the IMF’s programme of conditionality 
being leveraged by the US Treasury in order to effect policy change on Britain. Concerned about the 
left-wing direction of Labour and the danger that a collapse in sterling might provoke a siege 
economy (and subsequent withdrawal from NATO and the EEC), the Americans looked to use IMF 
negotiations to force domestic retrenchment on Labour, tying access to the Fund’s standby facilities 
to strict conditions on government spending and growth of the money supply. Despite Prime 
Minister Jim Callaghan’s efforts to escape IMF conditionality through his personal lobbying of 
President Ford and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in the end Labour was forced to 
accept the shift in policy mandated by the Fund.5
Mark Harmon examines the extent to which the imperative to secure agreement with the fund 
resulted in the Fund’s conditionality playing a role in forcing policy change on Britain. Drawing on 
regime theory, Harmon argues that Labour’s space for policy choice was effectively constrained by 
the structural power of international cooperation, which he views rather as “relations of coercion,” 
with which left-of-centre governments much seek accommodation to sustain themselves in power. 
Economic policy became decided by ‘external actors’ – market confidence, the conditions attached 
to the IMF loan and, ultimately, the attitude of the US Treasury. Together these set the parameters 
5 Burk & Cairncross Goodbye Great Britain p56 
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for economic policy. While this succeeded in restoring confidence in sterling, it was at the cost of 
Labour’s domestic support, resulting in a loss of power in 1979 following the Winter of Discontent.6
Peter Hall views the increasing external pressure of market sentiment impelling a change in 
government policy. Interested in the role of economic ideas in policy making, he construes the 
period of 1975-79 constituting a shift towards monetarism by the Labour government in order to 
placate opinion in the markets for government debt and foreign exchange which was itself 
increasingly interested in these ideas. In doing so, economic policy underwent a ‘paradigm shift’ – a 
discontinuous break in which the overarching goals of policy changed as well as the instruments 
used to achieve them. This change was determined by political criteria, reflecting a process of state-
social learning in which demand for monetarist policy became an “object of electoral competition”, 
championed by the financial press, opposition party and eventually office of the Prime Minister, who 
overruled the Treasury.7 This view has been revised somewhat by Kevin Hickson’s more detailed 
investigation of the influence of economic thought on the politics of the Labour government. 
Hickson concludes that rather than a wholesale adoption of monetarist ideas, Labour instead 
accepted some associated ideas of economic liberalism, including crowding-out and supply side 
theories.8
The extent to which IMF negotiations themselves proved the catalyst for policy change within the 
Labour government has been revised by the historical record. In an influential 1992 article, Steve 
Ludlam challenged the ‘four myths’ of 1976, namely that the Fund forced Labour to reduce 
government spending, introduce cash limits and monetary targets whole abandoning the pursuit of 
full employment through demand management. Instead, Ludlam notes that important policy 
decisions had already been taken in 1975, prior to any negotiation with the Fund, while the 1976 
6 Harmon, The British Labour Government p. ix, 4 
7 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State” p. 286 
8 Hickson, The IMF Crisis of 1976, p214 
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agreement merely “codified a change in political course already well underway.”9 This view has been 
confirmed by Douglas Wass, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury throughout the crisis who 
subsequently has written an extensive administrative history of the period. Wass argues the descent 
to the IMF negotiations were the product of failure of economic policy making by the Labour 
leadership and Treasury from 1974.10
Revisionist understanding of the domestic implications of the crisis has been taken furthest by Chris 
Rogers. Rather than IMF conditionality being imposed on domestic policy, Rogers argues that it was 
instead used by the Treasury to depoliticise the consequences of their preferred economic policies. 
The prospect of an external financing gap and the downward spiral of the pound from 1975 onwards 
(which Rogers labels “two non-crises” – based on projections of dubious validity in the case of the 
former, while securing a competitive devaluation was a Treasury objective), were positioned as 
implying there was no alternative to recourse to the IMF. In doing so, Callaghan was able to face 
down calls from the left wing of the party for a radical Alternative Economic Strategy [AES], since 
adopting protectionist measures such as import controls would be incompatible with borrowing 
from the Fund. According to Rogers: 
currency instability and IMF conditionality provided strong and credible justifications 
for the implementation of policies….and acted as a buttress between the 
government and the consequences of its policies.11
These analyses share a common understanding of the scope of the crisis. Sterling was unstable due 
to the current account deficit inherited from Heath’s government, exacerbated by the impact of the 
OPEC shock. Similarly, following agreement with the Fund, either due to its impact on policy or 
approval of existing policies, sterling stabilised into 1977. The most remarkable feature of this 
9 Steve Ludlam” The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis,” Political Studies (1992) Vol. 
40 (4) p727 
10 Wass, Decline to Fall, p. xiii 
11 Chris Rogers, “The Politics of Economic Policy-Making under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan and the 
1976 IMF crisis,” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 2009), p21, 169, 204 
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process was the shift in economic policy, which foreshadowed the much more enthusiastic embrace 
of neo-liberal policies by the Thatcher government from 1979 onwards.12
Accordingly, the subsequent Third Group Arrangement negotiated with the BIS at the beginning of 
1977 (distinguished internally as the ‘facility’ in contrast to the IMF ‘standby’), in which a credit line 
was extended to manage sterling diversification, has received less detailed investigation. Burk & 
Cairncross consider that while the IMF deal “fulfilled expectations,” the BIS deal did not, as sterling 
holdings were not run down any further in response to sterling’s growing attractiveness following 
conclusion of the IMF negotiations and the prospects of the North Sea oil.13 Harmon also believes 
the deal disappointed expectations, noting it was not announced simultaneously with the IMF 
bailout as Callaghan had hoped and served rather to re-enforce IMF conditionality, given the 
Managing Director’s role in overseeing compliance.14 For Dell, Callaghan overestimated the 
importance of the sterling balances in the crisis, arguing the BIS deal was unnecessary once the 
correct economic policies were being applied (a restatement of the American position).15 Hickson 
considers it only partially successful since it did not cover private balances as well as public ones, 
failing therefore to reduce the sterling balances significantly.16 Rogers views the threat posed the 
danger of sterling balance diversification supporting the Treasury’s arguments for reduced 
expenditure and direct wage controls, but considers them less important once it was clear no 
additional support would be forthcoming prior to agreement with the Fund.17
Catherine Schenk’s review of sterling’s retreat from its international role has accorded the 1977 
Basle facility more importance than traditional accounts. Viewing the IMF standby as “merely a 
consolidation” of previous support packages arranged over the previous year, the 1977 deal marked 
12 Ibid, pp. 1-2; Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” p286, Burk & Cairncross, Goodbye 
Great Britain, p213 
13 Burk & Cairncross Goodbye Great Britain pp. 111, 126 
14 Harmon The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis p227 
15 Dell The Chancellors pp. 437 - 438 
16 Hickson The IMF Crisis of 1976 p153 
17 Rogers “The Politics of Economic Policy-Making” pp. 162, 258, 293, 
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“further fundamental change in Britain’s external economic policy and had a long term impact on 
the role of sterling as an international currency.”18 Like its 1968 predecessor, the very existence of 
the deal fulfilled its objectives and did not need to be drawn upon.19 As sterling recovered from the 
beginning of 1977 and North Sea oil came on stream, the build-up of sterling assets finally ended the 
sterling overhang. As such the rescue package could be deemed successful.20 This was the conclusion 
of the multilateral process aimed at retiring sterling’s reserve role that had been ongoing since the 
1950s which had been achieved via multilateral negotiation, rather than through market forces.21
This thesis refines Schenk’s interpretation by arguing the British response to the 1976 IMF crisis 
marked the first-time official commitment to ending sterling’s reserve role was backed by both firm 
policy action and the international support required to do so. The crisis itself is positioned not as the 
impact of market forces on domestic autonomy, but the result of a prior reconfiguration of the 
external constraint. The renewed accumulation of sterling balances that had begun with the 1968 
Basle deal was now accelerated in response to the OPEC shock. Between 1974 and 1976, Labour’s 
commitment to maintaining output and demand resulted in a further expansion of the balances as 
newly enriched oil producers were encouraged to deposit their earnings into sterling. An expansion 
in public sector borrowing on capital markets and directly from oil producers permitted the 
continuation of expansionary government policies in the face of the oil shock and resulting external 
deficits. 
The thesis argues that extent of the crisis was not determined solely by the turn in market opinion 
against sterling in 1975/76 but the change in the nature of the Anglo-American relationship and 
hence the accessibility to the resources of the IMF upon which Britain had traditionally depended to 
manage its external commitments. While recognising by 1975 that adjustment was required, Labour 
believed that it could proceed according to its own timetable and interpretation. Its response to the 
18 Schenk The Decline of Sterling pp. 368, 378 
19 Ibid p392 
20 Ibid pp.394-395 
21 Ibid p415 
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external deficit was a continuation of post-devaluation strategy in which a competitive exchange 
rate would secure export led growth from demand flowing from the reflation of other major 
economies.22 As before, IMF resources would facilitate this period of adjustment without resorting 
to excessive deflation or protectionist measures. Labour was successful in expanding the IMF’s low 
conditionality support facilities for oil related deficits.23
However, growing ideological divergence with the US Treasury, exacerbated by conflict over how to 
respond to the OPEC shock, meant support packages arranged in 1976 via the G10 and IMF were 
more contentious. Significantly, by 1976 the process of international monetary reform had 
culminated in the demonetisation of gold and the formalisation of floating rates, allowing the US to 
contain sterling crises more effectively than under Bretton Woods.24 Meanwhile the US Treasury 
interpreted Labour’s use of international borrowing to defer adjustment as undermining its common 
front aimed at forcing down the oil price.25 Viewing the socialist policies of the Wilson/Callaghan 
governments with distaste, senior advisors in the Ford administration attempted to tie British 
requests for support to greater institutional oversight of policy by the IMF, itself seeking a new role 
in managing adjustment now that its previous one of overseeing exchange rate pegs was 
redundant.26
In response to these changed circumstances, Callaghan now prioritised resolving sterling’s reserve 
role. This was the first time this had become the major aim of sterling policy rather than stabilisation 
of the monetary system or financing deficits.27 This involved Labour in a fundamental disagreement 
with America over the narrative of what crisis exactly sterling was facing. While Callaghan blamed it 
22 TNA T358/207 "Exchange Rate Strategy" 10 April 1975 
23 TNA T354/367 “Tel No 3189” 1 October 1974 
24 Margaret de Vries The International Monetary Fund 1927-1978 Cooperation on Trial (New York: IMF, 1985) 
pp 770-771 
25 FRUS 69-76 Vol. E-15 Part 2 “Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford” 15 
November 1976 
26 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Robinson) to 
Secretary of State Kissinger” 29 March 1976 
27 TNA PREM 16/801 “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster “18 November 1976 
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on the existence of the sterling balances (ignoring the role Labour played in their recent 
accumulation), the US blamed over-expansionary domestic policies that destabilised confidence.28
Although Callaghan was forced to accept coming to terms with the Fund as a prerequisite for any 
further support, he proved adept in threatening the collapse of the agreement if an additional 
facility was not forthcoming.29 In return for a commitment to prevent any renewed accumulation, 
Ford gave backing to a new Basle facility that used the 1968 deal as precedent.30 Supported by 
Britain’s offer of foreign currency bonds to facilitate diversification, the result was a reduction by 
1979 of sterling held abroad to working balances.31 The true significance of the 1976 crisis therefore 
is reinterpreted as the resolution to the process of international monetary reform and evolution of 
sterling balances that had occurred since devaluation in 1967. 
6.2: Oil Crisis and the 1974 General Election – December 1973 – April 1974 
A new period in international monetary relations was inaugurated by the first OPEC oil shock which 
occurred at the end of 1973. A four-fold rise in oil prices resulted in a dramatic shift in the terms of 
trade between oil producing and oil consuming economies as well as the impact of ‘stagflation’ – 
stagnating output combined with accelerating inflation that traditional Keynesian prescriptions for 
pump-priming seemed ill-equipped to deal with.32
28 TNA T381/6" "Note of a Discussion" 3 October 1976 
29 TNA PREM 16/805 “Note of a Meeting Held a Number 11 Downing Street” 3 December 1976 
30 FRUS 69-76 Vol. E-15 Part 2 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Scowcroft) to President Ford” 18 December 1976. 
31 TNA T381/99 “Official Sterling Balances” 24 Nov 1978 
32 The economic effect of ‘stagflation’ impacted developed economies on multiple fronts. The huge external 
surpluses accruing to the OPEC states were deflationary, both for individual oil consuming countries and the 
global economy at large. Given the high dependence of Western economies on oil, the short run price 
elasticity of demand for oil was low: higher prices translated directly into higher revenue for oil producing 
states rather than reduced exports. In oil consuming states, higher energy prices squeezed consumption of 
other goods and services, resulting in a fall in the standard of living. At the same time oil producers, due to 
their size and development, could only absorb a fraction of their increased revenues in the form of imports of 
goods and services from oil consuming states. The result was an increase in the global rate of savings, and a 
deflationary effect on the global economy. However, the rise in energy prices and later in commodity prices (as 
other primary producers sought to imitate OPEC) also drove up the rate of inflation across industrialised 
economies, see Edmund Dell A Hard Pounding: Politics and Economic Crisis 1974 – 76 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991) pp198 – 199; Office of the President Economic Report of the President (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government, 1975) 
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Some countries adjusted better than others, depending both on the policy mix adopted as well as 
their relative dependency on energy and commodity imports. Differential rates of inflation made 
managing currency pegs more difficult and this had consequences for attempts to re-fix exchange 
rates, both in the wider global monetary system and with European attempts to move towards 
monetary union.33 The removal of the discipline of the exchange rate pegs opened space for more 
discretionary monetary policy, leading to faster money growth and inflation and prompting the IMF 
to consider new rules and methods to secure adjustment for unbalanced economies.34
In Britain, the most immediate impact of the oil shock was to give another twist to the nation’s 
increasingly disputatious industrial relations. The Heath government was involved in an acrimonious 
dispute with the miners and the rise in energy prices inevitably strengthened the union’s negotiating 
position. One representative asked Heath “why can’t you pay us for coal what you are willing to pay 
the Arabs for oil?”35 A work to rule initiated by the miners’ union had led to dwindling coal stocks 
and the government resorted to a three day working week between January and March 1974 to 
conserve energy. In response Heath called a general election, attempting to regain legitimacy under 
the slogan “Who Governs?” This was perhaps a legitimate question given the circumstances but not 
one to inspire confidence when asked by the Prime Minister.36
Despite the evident conflict between the unions and the Conservative government, Heath’s 
campaign proved remarkably moderate. As Andy Beckett has noted, “Heath wanted to assert the 
government’s authority over the miners, but he did not want to crush them utterly.” Wilson’s Labour 
party won the election by appearing even more conciliatory, portraying Labour as the party that 
could do business with the unions.37
33 Eichengreen Globalizing Capital p155 
34 James International Monetary Cooperation p260 
35 Beckett When The Lights Went Out pp131 -132 
36 Vernon Bogdanor “The Fall of Heath and the End of the Post War Settlement” in Stuart Ball and Anthony 
Seldon [eds.] The Heath Government 1970-74 A Reappraisal (London: Longman, 1996) p371 
37 Ibid pp150 – 151; Although, as the incoming Chancellor Denis Healey noted in retrospect, Labour’s low share 
of the vote meant perhaps “the electorate was trying to tell us something,” at the time there was little vocal 
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For the second time in his career, Wilson inherited an economy from the Conservatives in serious 
trouble. Recession, rising unemployment and inflation combined with a ballooning balance of 
payments deficit.38 As with his refusal to devalue in 1964, Wilson has been criticised for not taking 
more prompt action on the rate of government spending and inflation. Douglass Wass, who was 
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury throughout the IMF crisis, notes that of developed nations only 
Italy and Britain aimed to maintain levels of demand following the oil shock, and significantly, were 
the only economies needing assistance from the IMF in subsequent years.39 According to Andy 
Beckett, the inability of the Labour party and Treasury to absorb the implications of the oil crisis 
meant most of 1974 passed without a fundamental reappraisal of economic policy.40
Once again however, Wilson’s freedom of manoeuvre was limited by political considerations. The 
February election saw Labour taking only 4 seats more than the Conservatives, short of an overall 
majority. Unable to form a stable government even with Liberal support, Wilson was forced to call a 
further election in October which gained him an overall majority of just 3 seats. This was hardly a 
mandate for radical economic surgery.41 Indeed, the leftward drift of the Labour party during its 
years of opposition meant Wilson had to tread carefully with respect to the expectations of his own 
party. The most immediate priority given the circumstances was to re-establish some form of 
normalcy regarding industrial relations. Labour’s key industrial relations policy was the Social 
Contract. In return for unions moderating wage demands, Labour would repeal Heath’s hated 1971 
Industrial Relations Act while committing to welfare spending that would secure living standards for 
the working class.42 As such there was little immediate movement on the deficit inherited from 
support for alternative free market policies of the kind implied by monetarism beyond certain marginal 
sections of the Conservative party and free market think tanks, Denis Healey The Time of My Life (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1989) p372.37
38 Wass Decline to Fall p42 
39 Wass Decline to Fall p39 
40 Beckett When The Lights Went Out pp152 
41 Seat distribution was in part the result of the eccentricities of the British electoral system – Labour actually 
had a smaller share of the vote than the Conservatives in the February election while the Liberals gained only 
14 seats on the basis of 19% of the vote – Skidelsky Britain Since 1900 p314 
42 Newton The Reinvention of Britain p102 
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Heath and Wilson accordingly looked to economic diplomacy to expand demand for British goods 
with lines of credit to finance deficits. 
Britain’s external position was in some ways strengthened by the impact of the OPEC oil crisis. 
Foreign exchange activity greatly increased as large British oil companies like Shell and British 
Petroleum made royalty payments of up to $800m per month. On the other hand, the role of 
London as a leading financial centre meant Britain attracted dollar deposits in Eurodollar markets 
from the oil producers as part of their expected $60bn earnings in 1974.43 Sterling remained stable 
across the year and reserves were accumulated.44 Accordingly, the Chancellor had little to say about 
the size of the rapidly expanding current account deficit during his first budget in April 1974. As 
Douglass Wass noted, the figures involved “would have caused consternation to policy makers of an 
earlier generation. The Chancellor simply focused on his ability to finance it."45
Nevertheless, the OPEC funds moving into sterling did raise the possibility of exchange risk further 
down the line. Shortly before the budget, Healey wrote to Wilson notifying the PM of his decision to 
extend the guarantee of the sterling balances made under the Second Group Arrangement for a 
further 9 months. Although conceding that the previous unilateral extension had proved an 
expensive policy due to the weakness of sterling and that his preference was to be rid of the 
guarantees, Healey believed it was right to do so until additional lines of borrowing had been set up. 
The new extension was once again taken unilaterally but applied to a lower level of balances and 
was expressed in an effective rate for sterling rather than the spot dollar rate.46 Throughout the year 
funds from the oil surpluses continued to be deposited into sterling, boosting the currency in the 
short term but adding a potential source of instability for the future.47 Britain also developed direct 
financing links with the oil producers themselves, notably the Saudis who lent $1.2bn to the 
43 Cappie Bank of England p719 
44 Cappie Bank of England pp. 720 - 721 
45 Wass Decline to Fall p44 - 45 
46 TNA PREM 16/38 "Official Sterling Balances" 13 March 1974 
47 TNA PREM 16/49 “Petrodollars” 23 October 1974 
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nationalised industries between 1973 and 1976, as well as Iran with whom a deal to lend $1.4bn in 
three tranches over three years was agreed in 1974.48
Wilson therefore continued Heath’s policy of prioritising the needs of domestic expansion, taking 
advantages of new sources of international finance with which to delay or defer adjustment. As 
Figure 6.1 shows, in 1974 increased foreign holdings of sterling (driven by British public sector 
borrowing abroad) was enough to offset the oil-related current account deficits. This however 
resulted in a fresh build up in the level of sterling balances, and their accumulation in a small 
number of oil producing states (see Figure 6.2)  
Source: Central Statistical Office United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1979 (London: HMSO, 1980) Table 1.3 “Analysis of Capital 
Transactions and Official Financing”, Table 2.3: “Geographical Analysis” 
48 Cappie Bank of England p727 
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Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1977 Q1, “Table 19, Exchange Reserves in sterling; and banking and money-market liabilities in sterling 
to holders other than central monetary institutions, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1979 Q1 “Table 15: Exchange Reserves in sterling; 
and banking and money-market liabilities in sterling to holders other than central monetary institutions 
For the time being confidence in sterling meant Labour could draw upon this source of finance to 
maintain government spending. Nevertheless, the removal of Britain’s military ties to these states in 
1971 meant these holdings were now dependent on the relative attractiveness of inducements on 
offer. Britain’s increased dependence on foreign finance raised the possibility of market confidence 
constraining policy in the future. To counter this, Britain looked to secure other, institutional sources 
of support.  
6.3: Anglo-American Relations and the Response to the OPEC Crisis –  
January 1974 – December 1974 
Labour’s return to power meant a renewed focus on Anglo-American relations.49 However a marked 
divergence in both the two countries’ economic fundamentals, as well as the ideological outlook of 
their governments complicated the relationship. As much as the OPEC crisis itself, this divergence 
forms the context that is essential to understand the British response to the IMF crisis. Initially 
49 Newton The Reinvention of Britain p111 
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disagreement centred on the proposed response (both domestic and foreign) to the oil crisis and 
subsequently on the nature of the 1975/76 sterling crisis.  
The impact of the oil shock was felt differently in America. The US was less reliant on imported 
energy supplies and therefore could afford a more confrontational attitude with the OPEC states. As 
one Treasury memo noted, “for us the wolf is at the door, for the United States it is not even at the 
bottom of the garden."50 The Americans accordingly looked to bring the oil price back down. They 
did not wish to entrench the higher price by creating sources to finance it and believed external 
deficits resulting from the crisis served to reinforce solidarity among oil consuming states. A joint 
front was needed to force down the price.51 In contrast, Britain was dependent on oil imports and 
while the rise in the price spurred on investment in North Sea oil fields, in the immediate term the 
increased energy prices exacerbated the current account deficit inherited from Heath while giving 
another twist to the inflationary spiral.52
Ideologically, Labour had moved leftward during its time in opposition while the US government had 
moved rightward under Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford, who took power following the former’s 
resignation in August 1974. Labour’s Social Contract implied both large scale government spending 
and a key role for the interests of unions in formulating policy.53 Within the US Treasury there was 
growing support for neoliberal solutions to international trade and payments. At a meeting of the 
Committee of 20 in January 1974, Secretary of the Treasury George Schultz called for freeing 
markets as much as possible to facilitate recycling oil funds back to borrowers.54 Following the 
meeting, Nixon approved removing the final controls on capital exports, a campaign promise from 
the 1968 election.55  Schulz’s successor as Secretary of the Treasury Bill Simon, described as “far to 
the right of Genghis Khan” by Healey, consistently lobbied Ford to take a harder line with regards to 
50 TNA T354/125 “The Energy Crisis and its Consequences" 15 January 1974 
51 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum for the President's File” 21 January 1974 
52 TNA T354/125 “The Energy Crisis and its Consequences" 15 January 1974 
53 Newton The Reinvention of Britain pp 81-82 
54 TNA T354/125 “Tel no Remac 7” 13 February 1974 
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the British.56 Simon, together with under-Secretary Ed Yeo were advocates of neoliberal economic 
policy and like Arthur Burns at the Fed, viewed what they saw as the socialist temperament of the 
Labour party with distaste.57
Accordingly, Labour had different priorities in both its domestic response to the crisis and objectives 
for foreign economic policy. Wilson’s commitment to maintain full employment as part of the Social 
Contract meant Labour focused on the deflationary impact of the oil shock and sought to resist the 
reduction in demand it implied. Accordingly, Labour sought to encourage other countries to 
maintain demand in their economies while developing institutional sources of finance to enable oil 
importing economies to cope with the resulting balance of payments deficits. This put the British in 
conflict with those who focused on the inflationary aspect of the oil shock and the need to restore 
control over price rises, even at the cost of higher employment. 
The initial international response to the oil shock mirrored British concerns that levels of 
employment and output should not be sacrificed in the name of restraining inflation. It was unclear 
how long oil prices would remain high: OPEC states had tried on several occasions to corner the 
market and had not been successful before. The meeting of the Committee of 20 in Rome in January 
appeared to agree with British arguments. Recognising that there was an incentive to clear the 
deficits arising from the rise in oil prices, the communique argued that nevertheless simultaneous 
efforts to do so on the part of the developed economies would generate the risk of worldwide 
deflation and/or trade distortions. Accordingly, members agreed  
not to adopt policies which would merely aggravate the problems of other 
countries....to pursue policies that would sustain appropriate levels of economic 
activity and employment, while minimising inflation.58
56 Healey Time of My Life p419 
57 FRUS Vol. 31 Draft Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Kissinger) 10 March 1973 
58 Mark D. Harmon The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1997) p66  
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Notwithstanding this agreement, it soon became clear that other economies were focusing more on 
the inflation aspect of the declaration and were resistant to British arguments in favour of 
institutional funding out of the fear it would entrench the higher oil price. At a meeting of the OECD 
in February the debate turned on whether the oil price rises would be deflationary or inflationary. 
The British position was that they were decidedly deflationary, with Atkinson of the Treasury 
complaining that countries were responding in too “conventional” a manner to what was decidedly 
an unconventional situation. The oil importing states had no option but to run large current account 
deficits for some time; once this was accepted there was no need to reduce spending in the short 
term. Instead, the British called for a concerted plan to increase demand in line with the growth in 
capacity. 
This line was countered by Stein of the US who accepted the British argument that the price hike 
would impact demand but raised the issue of the appropriate policy response. As the Nixon 
administration had dismantled its wage and price control apparatus it would have to rely on demand 
management to restrain inflation. The Germans, who had always been lukewarm Keynesians, were 
even more alarmed by the price rises. Control of prices was paramount; they expected much of the 
liquidity flowing out to oil producers would return in the form of increased demand for exports and 
investment and they did not want to pre-empt this by raising domestic demand.59
The British were unable to use direct meetings with their American counterparts to convince the 
latter to focus on unemployment. Meeting with Kissinger in July, Healey outlined his main concerns 
as the prospect of a trade war and the impact of price rises on demand. He complained that the 
Americans appeared “obsessed” with the inflationary effect of the oil crisis and were not paying 
enough attention to the demand effect.60 When Harold Lever, the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, met Simon in Washington he found the US Secretary “breezily optimistic” about the oil 
59 TNA T354/125 "Economic Policy Committee Meeting" 21 February 1974 
60 TNA T354/367 “Record of a Conversation” 8 July 1974 
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crisis, convinced that the OPEC monopoly would break down since they would not be able to agree 
to restricting production to maintain prices. Lever urged Simon to address the monetary problems 
arising from the oil producers’ surpluses to which Simon gave evasive answers concerning the 
difficulty of getting Congress to accept any progressive policy.61 Wilson ended the year with a 
telegram to Ford in which he described the US economy as the “motor of the industrial world,” and 
worried that the price rise was having an impact on the American economy, resulting in a “motor 
which is indeed slowing down.” He urged Ford to undertake measures that would restore confidence 
of business and labour by demonstrating the government would intervene to prevent the recession 
turning into a depression.62
The OPEC crisis marked the first sign of the growing divergence between the US and UK. America’s 
political objective was to force the oil price back down and favoured market intermediation to 
provide finance for oil related deficits in the meantime. In contrast, the prospect of North Sea oil 
meant Britain instead to look benefit from high oil prices in the long run and accordingly sought 
expansion of institutional finance coupled with international borrowing to maintain output and 
finance deficits while they waited for this source of income to come on stream. In contrast, the neo-
liberal US Treasury believed borrowing from oil producers and support from the IMF allowed Britain 
to defer adjustment, undermining American attempts for a common front to force back down the oil 
price. This perception was to weaken Britain’s hand in subsequent negotiations with the IMF. 
6.4: Culmination of IMS Reform– March 1973 – January 1976 
These different perspectives fed into differing objectives and criteria for success in international 
monetary reform. While the British looked to expand international sources of finance to tide their 
economy over until higher exports and oil production relieved some of the pressure on the balance 
of payments, the Americans sought mainly to ward off any efforts by the French to restore gold to 
61 TNA T354/367 "Note for the Record" 26 July 1974. 
62 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Message From British Prime Minster Wilson to President Ford” 31 December 1974 
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the heart of the system and re-establish convertibility and fixed rates for the dollar. Success in their 
major objectives for reform by 1976 meant the Americans were less threatened by the prospect of a 
sterling crisis than they had been previously and less inclined to help for ideological reasons. 
The OPEC oil shock marked an end to any prospect of resurrecting Bretton Woods. The high and 
differing rates of inflation meant fixed exchange rates were now untenable without unprecedented 
levels of support and coordination. The world moved towards a floating dollar standard for lack of 
any alternative commanding widespread support. However, this was not before the contentious role 
of gold in the system was resolved, largely in America’s favour. The British did not engage directly in 
this debate, conserving their political capital for their attempts to develop institutional financing (see 
below). It is worth considering however to understand how the American objectives for international 
reform had largely been achieved by 1976, lessening the threat posed by destabilised British 
economy and therefore setting the context for the debates over the IMF bailout and resolution of 
the sterling’s reserve role. 
The rise in prices initially strengthened the hands of the French who argued that a revaluation of the 
official price at which its sizable gold reserves were valued was urgently required. In addition, 
approval of the resumption of official gold sales would allow the French to draw down their gold 
stocks to pay for the balance of payments deficit resulting from the rise in energy prices. 63 Selling 
their gold at market prices would allow the French to settle their intra-EEC debts while paying for oil 
without incurring future liabilities to OPEC states.  
Although reluctant to concede a rise in the official gold price, believing it would be more likely to 
entrench the metal’s role in world payments than phase it out, the Americans were keen to prevent 
any bilateral deals between the Europeans and OPEC states which might undermine US proposals for 
63 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and 
Development (Weintraub) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker)” 6 March 
1974  
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consumer solidarity.64 In April 1974 a meeting of EEC finance ministers proposed that governments 
be permitted to buy and sell gold to each other at the market price. In addition, they would also be 
allowed to buy from the market but to minimise fluctuation in the gold price there would be 
agreement that no central bank would be a net buyer of gold.65 Simon viewed these proposals 
favourably, noting to Burns that the accession to power of “financially orientated” leaders in 
Germany and France offered a good opportunity to move reforms forward.66 In August Simon 
proposed within the Nixon administration that the Americans concede free trading in gold between 
governments in return for the IMF selling its own gold stocks. Simon believed that doing so, the US 
would win support for its provisions to ensure the metal was phased out from the institutional 
framework of the monetary system.67
Further progress was made at a summit with the French at Martinique in December. Giscard 
d’Estaing, who had become the French President in May, denied he was in favour of restoring the 
gold standard. He therefore wanted to change the rules on gold without undermining the progress 
of monetary reform.68 As a briefing for Ford noted, Giscard was less insistent on gold having an 
official role than previous French presidents but still wanted the freedom to buy and sell it. The 
Americans conceded these points in return for prohibition on fixing the price of gold that might re-
establish it via a back door as well as a transitional period that limited net purchases of gold.69
Final agreement was reached the following year. The Interim Committee of the IMF, which advised 
on amendments to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, agreed in August 1975 to release one third of 
IMF gold stock, half of which would be returned to members while the other half would benefit Less 
64 Ibid.
65 FRUS 69-76 Vol.31 “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Bennett) to Secretary of the 
Treasury Simon” 09 May 1974 
66 FRUS 69-76 Vol.31 “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Bennett) to Secretary of the 
Treasury Simon” 09 May 1974 
67 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Bennett)” 
05 August 1974 
68 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Edwin Truman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors 
Staff to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (Burns)” 18 December 1974 
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Developed Countries.70  In his response to a letter from Ford, Wilson expressed satisfaction at the 
outcome of the meeting, “in particular the successful resolution of the gold issues that have proved 
so intractable in the past.”71 Revision to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in January 1976 gave formal 
recognition to the end of gold by formally phasing out the metal from international payments, 
including the sales of the Fund’s own gold reserves.72
At the same time as achieving a long-standing objective in the demonetisation of gold, the 
Americans also made progress on formalising the role of floating exchange rates in the post-Bretton 
Woods system. Again, the French provided the principal antagonists. The French believed that new 
par values should be established by the IMF, with governments obliged to intervene to maintain the 
value of their currencies against these pegs. To the Americans this would promote inflexibility in 
adjustment, while Simon was aware of Congressional opposition towards any amendment to the 
IMF articles which did not authorise floating the dollar.73
In return for its concessions on gold trading, the American view prevailed on amendments to the 
IMF’s provisions on adjustment. This resulted in a flexible and permissive exchange rate system, 
involving no compulsion on states to intervene in foreign exchange markets. The 1976 meeting of 
the IMF Interim Committee held in Jamaica in January, which gave formal approval of the move 
towards floating, made no corresponding settlement on liquidity, effectively ending progress 
towards a system in which the SDR played any meaningful role.74 Reporting to President Ford in 
January, Simon claimed the agreement was the “first sweeping revision of our international 
agreements” since the original Bretton Woods conference. 75 At the same meeting at which 
measures to phase out gold in international payments were adopted, including sales of the IMF’s 
70 TNA CAB 133/459 "International Economic Problems: Monetary" 31 August 1975 
71 TNA PREM 16/356 "Letter from Wilson to Ford” 30 August 1975 
72 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford” 13 January 
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73 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to President Ford” 03 June 1975 
74 James International Monetary Cooperation pp. 269-270 
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gold reserves, floating rates were also given recognition.76 This was the culmination of the reform 
process that had begun following the establishment of the C-20 in 1972. Despite anticipations, there 
was no provision for substitution of reserve currencies into SDRs.77 Instead the main significance was 
the formal recognition that the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates was no longer 
appropriate and was replaced by floating as the primary method of adjustment.  
The US had therefore achieved two long standing objectives: removing the role of gold from the 
international monetary system (and with it any prospect of restoring dollar convertibility) while 
formally establishing flexibility in adjustment. The British had largely stood back from these debates 
but generally sided with the Americans on exchange rate flexibility and while in favour of gold 
revaluation did not share the French’s totemic devotion to the metal. In removing any commitment 
of the dollar towards gold, these reforms acquiesced in a fiat, dollar standard. As such sterling crises 
could now be more effectively contained than under Bretton Woods.78
6.5 Britain and Intermediation Debates June 1974 – January 1975 
Despite the implications that reform of gold and adjustment had for sterling, Britain did not directly 
intervene much in the process. This was to preserve political capital for debates over the role of the 
IMF in intermediation between oil exporting and importing states. This was to prove a successful 
example of British economic diplomacy, with Healey leading European opinion and handling 
American objections to secure fresh IMF support with minor conditionality. In doing so, Britain was 
able to secure additional source of finance that could manage the external constraint in 1976.  
To consider the importance of intermediation we need to understand how the international system 
of trade and payments had been altered by the oil shock. The rise in oil prices overnight transformed 
the structure of the international economy. As the Saudi Oil Minister noted, “we are in a position to 
76 Ibid.
77 Margaret de Vries The International Monetary Fund 1927-1978 Cooperation on Trial (New York: IMF, 1985) 
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dictate prices…. we are going to be very rich.”79 If oil importing countries were to maintain demand 
and to avoid anti-liberal policies such as trade restrictions, competitive devaluations and a 
breakdown in trade and payments then to a certain extent the higher prices would have to be 
tolerated and resulting deficits financed. The money itself would come from the OPEC states – in 
effect “recycling” the money already paid out by the industrialised economies back to them. The 
way this would be facilitated was a source of debate pitting those favouring market led 
intermediation against those who preferred new institutional sources of funding.  
The Europeans were more suspicious of market led intermediation. The French were concerned of 
conceding sovereignty to the markets in such an important area, while the Germans worried that the 
ability of banks to borrow via off-shore sources of finance would undermine anti-inflation policies.80
Cold War imperatives meant concern for oil importing LDCs without the credit rating to borrow on 
the capital markets. Healey therefore looked to engage with existing initiatives underway in the IMF 
to secure financial support related to oil deficits, which could also support sterling.81
The main such initiative was the creation of a facility at the IMF with looser conditionality than 
attached to traditional lending facilities that would extend financing to countries experiencing 
balance of payments difficulties related to the oil price. This had been first proposed at the 1974 
Rome meeting by IMF director Johan Witteveen. A facility set up to this end (known as the 
Witteveen scheme) had proved a success with 38 countries using the scheme during its first year of 
operation.82 Healey wanted it renewed and expanded as a source of finance to cover the ongoing 
deficits (referred to as Witteveen II). An IMF paper in late 1974 recommended a facility in the range 
of $7 – $9.5bn, raising funds from OPEC states and those industrialised nations in surplus. However, 
this ran into opposition from the US which disliked financing oil deficits for fear of legitimising them 
and displayed a preference for private market solutions. In response to the IMF’s proposals, the US 
79 Allen Matusow Nixon’s Economy p258 
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brought forward its own plan for a Financial Support Fund [FSF] which would raise funds from OECD 
nations only to act as a lender of last resort to nations in severe difficulty. A key difference, and one 
which made it unpalatable to the British, was that it would come with strict conditionality.83
Speaking to the press after a meeting in New York in September, the Chancellor claimed that there 
was a convergence of views towards his proposals, with both the Europeans and Americans showing 
enthusiasm for what was becoming known as the ‘Healey’ plan.84 Despite the Chancellor’s sanguine 
comments to the press, Armstrong in the Treasury expressed concern that the British were moving 
away from the Americans at a time when they should be staying close. As one of the main 
beneficiaries of oil dollar flows, British proposals for extra sources of financing could look like 
“special pleading,” although Armstrong noted that if London recycled oil money on its own initiative 
it would bear the risk of debts turning bad. 
According to Armstrong, the meeting in September had revealed the differences in the British and 
American positions, where even Healey’s modest proposals for an IMF oil facility had been “received 
with horror.”85 Healey’s advocacy of fresh institutional funding therefore risked the support of the 
Americans. However, despite their opposition to the scheme, the fear of being isolated during a time 
of great stress in the international economy and geopolitical tension meant the Americans softened 
their position somewhat at the start of 1975. Witteveen passed on to the British Treasury a report of 
his discussion with the US IMF Executive Director Bennett in which the latter expressed satisfaction 
over the supposedly increased conditionality provisions of the revised Witteveen II facility.86 At a 
meeting of EEC Finance Ministers at Lancaster House on 7 January, Healey sounded out his European 
colleagues on the proposed IMF facility and secured unanimity on European support for Witteveen II 
in return for which they would give consideration to the US’s proposed FSF. Healey was asked to act 
83 Harmon The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis pp 72 - 74 
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as spokesman in the forthcoming Washington G10 meeting, an example of successful British 
economic diplomacy in Europe in contrast to the Heath years.87
Arriving in Washington in mid-January 1975, Healey presented a bullish face to the press, arguing 
that differences between the Americans and Europeans had been exaggerated and the IMF and FSF 
plans (now referred to respectively as the Healey and Kissinger plans) were complementary 
operating as they did on different time scales and to different objectives.88 Behind closed doors, 
Healey had to push Simon and Burns hard but by 16 January he was able to announce to the press 
success in securing agreement to set up a $25bn fund for industrial countries and a 5bn SDR IMF oil 
facility fund. The oil fund assumed that none of the big five industrialised countries of US, Britain, 
Germany, Japan, France would borrow money, but agreement had been reached that if these 
countries did require access then the Fund would lend on money from its existing resources.89
In London, the Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy agreed that the result of the 
Washington meeting was welcome, despite the limited size and duration of the resulting oil facility 
but expressed doubts that the proposed OECD scheme would ever be set up given likely opposition 
in Congress. This was prescient as the FSF was stuck in limbo after Congress failed to ratify it.90 Thus 
although the oil facility did not entirely solve the problem of financing oil deficits, it was believed to 
make a contribution and one that would be drawn upon by the British themselves before too long.91
However, it set the tone for the future debates over the IMF standby and sterling balances 
arrangement, during which Simon and Yeo were keen to avoid Britain escaping IMF conditionality 
once more.  
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6.6: Sterling in Crisis – April 1975 – June 1976 
Britain had maintained domestic peace through the first year of the oil crisis with the Social 
Contract, whereby borrowing had maintained external stability despite the expanding current 
account deficit. There had been some success expanding institutional sources of finance with limited 
conditionality via the IMF, but Britain also encouraged a further build up in the sterling balances 
among official holders while also drawing extensively on international capital markets. As such, 
although adjustment was flexible and liquidity plentiful, these extensive debts meant maintaining 
confidence in sterling emerged as the major constraint on British policy. This meant managing both 
access to institutional sources of finance as well as market sentiment. As the latter turned against 
sterling in 1975, Labour instead turned to institutional sources of financing, raising the potential for 
political conflict with the Americans.  
Market sentiment was undermined by suspicions that Labour was attempting to engineer a 
devaluation. Labour had by this time decided that domestic government spending and monetary 
policy could not continue on their current trajectory and looked to external demand to fill the gap. 
Arguing that a downward trend in sterling’s value was somewhat inevitable, a Treasury paper in 
February had highlighted the benefits of increased demand for exports that would result from a 10-
20% devaluation. However, the government would also have to take responsibility for a policy that 
increased inflation and imposed losses on sterling holders. This would raise accusations over 
breaches of trust and making future financing harder to achieve. Accordingly, it was decided the best 
course of action would be to accede to sterling’s decline and not to put up too much of a fight to 
prevent it, while avoiding giving the impression that the government was directly responsible.92 One 
April paper argued that three external factors would in any case drive the decline of sterling’s value, 
92 TNA T338/296 "A 20% Depreciation" 14 March 1975 
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namely narrowing interest rate differentials, a strengthening dollar and the market shorting sterling 
ahead of the 1975 referendum on EEC membership.93
Labour had committed itself to a referendum on membership of the EEC in opposition which was 
now scheduled to take place on 5 June 1975. Sterling was expected to be weak in the build-up to the 
referendum, and the government planned to eschew major intervention to let the rate drift 
downwards. Following a positive vote on the referendum, during which short positions would be 
unwound, the Bank of England would intervene to prevent strong demand for causing the rate to 
rise. On 11 April, the Chancellor gave preliminary approval to this tactic of letting the rate depreciate 
during the referendum period.94
The lack of firm commitment to defence of sterling raised market suspicions that the government 
was in fact attempting to engineer a depreciation. Reductions in interest rates at the end of April 
were taken to be a sign of the government’s desire to bring down the rate and heavy selling erupted 
following the publication of an article in the Sunday Times: “Healey Ready to Let £ Drop.”95 The 
growing instability of sterling prompted a shift in government policy. As Healey told a TUC 
committee, “oil producers were simply not prepared to put their money into a country where its 
value could be undermined.” Healey warned that if this did happen living standards would be 
reduced as well as recourse made to institutional borrowing with conditions imposed on economic 
policy.96 In the discussions regarding the April budget, Healey and his allies in the Cabinet, notably 
Wilson, Callaghan and Roy Jenkins made the case for cuts to public expenditure to free up resources 
for exports as well as deal with the issue of confidence. The proposals for public expenditure cuts 
and a more robust anti-inflation strategy did not go unchallenged within the Cabinet. Tony Benn 
pitched his Alternative Economic Strategy whereby domestic demand and employment would be 
given priority and expansion protected through import restrictions, rationing of certain imported 
93 TNA T358/207 "Exchange Rate Strategy" 10 April 1975 
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materials, control of capital outflow and a downward float of sterling. If enacted, Benn’s strategy 
would have represented an unprecedented shift in economic policy, effectively creating a ‘siege 
economy’ involving a level of government economic control not seen since Wilson’s ‘bonfire of 
controls’ in 1948.97
Ultimately however, Healey carried the day and the Cabinet endorsed the Chancellor’s position that 
cuts in public expenditure of £1bn for 1975-1976 were necessary to forestall a collapse in confidence 
in sterling.98 Announcing the cuts in the April budget and his intention to reduce £3bn from the PSBR 
1976-1977, Healey stated the measures were necessary to take advantage of the increase in world 
trade he foresaw for the forthcoming year. Healey warned that while financing the deficit had not 
proved difficult in 1974, the supply of unconditional funds was not unlimited: 
If we are to go on attracting such funds their owners must believe that the value of 
the money they have placed with us is not threatened by the consequences of our 
policy actions or inactions. 99
Controlling inflation was vital to this endeavour. Healey was critical of excessive wage settlements 
for the damage they imposed on Britain’s competitiveness and warned that unless the voluntary 
policy achieved stricter adherence the result would be higher unemployment and lower living 
standards all round.100  On 30 June 1975, as the Cabinet was considering an incomes policy, a 
massive bear attack erupted over sterling driven by diversification in official balances held by Kuwait 
and Nigeria. Meeting Healey at mid-day, Richardson informed the Chancellor that he feared “we 
might be faced with a real collapse in our position.” Briefing his ministerial colleagues later that day, 
Healey warned them Britain’s reserves could potentially be wiped out within 24 hours and that an 
immediate decision on counter inflation strategy was imperative to restore confidence in markets.101
Healey explained the position of sterling was “crumbling” and that an announcement was needed 
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that day to stop the rot.102 After long discussions with the TUC, the unions eventually bought into a 
new incomes policy based on a flat rate increase in the weekly wage of £6. This was after being 
presented with the alternative of further public expenditure cuts and borrowing from the IMF which 
would insist on conditions that would prompt more unemployment and reductions in living 
standards.103 The resulting White Paper based on agreement with the TUC drew the implications in 
stark terms:  
This is a plan to save our country. If we do not over the twelve months achieve a 
drastic reduction in the present disastrous rate of inflation the British people will be 
engulfed in a general economic catastrophe of incalculable proportions.104
As Wass notes, it was remarkably successful. The annualised rate of inflation falling from 20% to 10% 
by the second half of the year, with no breaches in its first year of operation.105 However Britain’s 
inflation rate remained well above comparable industrial countries into 1976 (who had also achieved 
reduced inflation, see Figure 6.3), threatening diversification of foreign holders of sterling into more 
stable currencies.  
Source: IMF Annual Report 1977, Table 1 “Industrial Countries: Changes in Output and Prices, 1962 – 76”  
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This continuous source of instability led Labour to approach the IMF for support, although at this 
stage only ‘routine’ drawings were being considered. In August 1975 Healey sent Treasury officials to 
Washington to look into drawing upon the IMF’s oil facility as well as Britain’s first credit tranche. 
The oil facility was due to lapse by March 76, meaning an application was needed soon if the British 
were to draw upon it.106  Making his case for drawing on the oil facility, the UK’s Executive Director 
to the IMF William Ryrie was clear that no major change in economic strategy was imminent. 
Referencing the IMF’s own 1974 statement that countries should avoid excessive deflation, as well 
as the “political difficulties” enacting policies which “increased unemployment and reduced real 
income of the work force,” the British were successful in gaining access to the first credit tranche as 
well as the oil facility. On 16 January 1976, Britain borrowed $812m on its gold tranche, as well as a 
further $1.16bn from the oil facility drawn the following week.107
The period between the sterling crisis in April 1975 and the end of the year has been taken as a 
turning point in Britain’s post-war economic history. Historical focus has been on the shift in the 
domestic priorities of economic policy as the commitment to maintaining demand through 
government spending was replaced, however reluctantly, with policies that aimed to maintain 
market confidence in sterling. Steve Ludlam has argued that Healey’s 1975 budget marked a change 
in priority from bringing down unemployment to controlling inflation.108 Mark Harmon agrees that 
the cuts announced in the April budget “constituted a turning point,” cutting demand at a time 
when unemployment was still rising.109
Chris Rogers goes furthest in arguing that Labour actively leveraged the threat of a collapse in 
sterling to secure domestic support for government retrenchment and incomes policy. Rogers 
downplays the significance of market turmoil in 1975, arguing that the year was characterised by 
two “non-crises”. First, despite the Treasury’s own preference for a decline in the exchange rate, its 
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107 Burk & Cairncross Goodbye Great Britain p 18 
108 Ludlam ”The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis,” pp. 724 -725 
109 Harmon The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis p95 
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fall was presented as demonstrating the need for a more robust anti-inflationary policy. Secondly, 
despite drawing on the oil facility out of prudence rather than any imminent financing gap, Britain 
accepted restrictions on its freedom of manoeuvre in domestic policy by agreeing to rule out import 
restrictions without prior approval of the Fund.110 Together this enabled the Labour leadership to 
pursue its preference for reducing expenditure and introducing an incomes policy while also 
preserving its political legitimacy by communicating to a domestic audience that there was no 
alternative, effectively ‘depoliticising’ the decision to abandon the Social Contract’s commitment to 
higher government spending.111 Rogers argues this was actually an overtly political choice that 
enabled Wilson and his allies in Cabinet to face down Benn’s call for an Alternative Economic 
Strategy by presenting it as inconsistent with financial support from the IMF upon which Britain was 
said to depend.112 Likewise, the problems presented by sterling’s international role proved useful in 
securing wider political support for domestic retrenchment aimed at reducing the external deficit, 
increasing sterling confidence and maintaining lines of credit.113
The argument advanced here is that the policy Labour pursued in 1975/76 was a continuation of its 
export-led growth strategy following devaluation. While Benn’s AES would have supposedly 
insulated the domestic economy from the impact of market opinion, allowing the prioritisation of 
domestic growth and investment over defence of the currency, this would have been at the cost of 
cutting off Britain from trade and the capital flows which had preserved the standard of living 
following the oil shock’s shift in the terms of trade. While the liberal trading system had survived the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods (Nixon’s surcharge was quickly abandoned), there was a renewed 
danger that countries might respond to the first major international economic crisis since the war 
with protectionist measures. Instead, Labour looked to secure both a competitive exchange rate and 
110 Chris Rogers “From Social Contract to ‘Social Contrick’: the Depoliticisation of Economic Policy-Making 
under Harold Wilson 1974-75” British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2009) Vol. 11(4) p649 
111 Ibid p636
112 Ibid p644 
113 Chris Rogers “Economic Policy and the Problem of Sterling under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan” 
Contemporary Political History (2011) Vol. 23 (3) p346 
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a shift of resources into the export sector to take advantage of a reflation of global demand they saw 
on the horizon.114
There was also the unresolved issue of the sterling balances. Pressure on the currency had begun in 
December 1974 following substantial sales by American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia 
after being instructed by the Saudi government that all oil payments must be made in dollars.115  The 
timing was unfortunate as ARAMCO had recently acquired £226m which it had to dump on the 
market at once. Embarrassingly, the new policy was announced while Healey was in Riyadh and 
although the Saudi Ministry of Finance instructed the oil majors to make no further sales of sterling, 
this was, as the Treasury noted, “a bit late in the day.”116 Given the concentration of the balances in 
a small number of holders, decisions in a single country could have dramatic consequences for the 
rate. Controlling inflation was therefore vital to improve the incentive to hold the currency.  
Therefore while the Labour leadership did need to buy support domestically for measures to bring 
down the public sector borrowing requirement, as we have seen in Chapter 4, this was never 
reduced to the levels achieved in 1968/69, while the public sector continued to borrow extensively 
on international capital markets (see Figure 6.4), increasing the need to maintain confidence in 
sterling. 
114 TNA CAB 133/459 "Steering Brief" 6 November 1975 
115 TNA PREM 16/49   "the November trade figures and the foreign exchange market" 10 December 1974 
116 TNA PREM 16/49 “Letter from Paymaster General private sec to Butler Esq - PM Private Secretary” 13 
December 1974 
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1976 Q1 “UK Official Short and Medium Term Borrowing From Abroad”; Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, 1978 Q1 Table 24 “UK Official Short and Medium Term Borrowing From Abroad”
At the same time as domestic retrenchment, Labour simultaneously looked to foreign demand to 
secure growth via an export-led growth strategy, similar to its approach following devaluation. This 
dual strategy can be seen in the first summit of the G6 (France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the US 
and the UK), held in November 1975 at Rambouillet, France summit. Despite Wilson’s reservations, 
fearing it would descend into Franco-American arguments over “pursuit of fetishes about the 
monetary system,” Labour saw a limited advantage in their participation.117 It would communicate 
to domestic audience the extent to which British economic problems were rooted in world 
problems, buying acceptance for tough remedies for inflation and the external deficit.118 There 
would also be potential to use the summit as a forum for discussing reflationary policies at a global 
level, notably from the Germans and Japanese.119
Labour’s confidence that the right policy mix had been taken in the 1975 budget was demonstrated 
in the Treasury’s preparation for Rambouillet. The Treasury argued it was inevitable there would be 
some deficit in government expenditure given OPEC and private sector surpluses resulting from the 
117 TNA PREM 16/356 "Record of a meeting at Chequers"" 14 September 1975 
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prevailing high saving ratio.120 Nevertheless an improved forecast for inflation and the balance of 
payments as well as new measures to control public spending and protect sterling meant “a number 
of major problems in the United Kingdom’s economy are well on their way to solution.”121 As in 
1968, Labour’s strategy depended on export led growth, which in turn depended on the demand in 
other industrialised economies. The British therefore aimed to talk up the danger of unemployment 
to maintain support for reflation in other countries, describing the 12.5m unemployed between 
them was a “tragic waste” of human resources,” while warning of the pressures for protectionism.122
At the summit itself Wilson took an optimistic tone, noting improvements in the non-oil external 
deficit and the forecast decline in inflation following the agreement with the unions on incomes 
policy. The prospect of $200bn reserves from North Sea oil meant the long-term balance of 
payments position was secure, while Wilson even joked of his ambition to become President of 
OPEC. In the immediate term, he asked his fellow delegates to take a “flexible” attitude to 
adjustment and that countries with balance of payments surpluses or “causal” countries with the 
ability to play a key role in the global economy expand domestic demand.  
This however ran into outright opposition from the US represented by President Ford. Despite 
lauding the progress of the American economy, Ford also took pains to stress even faster growth 
would not lift the Europeans out of recession. The American position reflected concern that volatility 
in exchange markets would result in protectionism as countries sought to isolate their economies 
from the impact of global financial crises. A report for the President’s office noted it was imperative 
that countries like Britain and Italy “live more within [their] means,” but forecast major political 
difficulties for governments as they attempted to do so.123 Simon was wary of being drawn into a 
European economic malaise, believing that the international financial crisis had its roots in 
120 TNA CAB 133/459 "Steering Brief" 6 November 1975 
121 TNA CAB 133/459 "Economic Outlook: International and in Participant Countries " Brief by Treasury 5 
November 1975 
122 TNA CAB 133/459 "Steering Brief" 6 November 1975 
123 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)” 17 March 1976 
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inappropriate domestic policies. Countries like Britain had reacted to the oil shock by heavy 
borrowing rather than adjustment and now the bill was due. Noting that the British government had 
“staked its future on the expansion of exports” to drive growth up and unemployment down, Simon 
believed that the recent fall in sterling was part of a deliberate effort to engineer a devaluation by 
the Bank of England. He subsequently issued a clear warning against competitive devaluations to the 
British, which he saw as contrary to the spirit of the new flexible system agreed under reforms to the 
IMF.124 As such, in contrast to 1968/69 Labour’s efforts to engage economic diplomacy to negotiate 
the external constraint ran into determined opposition from the US. Ideological opposition was to 
subsequently determine the true scope of the crisis, rather than the scale of adjustment required.  
A fresh crisis over sterling began in March 1976, in which once again diversification on the part of oil 
producers was compounded by market suspicions over Labour’s intention for sterling. A sell order 
from the Nigerian central bank prompted heavy selling in the market. A technical procedure, 
whereby the Bank of England had to recoup the Exchange Equalisation Account from which the 
Nigerian sterling had come by itself selling sterling was interpreted by the markets as a deliberately 
engineered attempt to drive down sterling. The reduction in the Market Lending Rate the next day, 
although also following technical rules to bring it in line with market rates, reinforced this view (see 
Figure 6.5).125
124 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to the Economic Policy Board” 19 
March 1976 
125 Wass Decline to Fall pp 178 – 180  
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Source: Minimum Lending Rate: Bank of England, “Changes in Bank Rate, Minimum Lending Rate, Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate, Repo 
Rate and Official Bank Rate” [Online] https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/monetary-policy/baserate (accessed 13 August 
2019); Dollar/Sterling Exchange Rate: Federal Reserve, “G.5/H.10 – Foreign Exchange Rates” [Online] 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload (accessed 13 August 2019)
The decision to reduce interest rates took a heavy toll on the reserves. At the beginning of the crisis, 
the Bank had $6bn in the armoury, of which $1bn was from a recent drawing on the IMF’s oil facility 
as well as the first credit tranche.126 Following the resumption of heavy selling, the Bank spent 
$1.2bn supporting the rate over the rest of the month in an attempt to prop up the currency. 127
Markets were not placated however and despite the rise in the MLR at the end of April, sterling 
continued to slide.128 Markets were also unnerved by the surprise resignation of Wilson in April and 
a strong showing for the left-wing candidate Michael Foot in the subsequent election. After the third 
ballot Callaghan eventually became PM, but markets were not reassured by the 1976 budget which 
gave unprecedented influence to the unions by linking increases in tax allowances to the TUC 
respecting a 3% ceiling on pay rises.129
Callaghan’s inheritance was therefore not a happy one. Confidence in sterling was impinging on 
policy and markets remained unimpressed by measures taken so far. However, dramatic 
126 Ibid p195 
127 Ibid pp. 178 – 180  
128 Ibid p193 
129 Burn & Cairncross Goodbye Great Britain p35 
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retrenchment would undermine the support of the unions, bringing down the government. Only 
institutional finance could enable the government to stabilise the economy, support the exchange 
rate and manage diversification of the sterling balances. The failure of an independent European 
monetary policy since the collapse of Bretton Woods meant Labour was once again dependent on 
the American relationship. However, changes in the basis of Anglo-American relations since 1967 
meant it was uncertain how would they respond to a request for further support. 
6.7: Decline to the IMF: June 1976 – November 1976 
Following Callaghan’s election, the pound continued to slide, reaching a low of $1.72 by the 
beginning of June. Cappie construes this slide as indicating a lack of strategy towards the exchange 
rate as well as lack of communication between the Treasury and the Bank.130 Healey however 
resisted calls from the IMF for further government expenditure cuts, believing the correct policies 
were in place and required time to work through. This however exposed the British to the full weight 
of American disapproval. At a summit held in Puerto Rico at the end of the month, Callaghan 
conceded that fiscal and monetary restraint were required for the British economy to stabilise but 
questioned whether it was necessary in the doses being applied elsewhere in the developed world. 
He admitted he was very much concerned about what he saw as a “premature tightening up,” given 
that export led growth was the Britain’s “salvation” and would be jeopardised should her trading 
partners “overreact to inflation.” 
In response, Ford contradicted Callaghan openly, claiming pre-recession output had been surpassed 
and inflation was falling in a number of countries precisely because governments had refrained from 
over-expansive policies, despite domestic political pressure to do so. According to Ford, inflation 
caused recessions and ultimately unemployment. The current inflationary climate, while 
exacerbated by oil crisis, was the culmination of a decade in which governments overextended 
themselves in an attempt to drive up living standards and ameliorate social inequalities. Restoring 
130 Cappie The Bank of England p748 
207 
employment and output therefore required progress on inflation and, given the interdependence of 
the global economy, the most important contribution to the recovery he could make was to achieve 
stability in the US economy.131
The Americans therefore looked to use whatever leverage they had to impress on Britain’s 
government the necessity of further corrective action. Greenspan, the Chairman of the CEA, wanted 
the US in concert with Germany to leverage the financial support required by Britain and Italy to 
impose correct domestic policies aimed at reducing public sector borrowing and monetary 
growth.132 Accordingly, when Richardson explored the possibility of drawing a $3bn swap facility 
with the Federal Reserve on 3 June, Yeo looked to leverage this request to impose conditionality on 
British economic policy.133 On 5 June, Yeo laid out the conditions in talks with Healey and Wass. The 
swap would be for 3 months, with only one renewal possible and in no circumstances would it be 
extended. Although opposed to the six-month limit, Callaghan conceded and agreed Britain would 
turn to the IMF if it needed further support at the end of the six-month period.134
The swap agreement formed part of a wider $5.3bn standby organised by the G-10 and was 
announced to the Commons on 7 June. Healey characterised the June loan as a “massive 
international endorsement of sterling” due to sterling being undervalued by the markets, but this 
was contradicted by American officials, who felt sterling’s current market value reflected current 
British policies.135 Burk & Cairncross believe the standby was designed to buy time, with the British 
hoping the measures already taken would work through the economy. In contrast, the Americans 
thought the time bought was to enact fresh measures.136 Wass however dismisses the influence of 
the standby, claiming its announcement failed to restore confidence in sterling, while the reluctance 
131 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum of a Conversation” 4 June 1976 
132 FRUS 69-76 Vol. 31 “Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Robinson) to 
Secretary of State Kissinger” 29 March 1976 
133 Ibid p749 
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135 Harmon “The 1976 UK-IMF Crisis: The Markets, the Americans, and the IMF” p10-11  
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of the Treasury to draw on it due to its short maturity meant it had “little real effect on the 
situation.” Only $1bn was drawn, for presentational purposes to boost the reserves.137 As such both 
the markets and Labour drew the same impression, namely that the standby was not enough by 
itself to restore confidence in sterling. The markets, lacking their own apparatus of economic policy 
appraisal, looked to the IMF’s ‘seal of approval.’ Before the IMF negotiations had even begun 
however Labour were already reconsidering economic policy.  
The failure of the standby to restore confidence in sterling meant a fresh reappraisal of domestic 
policy. At a meeting of the Economic Strategy (EY) committee, Healey made the case for a round of 
£1bn expenditure cuts, running into opposition from Benn who believed a loan from the IMF could 
be obtained with little conditions and advocated fresh expansion to lift the economy out 
recession.138 Eventually obtaining agreement from the full Cabinet, Healey announced the measures 
to the House on July 22, involving £1bn public expenditure cuts, a £1bn rise in National Insurance as 
well as a 12% target of money supply growth for the 76/77 financial year.139
Markets continued to be unimpressed. Large scale selling resumed in September and while a three-
month renewal of the central bank credit was easily obtained on 7 September, as per the conditions 
of the deal there would be no further extension when it expired in December.140 Callaghan did not 
favour using the reserves to prop up the rate and heavy selling on 8 September followed agreement 
between Callaghan and Healey to cease intervention in sterling, overriding Bank of England 
objections. Despite a rise in the MLR from 11.5% to 13% on 10 Sept, by the time intervention 
resumed the following week the rate had fallen to $1.72 and would continue to slide to $1.67 by the 
end of the month. The Treasury was forced to accept that there was no substitute for intervention if 
a catastrophic collapse in the exchange rate was to be avoided.141
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On 29 September the government announced it would draw on its remaining credit tranches at the 
Fund, loans totalling $3.9bn, of which $1bn would be used to repay existing borrowing from the G10. 
The sense of crisis peaked before the IMF even arrived in town. Healey had planned to leave London 
on 28 September to attend a Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting prior to the IMF annual 
meeting in Manila on 4 October. As sterling came under a renewed onslaught, Healey cancelled his 
trip while on the way to Heathrow. 142 In order to demonstrate their commitment to resolve the 
crisis, Healey and Callaghan came out fighting at the party conference, to the open hostility of the 
left of the party. One portion of Callaghan’s speech has in attracted a great deal of attention:  
We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all 
candour that that option no longer exists, and that in so far as it ever did exist, it only 
worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the 
economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step. Higher 
inflation followed by higher unemployment. We have just escaped from the highest 
rate of inflation this country has known; we have not yet escaped from the 
consequences: high unemployment.143
This has often been taken as evidence that Labour had abandoned full employment as a goal of 
policy, endorsed monetarism and repudiated the post-war consensus.144 However this overstates 
the extent to which the IMF crisis marked a change in policy. As Steve Ludlam has noted, the change 
in policy had begun in 1975.145 Burk & Cairncross consider it a ruse to impress market opinion, but 
not one that translated into any policy that would lead to cuts and further unemployment.146 Jim 
Tomlinson agrees, noting: 
142 Wass Decline to Fall p229 
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[A]s a description on post war economic events it was largely nonsense; full 
employment in the 1950s and 1960s had not been maintained at the price of ‘higher 
and higher’ inflation. 147
Instead the speech recognised the need to placate market opinion to secure survival of a Labour 
government. Earlier in his speech Callaghan recognised the cause of unemployment as “paying 
ourselves more than the value we produce,” and indeed most of his speech dealt with how to 
overcome unemployment.148 This was a theme reinforced by Healey’s speech who shot down 
criticism from the left who favoured Benn’s AES, arguing it would bring the Tories to power and 
mass unemployment. Healey claimed, “if you do not want these alternatives, then we have got to 
stick to the policy we have got.”149 Healey and Callaghan were therefore able to facedown criticism 
from the left in favour of an AES by positioning recourse to the Fund as the means of preserving a 
Labour government. 
6.8: What Crisis? The Sterling Balances and IMF Bailout October 1976 – November 1976 
While committing to a programme of reduction in government borrowing and greater control of 
credit, Callaghan’s objective for resolution of the crisis was wider than securing agreement with the 
IMF. This stemmed from his analysis that the fundamental cause of the crisis was sterling’s 
continued reserve role and the danger posed by diversification from the small number of oil 
producers which now accounted for the majority of official balances. Callahan did not interpret the 
crisis as primarily resulting from his government’s current economic policy, which following previous 
rounds of expenditure cuts, was now deemed appropriate. However it should be remembered that 
the continued existence of these balances was, in part, the result of previous attempts to negotiate 
the external constraint, notably the terms of the 1968 Basle deal aimed at preserving Bretton 
Woods, as well as the use of oil producers’ deposits to defer adjustment to the OPEC shock. 
147Jim Tomlinson “Economic Policy” in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson [eds.] Cambridge Economic History of 
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Nevertheless, Callaghan now used his commitment to agreeing terms with the IMF as leverage to 
secure international commitment for a wider support package aimed at finally resolving sterling’s 
reserve role given the failure of previous rounds of reform to do so.  
In economic diplomacy therefore, Callaghan’s first objective was in his narration of the crisis, to 
demonstrate it resulted from sterling’s reserve role. He looked for a quick deal with the IMF based 
on Britain’s existing policies but believed a separate deal on the sterling balances would be required 
to definitively settle the issue. Conversely, an IMF deal without a separate facility would not stabilise 
sterling or allow that Labour government to continue in office, given the level of expenditure cuts 
that would then be required. In a letter to Ford expressing his gratitude at the President’s agreement 
in expediting the British discussions with the Fund, Callaghan defended his government’s existing 
policies, arguing inflation and government spending were on a downward trajectory and called for a 
“contingent loan facility” linked to the balances, without which stability could not be restored. If 
such a facility was not forthcoming, Callaghan called into question the British contribution “as an ally 
and a partner in the Western Alliance and its value as a member of the International Trading 
Community.”150 On 25 October Callaghan appeared on Panorama to call publicly for an end to the 
sterling balances: 
I would love to get rid of the reserve currency...I am not sure that everybody in the 
Treasury would, or maybe in the Bank. But from Britain's point of view I see no 
particular advantage in being a reserve currency at all.151
As we have seen, this was somewhat misleading given the extensive use of sterling’s international 
role his government had made since 1974 in delaying adjustment. This attempt to narrate the crisis 
as an issue of the sterling balances ran into opposition in Washington. To the Ford administration, 
the crisis resulted from Labour’s pandering to the unions in formulating economic policy and lack of 
150 FRUS 69-76 Vol. E-15 Part 2 Documents on Western Europe 1973-1976 “Memorandum From the 
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resolute action on inflation. Markets had also been unsettled by calls from within the Labour party 
for nationalisation of the banks and insurance companies.152 As Yeo had noted to Ford in June, some 
form of additional support for sterling was not beyond the means of the US but argued it would 
mean fresh unconditional credit for the United Kingdom. Any indication that the US was prepared to 
consider the idea would support those on the left of the Labour party who did not appreciate gravity 
of the situation.153
At the heart of the conflict was disagreement over what would shift market sentiment in a positive 
direction. While Callaghan looked for international endorsement of the government’s policies based 
on agreement with the IMF and a separate facility for sterling, the Americans advocated a change in 
the policies themselves. Sterling remained under pressure in October. dropping to $1.65 on 3 
October, its lowest level yet. In a meeting with Yeo, Healey was advised to undertake a bear squeeze 
on creditors, with the MLR raised to 15% on 7 October. “Greed will overcome fear,” Yeo had advised 
the Chancellor, but the Treasury was not taken in by his arguments, believing sterling holders were 
not much influenced by marginal changes in interest rates. 154 Although the exchange rate stabilised 
following the increase of MLR, a report in the Sunday Times on 24 October which stated the IMF 
expected a depreciation to $1.50 resulted in a fresh bout of selling. The same day Milton Friedman 
appeared on American television to offer the opinion that Britain was on the verge of collapse.155
At the IMF meeting in Manilla, Burns expressed criticism of Labour’s economic policies, arguing the 
current crisis was the result of failing to take more decisive action earlier in the year.156 The US plan 
was indeed to leverage the role of IMF conditionality to secure a fundamental shift in British policy. 
Kissinger had made this point to Yeo in June, noting:  
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if the British are smart, it could be in their interest to be pressured into agreement 
on conditions, so that they can say that the only reason they imposed stringent 
conditions on the British economy is because of those American SOBs. This is better 
for Callaghan than having to deal with the unions himself.157
This line of reasoning has been developed by Rogers, arguing that the imposition of IMF 
conditionality allowed Callaghan to shore up his domestic support, depoliticising the consequences 
of policies to stabilise sterling by presenting them as lacking an alternative.158 This is however only 
one side of the story. Callaghan’s preferences extended beyond domestic policy and into the realm 
of economic diplomacy, namely resolving the issue of the sterling balances. Analysing the 
simultaneous attempts to secure international support for an additional sterling facility allows us to 
put the IMF negotiations in a wider context, demonstrating the outcome of the crisis to be more 
significant than reduction in public spending levels.  
6.9: Solutions to the Sterling Balances – June 1976 – November 1976 
While Callaghan was in favour of doing something about the balances, there was not at this stage 
clarity on what exactly could be done. The experience of the previous ten years had outlined various 
proposals for resolving the issue of national currencies in reserves, both as general reform to the 
international monetary system and as part of schemes tailored specifically to sterling. The Treasury 
was therefore able to draw on these to quickly detail options for resolving sterling’s international 
status, while also drawing appropriate lessons from the successes and failures of previous attempts.  
According to a paper by Douglas Walker of the Treasury, there were several options. Funding would 
involve some form of maturity transformation, in which the short-term liabilities were replaced with 
long term, less liquid ones. On the other hand, substitution would see sterling be replaced by claims 
on the international community, while the British would assume an obligation to the IMF to 
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amortise the liability. Finally, the United Kingdom could finance switching out of the currency by 
drawing on a medium-term loan set up for the purpose – which was the precedent of 1968 Basle 
deal. Any operation would have a cost for Britain, either in the maintenance of new obligations 
arising from any funding or substitution operation or in the exchange rate element in taking on 
medium term borrowing to finance switching out of sterling.159
Substitution had been the objective of the previous Labour government whereby the problem of 
sterling would be resolved via a general reform of the role of reserve currencies in the international 
monetary system. As Walker’s paper noted, reform efforts had stalled in response to disagreements 
over the dollar overhang and the policy of benign neglect regarding the dollar. As well as setting a 
significant precedent in the international community assuming the obligations of an individual 
country, it would also likely be mandatory, provoking pre-emptive switching in the event of any 
negotiations around the prospect, destabilising sterling and making a Basle style facility necessary at 
the outset of any such negotiations. While such a facility could therefore stand on its own, it would 
be a necessary preliminary condition for any wider substitution discussions.160
Circulation of Walker’s paper around the Treasury and the Bank revealed scepticism over the 
prospects for support. Ryrie was pessimistic about the chances of receiving substantial support for 
sterling without additional onerous conditions. He was sceptical about Walker’s ideas for 
substitution via the Fund, as he did not think there was enough concern about the sterling balances 
to warrant such a radical precedent. There was no longer a general fear about a collapse of sterling 
undermining global trade and payments. Nor in a dollar world was there much concern about dollar 
overhang given that dollar convertibility had already ended. Ryrie concluded the proposal for 
financing switching through a medium-term loan was the more likely option, but warned that any 
such deal would be acceptable only on its terms, not for the sake of it.161 The Bank, traditionally 
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more in favour of the reserve role of sterling, was also critical of Walker’s paper. Like the Americans, 
the Bank believed that any support of sterling would prove short lived if not accompanied by more 
fundamental measures to improve confidence. Like Ryrie, the Bank considered the safety net facility 
the more likely option, but Walker was concerned the Bank favoured a facility that would never be 
drawn.162  In any case the Bank correctly expected there would be no movement on the balances 
from Germany and the US until the British had drawn all its resources from the IMF and had been 
subjected to Fund conditionality. The Bank also warned against accepting any facility for the sake of 
it and made a defence of the balances, in effect making the same argument as the Americans were 
to do:  
Sterling balances can be tiresome; they involve higher interest rate payments than 
debt in most other currencies; but if we can manage our economy even tolerably 
well, they have the great charm of not necessarily having to be repaid.163
Walker was not convinced by this argument. The massive external balance sheet of the United 
Kingdom and its substantial dependence on the current account meant Britain would find it difficult 
to accept an exchange rate wholly determined by the market, even if the policies deemed 
‘appropriate’ were being pursued. Sterling was particularly prone to “bandwagon” effects – what 
would become known as overshooting – due to the existence and liquidity of the balances. The case 
could be made that even after drawing on Britain’s 4th credit tranche at IMF – involving the Fund’s 
approval of domestic policies – this would not be enough to assure stability due to the danger from 
diversification.164
Work had advanced sufficiently by the end of August for the Treasury and Bank to submit a joint 
paper to the Chancellor, who forwarded it with his approval to the Prime Minister. The paper was 
concerned that the $3.8bn available from the IMF would be a first step towards solvency but might 
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not be enough to see sterling through the projected deficits of 1976 and 1977, making further 
support necessary. The paper listed arguments against an IMF substitution account, noting it would 
lead to debates over the role of reserve currencies in general, involve protracted negotiations via the 
IMF and could prompt mass diversification out of sterling as holders sought to get out before they 
were forced to take on SDRs. It was believed that the safety net would be easier to organise since it 
would draw on the precedent of 1968, although the paper conceded that other countries could not 
be expected to be enthusiastic about the idea.165 Although using the 1968 Second Group 
Arrangement as a precedent it was recognised that developments in the global economy since then 
meant fundamental changes would be required. Exchange guarantees were considered unsuitable in 
a floating world, while the concentration of the balances in a small number of oil producing states 
for whom sterling constituted a minority of their reserves meant participating countries were less 
likely to commit themselves to MSP ratios.166 The 1968 deal had been associated with a build-up of 
sterling balances rather than a run down. As Walker noted, countries lending the money would want 
to avoid an open-end commitment and would look to sterling guarantees and MSPs as tools that 
would minimise the possibility of any drawing. On the other hand, Walker believed the British 
interest was that any such facility was not merely a safety net, but one that was drawn upon to 
finance a sizable net reduction in the balances.167
A key issue for the government was conditionality. Both the Treasury and the Bank warned against 
being bounced into accepting any scheme just for the sake of it, although the danger was that once 
negotiations had been made public the reaction of markets to the disappointment of no scheme 
being arranged could seriously threaten sterling. It was hoped that conditionality for the facility 
would be along the lines of the general IMF conditions of economic management. Agreeing with the 
paper’s conclusions, Healey cautioned the Prime Minister that new facility was no substitute for IMF 
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drawing and in any case would not be forthcoming prior to the settlement of the standby, since they 
would be drawing the required funds from the same group of creditors.168
Much would depend on the attitude of the Americans. Simon and Yeo had already made their 
opinions known, Yeo advising Healey on 3 August that the balances would be an advantage once the 
British economy turned the corner and that an additional safety net would involve heavy political 
costs and would tie up funds needed elsewhere.169 This opposition had made some in the Treasury 
consider whether it was worth the political capital.170 Nevertheless, Callaghan looked to circumvent 
them by appealing directly to Ford, positioning a facility as part of package with any IMF deal that 
would decisively end the problem of the sterling balances.171 As he explained to Healey, "we must 
keep up the momentum gained, and I do not think we should be inhibited in doing so by the timing 
of elections in the United States.” At this stage, Callaghan was thinking of a $5bn safety net, 
speculating further that $10bn or even more would constitute a decisive breakthrough while not 
ruling out substitution through the IMF at some point. Callaghan’s main leverage was the threat to 
the British contribution to trade and defence.172 For his part Healey was more cautious, critical of 
reports in the press which he saw emanating from “Mt. Lever” about the needs for massive loans for 
Britain beyond which the IMF could provide. As he noted to the Governor of the Bank of England, 
when the subject of the safety net had been raised with Ford, the President had been non-
committal.173
The initial American response was not positive. At his meeting with Healey on 3 October, Yeo talked 
down the prospects of a facility for sterling, claiming he saw no prospect of massive additional help 
for the currency. If any support was to be made available it would be dependent on policies such as 
monetary restraint and cutting public expenditure which, he believed, would solve the so-called 
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problem on their own. Despite Healey reiterating his belief that the facility would not likely cost its 
contributors anything, Yeo advised the Chancellor not to raise the facility at the current time, 
arguing that the markets would not be impressed by the admission that even the IMF standby was 
not enough to solve British problems.174 Meanwhile in Manila, Simon forwarded on to Ford the 
results of conversations he and Burns had been having with British officials. Simon advised the 
President not to give any indication of support to the British beyond the IMF standby to maintain the 
principle that countries with balance of payments difficulties should resort to the IMF alone.175
There was also an attempt to solicit German support. Assuming the IMF drawing was approved, the 
British looked for German backing on securing the overall size of the standby, including the initial 
drawing and support for a safety net facility to be negotiated at the same time.176 A visit by Helmut 
Schmidt, who had become West German Chancellor in 1974, to Chequers at the beginning of 
October was kept off the record, but as a colleague noted in a letter to Derek Mitchell of the 
Treasury, “one can be pretty sure that if Schmidt saluted when the PM ran the safety net up the 
flagpole, we should have heard all about it immediately.”177 A call between Pohl and Mitchell 
revealed Schmidt had returned from Chequers “depressed and pessimistic” and advised that while 
the Germans would give what support they could, there had to be a political dimension, including 
first settling terms with the IMF.178 Following Callaghan’s appearance on Panorama, Pohl complained 
to Mitchell had once again raised the issue without clarifying his ideas on the subject. Mitchell, who 
was still in the dark regarding the discussions between Schmidt and Callaghan, conceded the he too 
was unclear as to what the PM had in mind, but ruled out sterling guarantees and talked in terms of 
a medium-term facility as the most attractive option to sterling holders. Pohl considered such a 
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“liquidity guarantee” possible but not without the US and promised to raise the issue with Yeo in 
forthcoming talks.179
With the Americans and Germans non-committal at best, the Treasury considered what actions 
could be taken unilaterally by the British to solve the sterling balance problem. A proposal drawn up 
by the Treasury for an SDR bond whereby sterling holders would be offered a transformation of their 
liability from short term to long term was overruled by the Chancellor on the advice of the Bank on 
the basis that it would be an implicit admission of weakness. This argument was criticised by the 
Treasury noting that knowledge of sterling’s weakness was already widespread and that an SDR 
bond would offer Britain the means of taking the offensive, offering sterling holders another option 
beyond diversification into another currency. The scheme could operate in tandem with the safety 
net and would reassure creditors the facility would not be drawn upon.180 Alternatively a scheme 
involving $5bn - $10bn bond issued through the BIS would have the advantage of leaving Basle to 
negotiate with creditors.181 In response, Healey advised Callaghan he was against the SDR scheme on 
its own, fearing it would imply the United Kingdom was only worth investing in when denominated 
in a non-sterling currency, but felt that, in tandem with safety net proposals it would prove a 
welcome contribution towards stability in exchange markets.182
Britain’s strategy continued to develop in the week before the arrival of the IMF mission. A meeting 
held on 1 November between Callaghan, Healey, and Lever, with Wass and Mitchell representing the 
Treasury, discussed the options open to sterling. Prior to the meeting Wass advised the Chancellor 
that the question of additional support was likely to take up the bulk of discussion. Callaghan wanted 
agreement on the safety net thrashed out before signing up to any IMF arrangement. Wass argued 
this implied “immense problems,” given the reluctance of Simon, Yeo and Congress to put forward 
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any funds outside of the IMF agreement.183 Reporting back on Pohl’s discussions with Yeo, Mitchell 
informed the group that Yeo had taken a hard line with regards to sterling, apparently demanding 
Britain repay in full all withdrawals from the swap agreement credit by the 9 December deadline. No 
further support would be forthcoming prior to settlement with the IMF. Pohl himself had been more 
positive, claiming the Germans were in favour of a safety net but this would depend ultimately on 
the approval of the Americans. He recommended the British “downplay” the proposal prior to the 
IMF settlement, on which he advised accepting at least the “impression” of conditionality.184
Despite the obvious American reluctance to concede a limited safety net, Lever believed even more 
support could be secured. That same day he had forwarded Healey a detailed proposal of a so-called 
“masse de manoeuvre,” whereby swap arrangements would be arranged with the Fed in the order 
of $3bn - $5bn, in addition to $2bn lines arranged with the Japanese and Germans. Although the 
swap lines would nominally be short term, Lever believed the overall facility would effectively be 
long term, since one swap could be paid off by drawing upon another.185
Prior to the meeting, Wass acknowledged the attraction of having enough funds at the government’s 
disposal to corner the exchange market and pursue any strategy the government wished, but 
diplomatically concluded that it would be extremely difficult to negotiate on the basis of a minimal 
change in policy. 186 Commenting later in the month, Walker was much more scathing, arguing it 
would be  
sanguine to the point of total unrealism to suppose that we might be able to bring 
off Mr Lever's suggested multiple swap facility in addition to both the IMF standby 
and a safety net. 187
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The mere suggestion that both the IMF drawing and the safety net would still not be enough to solve 
sterling’s problems would confirm creditors in their worst views of the government’s economic 
strategy.188 At the meeting itself however, Healey seemed inclined to give Lever’s proposals a 
hearing. His stated objective for the crisis was securing international assistance in three separate 
operations; an IMF loan to stabilise the exchange rate and finance the deficit; a safety net facility to 
stabilise the sterling balances; a further long-term loan. However, he recommended that IMF 
negotiations be completed as soon as possible to begin work on what further support would be 
available.189 This however would require some revision to the government’s spending plans. As Wass 
noted, on present policies the United Kingdom was faced with a very high PSBR in 1977 and an 
excessive growth in money supply, undermining confidence in sterling. On the other hand, the 
prospect of North Sea oil coming on stream within the next two years argued against ‘overkill.’ Wass 
claimed that it was in Britain’s interests to moderate government spending, even if creditors 
permitted the government to make no change in policy (an unlikely prospect). However, given the 
weak state of domestic demand and prospect of external balance by 1978 the adjustment should be 
a small one, in the region of £1bn change in fiscal demand.190
The build-up to the IMF mission therefore demonstrated the extent to which an IMF deal was 
considered only part of the solution by Callaghan. As Healey noted to a meeting of the EY committee 
on 3 November, projections for economic fundamentals such as unemployment, inflation and living 
standards were not favourable, requiring extensive international support to stabilise sterling. “We 
must get the IMF borrowing for 1977 and fund the sterling balances if we can.”191
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6.10 The IMF Mission November 1976 – December 1976  
Following the arrival of the IMF mission, the respective IMF and Treasury teams met formally for the 
first time on 4 November. Wass informed the Treasury’s Policy Coordinating Committee [PCC] that in 
negotiation with the Fund, “on no account should officials express any view, except on his specific 
authority, about what policy changes were desirable.” Despite a PSBR figure for 77/78 of £11.2bn 
being leaked to the press on 6 November, the British team opened negotiations on the basis of 
existing policies.192 The scale of the disagreement between the British and the Fund was revealed at 
a meeting on 10 November when Alan Whittome, the IMF lead representative, called for a PSBR in 
77/78 of no more than £7bn. Meeting Healey the next day he was told by the Chancellor that a 
reduction in the region of £3-£5bn was “not on.”193 Disagreement in Cabinet over a public 
expenditure white paper centred over whether the government should propose its own cuts or wait 
for the Fund to do so.194 Whittome returned to Washington on 12 November with little progress to 
show as a result of Healey’s refusal to allow discussion on policy changes.195
While stonewalling the IMF, much greater effort had gone into engaging the international 
community regarding a separate sterling facility. Prospects for such a facility took a brighter turn on 
3 November when Schmidt called Callaghan to tell him, in “suitably guarded language” that after 
speaking to Ford he had discerned a genuine will in the White House to be helpful towards Britain, 
notwithstanding opposition in the Treasury and Congress. 196 The British attempted to kick off 
discussions on a safety net at the BIS although resistance from Burns was anticipated whether 
dealing bilaterally with the Americans or via the BIS.197 At a meeting of Central Bank governors in 
Basle on 8 November Richardson attempted to secure agreement for the BIS to set up a working 
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party to examine the technical details. The opinion of the Germans and Americans would be key and 
prior to the meeting Healey talked with Pohl to discuss his major concerns for the British economy. 
As the Chancellor summarised the situation, a collapsing exchange rate from sterling holders’ 
diversification risked fuelling inflation and growth in the PSBR. The IMF arrangement would help 
stabilise sterling but there was a danger it would not be enough. Healey also warned that the 
demands of the IMF might be too much for some of his cabinet colleagues who were flirting with the 
idea of a siege economy. While conceding that there was no chance of activating a safety net prior 
to the IMF negotiations, Healey sought Pohl’s support for beginning technical discussions so 
progress could be made quickly once the IMF standby was agreed.198
The response was not promising. In his discussion with Healey, Pohl seemed uninterested in the 
arguments for a sterling balance facility, advising instead the British would better off pursing policies 
that attracted capital and warned that the German delegate Klasen agreed with Yeo in his 
perception of the crisis.199 At Basle, while most of the delegates found Richardson’s argument that a 
safety net would complement an IMF standby in stabilising the exchange rate reasonable, the 
Americans were adamant that technical discussions should not even begin until after the IMF 
standby had been agreed and gave no indication as to whether they would participate even at that 
point. As a result, no working party was established although the BIS agreed to do bilateral work on 
the subject with the Bank of England.200
Callaghan now appealed directly to Ford, sending Lever to Washington as his personal envoy. In his 
letter informing the President, Callaghan took the opportunity to defend his government’s record 
noting the July decision to reduce the PSBR in 1977 by £2bn, despite domestic political opposition. A 
lacklustre world economy had frustrated Labour’s export led growth strategy and compounded the 
problem of the sterling balances. “We find ourselves running hard to stay in the same place,” 
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Callaghan noted and while conceding the potential for further action on government spending, ruled 
out the calls for “massive deflation” he saw emanating from the IMF. Such policies would be 
catastrophic, not just for the Labour government but in a wider sense, leading to Britain being 
unable to fulfil its global commitments and resorting to extreme left or right-wing solutions.201
In response to Callaghan’s letter, Simon personally lobbied Ford on standing firm against what he 
saw as British attempts to circumvent IMF conditionality. According to Simon, the British proposals 
at Basle demonstrated their belief that the sterling balances rather than Labour’s excessive policies 
were the cause of the crisis and a “funding” operation via a large international credit would help 
rectify the situation. This was perhaps not a deliberate misrepresentation of British ideas, since 
Simon admitted the definition of funding was an elusive one that the British had failed to clarify. 
Simon noted that Britain had so far drawn extensively from international sources of credit, including 
$2bn from the Fund earlier in the year, the $3.9bn standby being negotiated, drawings on swap 
networks and reserves as well as an estimated $3.5bn on private capital markets. If the British could 
expect to be continually bailed out from the consequences of their poor decisions, countries like 
Italy, Mexico and Brazil would want the same.202
Lever met Ford on 16 November, accompanied by the British Ambassador Ramsbotham and Ryrie 
who represented the Treasury. Aware of Simon’s position, Lever was at pains to stress the Labour 
government’s pragmatic approach to economic management, claiming the British economy had 
undergone a “remarkable” transformation since the July measures. His main concern was that not 
everyone in the US appreciated the extent of change in British policy or the risk to Britain’s 
commitment to free trade and her global role from the continuing instability. Lever warned that 
demands for excessive cuts from the IMF would create domestic unrest if pushed through against 
high unemployment. Action on the sterling balances was also required since the decline in sterling 
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was unjustified given the government’s policies and prospect of North Sea oil balancing the external 
account by 1978. Ford was sympathetic, if non-committal during this first meeting. 203
The next day Lever delivered a note from Callaghan stressing it was “essential” that the finalisation 
of the IMF loan and agreement on a facility for sterling were announced simultaneously. Callaghan 
wanted agreement that after the IMF drawing was finalised, the Fed would participate in the BIS 
initiative on a sterling safety net.204 Ford’s senior advisers were unenthusiastic to say the least. 
Simon evaded giving any firm commitment to the safety net, Kissinger confused the proposal with 
his moribund OECD fund while Burns flatly refused to even consider the idea prior to successful 
agreement with the IMF.205 Despite this, Ford sent Callaghan a letter shortly after Lever’s visit 
claiming that once the IMF negotiation had been successfully completed the US would work 
sympathetically on a solution to the problem of the sterling balances. Overruling the objections of 
the Treasury and Burns, Ford agreed that a safety net operation could be announced simultaneously 
with the IMF drawing.206 Thus while Callaghan was disappointed by the timing of the relative IMF 
and BIS support arrangements, this was an acceptable compromise to ensure American 
commitment.  
The prospect of American support for a deal on the sterling balances provided impetus to come to 
agreement with the Fund. While Lever was meeting with Ford, Whittome, who had returned to 
London the previous day, sat down with Callaghan and Healey. With a PSBR of £10.5bn expected on 
77/78, action was required on public expenditure while the monetary aggregates also needed to 
come down.207  A briefing for a meeting of the EY committee on 17 November noted that ministers 
understood agreement with the Fund was necessary as support for sterling was urgently needed. 
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However, given the forecast of 2 million unemployed by mid-1978, even on a PSBR of £11bn it was in 
Britain’s interest to get “economically rational and politically acceptable terms.” As such, any deal 
with the IMF should be based on a package with a minimum impact on employment. Raising £700m 
from selling BP shares and cutting export credits was floated but it was noted that this might be “too 
little blood” for the IMF. Ideally this would be combined with savings of £300m from a public-sector 
recruitment moratorium, £2-300m savings on defence while softening the blow with an extra £200m 
extra investment. If forced into a big package, £2-3bn of savings could be found by also increasing 
£1bn in taxes combined with £1bn in cuts from social security.208 The meeting concluded with 
authorising the Treasury to discuss with the Fund the implications of cutting the 77/78 PSBR to 
£10bn, £9.5bn or £9bn but without committing ministers to any such deal.209
Full discussions took place between the Fund and the Treasury on 18 and 19 November. On 18th, 
Wass informed Whittome that while he could not commit the government be believed it would be 
possible to secure a PSBR of £9.5-10bn. Whittome was “visibly astonished at this” and said the gap 
now looked unbridgeable, to which Wass suggested he sleep on it.210 At a meeting with Healey the 
following day, Whittome said he wanted a 78/79 PSBR of £6.5bn as a focal point from which he 
implied a 77/78 PSBR of £8.5bn. Healey responded that he had no authority to negotiate on the 
basis of a PSBR lower than £9bn for 78/79.211 In response to the meeting the Fund communicated a 
memo in which they outlined their assumptions for the British economy. The starting point was a 
DCE expansion of £5bn in 78/79 which was consistent with a PSBR of £6.5bn and assumed 4% 
growth in GDP. Working backwards, the figures in 77/78 would involve DCE expansion of £6.7bn 
with a PSBR of £7.5bn and growth of 1.5%. The cuts were therefore assumed to be deflationary in 
the first year but followed by strong growth in exports and investment the subsequent year. The 
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Treasury were not impressed by this approach (which was based on assuming a high rate of GDP 
growth resulting from improved confidence and lower interest rates). In response, the cabinet 
approved the Treasury to put forward its own proposals on the size of PSBR and DCE.212
A meeting of the Cabinet on the 23 November witnessed a showdown between ministers over the 
IMF negotiations. A left-wing group of ministers including Foot, Benn and Shore made the case for 
resistance to the IMF. In reply Healey argued for a PSBR of £9bn in 77/78 based on £1bn in cuts and 
£500m sales from BP shares. Crosland objected that there was no case for further deflation given 
the level of unemployment and called into question the Treasury’s forecast. Crosland advised 
threatening the IMF, Germans and Americans with a siege economy, concluding “our weakness is 
our strength…it is a test of nerve and IMF must give us the loan.”213 Meeting Whittome later that 
day, Callaghan informed him that the Cabinet would not agree to a lower PSBR than £9.5bn for 
77/78. Callaghan argued the PSBR acted like a “talisman” in negotiations. Too small a reduction and 
the markets would not be convinced, too much and the Social Contract between the government 
and the unions would collapse. In response Whittome argued that a £9.5bn PSBR would not 
convince the “millions of bankers all over the world” whose response would determine the fate of 
sterling.214
At the same time Callaghan looked to engage Ford and Schmidt to lobby the IMF. Noting the 
Cabinet’s refusal to go below £9.5bn, Callaghan argued there were extensive political and economic 
reasons not for agreeing to more stringent cuts. Unemployment was higher than at any time since 
the 1930s and forecast to rise higher on the basis of existing policies, let alone further public 
expenditure cuts. While in deficit, the balance of payments was projected to be in surplus by 1978. 
The extent of the cuts demanded by the IMF would undermine the relationship with the unions and 
would precipitate a fall in the government. Callaghan urged both to intervene with the Fund’s 
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Managing Director to “impress on him the need to moderate their terms to what can be made 
politically acceptable in this country.”215
Ford however would not be drawn to leverage American influence on the IMF negotiations. As he 
agreed with Schmidt, strong conditions needed to be imposed on the British, although perhaps 
moderated to keep the Labour government in office. The President believed Callaghan could go 
further than £9.5bn, although not as far as £9bn, indicating his assessment of the situation was 
closer to Callaghan’s than the Fund’s. 216 Replying to Callaghan on the 24 November Ford explained it 
would be “inappropriate” for America to interfere with the Fund negotiations, but assured the Prime 
Minister once more that the US would move “sympathetically” on the sterling balances once 
agreement was reached on the IMF standby.217 In his own response Schmidt noted he could hardly 
persuade Witteveen of the necessity of Callaghan’s economic arguments if he was not convinced by 
them himself.218
With the international context hardening against the British, the Treasury proposed its own series of 
3 alternative packages to the Fund on 24 September, each including £0.5bn sales of BP Shares. The 
only package which raised any interest from the Fund, was the third, heaviest one which proposed 
cuts of £1.5bn in 77/78 and £2bn in 78/79 leading to PSBR of £8.5bn in 77/78 followed by a slightly 
smaller one the following year. DCE was accordingly given at £7.5bn for both years. The most 
disturbing outcome of the meeting was how far apart the Treasury and the Fund were on the PSBR 
for 78/79, even based on a reduction in public expenditure that was resisted by a majority in the 
Cabinet. At the heart of the disagreement was the Fund’s much more optimistic assessment that 
cuts would have on the economy, boosting investment through improved confidence which, 
together with higher exports, would increase tax receipts and hence lower government borrowing. 
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Due to the inherently uncertainness of the projections, Wass advised against making commitments 
to the PSBR and DCE for two years. 219 A proposal made by Wass and taken up by Healey suggested 
making targets for 78/79 dependent on economic growth projected by the Fund. According to 
Wass’s later record, this proved a breakthrough, with Whittome accepting the 78/79 PSBR could be 
given in “general terms” linked to the level of economic activity. Whittome returned to Washington 
on 28 November having advised Wass he felt the cuts laid out in third package would be acceptable 
for 77/78 but that a further round of cuts would be required in 78/79 unless the economy was 
growing slower than the IMF assumed.220
At gruelling round of Cabinet meetings on 1 December Healey proposed to negotiate on the basis of 
£1bn of public expenditure cuts and £0.5bn from the BP sales in 77/78 followed by £1.5bn of cuts in 
78/89 plus a further £0.5bn in additional cuts or tax rises. Revisions of the Treasury forecasts that 
considered lower interest rate payments the government would need to make on its debt suggested 
these would now be enough to achieve a PSBR of £8.5bn for both years. Despite opposition from 
Crosland, Benn and Shore, by the end of the meeting Callaghan was able to summarise that Healey 
had the support of the Cabinet. However, Witteveen himself had arrived in London on the 
suggestion of Ford. An unsatisfactory meeting with Callaghan and Healey followed, where he 
explained the £1bn of “real” cuts in 77/78 were unsatisfactory.221
Following another Cabinet meeting on 2 December, at which the exact nature of the proposed cuts 
was agreed, Healey informed Whittome that he had authority to reduce the PSBR in 77/78 to £8.7bn 
on the basis of £0.5bn BP sales and £1bn expenditure cuts. Tentative agreement had been reached 
on further adjustment in 78/79 of £2bn but this would be discussed at a Cabinet meeting on 6 
December.222 Whittome communicated this to Witteveen, but at a meeting with Healey on 3 
December reported that the IMF managing director had asked for a greater adjustment of £1.5bn of 
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cuts in 77/78 and £3bn in 78/79. Healey famously replied “Dr Witteveen could take a running jump.” 
An impasse loomed. Whittome felt able to sell the 77/78 cuts but argued Witteveen would require 
more than £2bn in the second year. In response Healey argued he had not yet secured agreement 
even for £2bn. He suggested Whittome give his boss an account of Callaghan’s thinking. While 
failure to reach agreement with the IMF would cause the fall of the government, so too would 
accepting Witteveen’s proposals then failing to get them past the party and parliament. Healey 
claimed Callaghan would rather go down fighting the IMF then his own party. He might even win an 
election called on a change of economic strategy that enabled Britain to “go it alone.”223
In response Whittome proposed to negotiate on the basis that a large adjustment in the second year 
was contingent on the upswing in the British economy that the Fund foresaw. In response Healey 
and Whittome agreed a draft which proposed an adjustment between £500m and £1bn if the rate of 
growth between the beginning of 1978 and end of 1979 was more than 3.5%.224 With this 
compromise in place both Witteveen and Callaghan agreed to the scope of the adjustment and work 
could begin on the Letter of Intent that detailed the specific commitment to public spending and 
DCE.225
The cut and thrust of the IMF negotiations means that attention has inevitably focused on the 
contentious debates over the PSBR, while analytical debate has centred over whether IMF 
conditionality imposed a shift in economic policy on Labour or whether this was undertaken 
previously of the government’s own volition. However in separating the essentially domestic debate 
over government economic policy from the international debate over what to do about the sterling 
balances, these analyses overlook the true significance of the IMF deal from the perceptive of the 
Callaghan government, namely that it was part of a wider package aimed at definitively resolving 
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sterling’s international status. As the Prime Minister explained to Lever in a call while the latter was 
in Washington: 
I don’t think that we can take it separately. They have got to be taken together. 
There has got to be something to be sold to our people. The sterling balances, they 
have got to be part of it. 226
While Rogers has argued that Callaghan used the imposition of IMF conditionality to depoliticise the 
consequences of his chosen economic policy, from the perspective of international negotiation we 
can see he was equally adept at threatening the collapse of his domestic political base to secure 
foreign commitment to a sterling balance facility. Callaghan’s major objective across the crisis was to 
resolve the sterling balance problem, hence his narration of the crisis as stemming primarily from 
the existence of the balances. Given that the Ford administration was clear that discussions on an 
additional facility could only begin once the IMF negotiations had concluded, conditionality was 
entered into on the understanding that this would then secure the international support needed. 
Negotiations with the Fund revealed that Labour’s interpretation on the medium-term prospects for 
sterling was much more positive and they resisted attempts to tie down British policy beyond the 
forthcoming year. However they also recognised that an impression of conditionality needed to be 
given (hence talk over whether proposed cuts would be “enough blood” for the Fund) in order to 
impress market opinion as part of a wider reappraisal of confidence in sterling.  This means that 
agreement with the Fund was only the penultimate stage, as attention now turned to the exact type 
of support Callaghan could extract from the Americans.  
6.11 Negotiating the Third Group Arrangement – November 1976 – February 1977 
Throughout the negotiation of the IMF standby, work had been proceeding on what facility could be 
available for sterling. On 25 November, a Treasury paper outlined the scale of the problem. Since the 
last arrangement in 1968 the size of the balances had nearly doubled from £3.4bn to £6.2bn. Of 
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these balances, the ones held by official bodies were the more volatile, having risen steadily under 
the terms of the 1968 arrangement and peaking at £4.9bn in March 1975 before dropping back to 
£2.8bn by the end of 1976. The danger therefore was that a further mass diversification would 
absorb the forthcoming IMF money.227
Work between the Bank of England and the BIS had proceeded throughout the IMF negotiations, 
with the BIS producing a paper similar in outline to British proposals, albeit with an exchange 
guarantee. It was hoped that once agreement was reached with the IMF, work on the safety net 
would progress sufficiently for the Chancellor to announce them simultaneously on 15 December.228
This however depended on the attitude of the Americans. Ford had given his agreement that work 
would progress on the sterling balances once the IMF deal was signed but having lost the election to 
Carter on 2 November, the British were concerned the US Treasury would scupper the deal. Simon 
continued to believe that once the right policies were in place the balances would cease to be a 
problem, to which Healey replied that the issue of confidence among sterling balance holders meant 
the presentational value of the safety net was extremely important.229
Simon was concerned that a separate deal on the sterling balances would allow the British to 
circumvent the Fund’s conditionality. Previous support for sterling had in effect “provided 
continuous underwriting of the sterling balances,” allowing successive British governments to pursue 
inappropriate policies.230 A more influential actor was now Burns, who would remain in office into 
1977. A memo prepared for him considering the pros and cons of the safety net considered the 
economic argument weak. The volatile elements of the sterling balances – around $2.4bn or 
probably less – could be financed by the IMF standby and borrowing on the Eurodollar markets. 
Additionally, the facility might encourage the very switching it was designed to avoid, inciting 
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holders to get out while the going was good. More promising for the British were the political 
arguments. it was recognised that given the build-up of expectations regarding a facility for balances 
it would be dangerous to now disappoint them. The flipside of the weakness of the economic case 
meant the facility would be small and cheap.231 While in London on the 29 November Yeo spoke to 
Richardson to convey Burns’ current thinking on the issue. Yeo claimed Burns was sympathetic but 
like Simon did not recognise the balances as the principal problem and was not prepared to discuss 
them until after agreement was reached with the Fund.232 However, Yeo also gave the impression he 
was now “resigned” to a Basle type facility with an accompanying dollar bond issue.233
With agreement of the Fund secured at the beginning of December, Callaghan looked to expedite 
discussions on the sterling balances. In his letter to Ford on 2 December outlining the details of the 
agreed public spending cuts, he warned the President that he was “not sanguine,” about being able 
to carry the country with him.234 In a later letter, he claimed he would not be able to persuade the 
unions or the Labour parliamentary party to support the IMF deal without agreement on a sterling 
safety net.235 In order to win public support he wanted to make a specific reference to a facility for 
sterling when announcing the IMF deal in the House of Commons on the 15 December. He informed 
Ford of the specific statement he wanted to make: 
President Ford has indicated to me that he will be recommending Congress to 
approve United States participation in this facility and I now expect that negotiations 
on it can be brought to a speedy conclusion.236
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While Callaghan had secured domestic commitment to the IMF deal by presenting it as the only 
option to stabilise sterling and secure a Labour government, in economic diplomacy he was also 
prepared to leverage domestic opinion itself (specifically the treat of an adverse reaction and the fall 
of Labour’s government) to secure international support for his wider objective of resolution of the 
sterling balances. Once again Callaghan made clear in his dealings with Ford that acceptance of the 
IMF deal could only be achieved as part of a wider package that involved some international 
commitment to resolving the sterling overhang.  
However, the belated attention of Yeo and Burns to a safety net now threatened to slow down 
progress. A leader in the New York Times that was assumed to be sourced from Yeo insinuated the 
British were “fuzzy” in their ideas regarding the safety net. Healey complained to Kissinger about 
Burns’ and Yeo’s obstructive attitude and requested Kissinger lean on Burns to engage with 
discussions underway in Basle.237 Mitchell was dispatched to Washington on 12 December in an 
attempt to finalise the details with Burns and Yeo, however found Burns “immovable” on the 
suggestion that his delegate Walich take part in the Basle discussions. Burns apparently considered 
the sterling balances a problem for the British rather the rest of the world that could be easily solved 
with exchange guarantees if the British government could not enact the appropriate domestic 
policies. Callaghan’s repeated interventions to Ford had upset Burns who claimed the Prime Minster 
failed to appreciate the independence of the Fed. Embarrassingly for Mitchell, Yeo then took the 
opportunity to read out Callaghan’s message from the previous day, provoking Burns into “another 
tirade about the Fed’s independence” and demanding Mitchell report back that the timetable 
required of the Americans was impossible.238
Meeting Yeo alone later that day, Mitchell found him slightly more forthcoming. Yeo agreed in 
principle to the safety net, on the condition it applied to public balances only and was tied to 
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commitments to eventually reduce and eliminate the balances. While Yeo’s proposal for a dollar 
bond offer to facilitate switching out of the currency was uncontroversial, his demands for 
conditionality were. Yeo wanted the facility operated via the IMF and subject to the same 
conditionality as the third and fourth credit tranches. This reflected Simon’s belief that if something 
was to be done about the sterling balances it was better to deal with them over the medium term in 
a forthright manner rather than via a safety net which provided finance nominally on a short-term 
basis but with the option of rolling over funds over several years – “a medium-term facility in short 
term clothing.” In this case the costs and risk would be spread across the system, with OPEC 
countries contributing to the funds provided. In contrast, the safety net would provide OPEC sterling 
holders with lucrative interest rates and (Simon believed) exchange guarantees, while only the West 
would be required to put up money. 239
Mitchell was understandably taken aback by this last demand, noting that it was a radically different 
proposition to the one being considered in Basle. Much previous work had been done on funding in 
the Committee of 20 but this had elicited little support during previous rounds of reform. Yeo’s 
proposed scheme would take many months to negotiate and implied an element of compulsion on 
sterling holders that would inevitably provoke them to switch out of the currency.240 In a memo 
passed to Kissinger the next day it was pointed out that although intended only for official balances, 
Yeo’s scheme would require controls on private balances also, which was “hardly consistent with 
London remaining a major financial centre.” The British were adamant that they would not accept a 
scheme in which withdrawals were linked to IMF conditions. 241
Breakfasting with Yeo and Burns on the 13th, Mitchell took the opportunity to debate the relative 
benefits of the Basle and Yeo schemes. Burns notably did not endorse his colleague’s proposals and 
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conceded Mitchell’s argument that deliberate run down of the balances would be difficult to 
organise and might produce panic. However, he held firm regarding the Basle negotiations, claiming 
his attitude was "God bless all central banks that wanted to support it," – not particularly helpful 
since they would not proceed without American involvement.242 Reporting on the discussions Wass 
informed the Prime Minster that he now had “serious anxieties” about the prospect for the safety 
net and advised concentrating efforts on the meeting in Paris the next Monday. 243 Callaghan was 
much more irate and threatened to send Ford an angry letter but was talked down by his Treasury 
advisors who thought it unwise to jeopardise relations at this critical juncture.244
The news from Basle was no more heartening when Richardson called to report to Wass later that 
day. Discussion on the wording of the Chancellor’s statement on 15 December revealed exception 
taken at the word ‘willingness’ being used to describe the delegates feeling towards the project. The 
revised statement dropped the reference to the Fed, speaking only of “discussions being taken 
forward in Washington,” and the “general desire” on the part of those concerned to resolve the 
issue.245 Callaghan was disappointed by the statement but recognised there was not much chance of 
amendments given the tight deadline.246
Having been unable to secure the commitment on the sterling balances by the 15 December, Healey 
announced the details of the IMF arrangement without them.247 Presenting the IMF agreement as 
the means to “achieve the fastest possible return to a high and sustainable level of employment,” 
Healey was on his feet for half an hour in what appeared to the American ambassador as a 
“particularly boisterous – somewhat raucous – House of Commons.” Healey stressed that the 
adjustment would come in the form of expenditure cuts rather than tax rises and downplayed the 
severity of the cuts. After detailing the cuts in food subsidies, defence, export credits, local 
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government as well as raises in duties and the sales of the BP shares, Healey turned to incomes 
policy and inflation. Healey reiterated the policy that if pay rises were moderated and it would not 
take the 77/78 PSBR above £8.7bn then there would be scope for reduction in taxes, demonstrating 
that even after the IMF deal the union relationship continued to be at the forefront of government 
strategy. On the sterling balances he referred to the on-going discussions in Basle and Washington 
and as agreed in Basle, the “general desire” on the part of those concerned to achieve as 
“satisfactory arrangement” for the sterling balances.248
The reaction was mixed. One member of the House complained that the government was trading 
away the nation’s sovereignty, to which Healey replied that the endorsement of the IMF of Britain’s 
policies would do much to improve the country’s economic prospects. The Sun newspaper the 
following day carried the headline “Britain’s Shame.”249 However in his report to Washington, the 
American ambassador quoted a senior trader expressing surprise that the UK was able to arrange an 
IMF loan on such easy conditions, while expressing his own view that once again domestic politics 
had got in the way of the necessary structural adjustment. On the narrow grounds of meeting IMF 
conditionality the measures would succeed but it was in doubt whether this would be sufficient to 
restore confidence more generally among Britain’s creditors. What cuts had been announced were 
seen as ineffectual. The ambassador concluded by noting “The Chancellor has once again produced a 
package which pleases no one, neither the left wing of his party nor the opposition nor the 
markets,” but conceded the markets might take a more favourable view in the longer term upon 
reflection.250
As the report revealed, the perception in Washington was that Britain had still not entirely taken 
measures to resolve the crisis according to their analysis that the fault lay in domestic policy and 
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continued to resist demands for further support for sterling that might loosen the impact of the IMF 
deal. This continued American resistance forced the British to reappraise their demands. The 
insistence on linking eligibility on drawings to IMF conditionality made one Treasury memo suggest 
considering “whether American pollution of the position so far reached in Basle is such as to render 
the whole facility not worth having.” The Treasury now recognised private balances were unlikely to 
be covered and hence the size of the facility would be correspondingly smaller. Although no specific 
amounts had been discussed, the Americans appeared to be thinking in the region of $2 - $2.5bn.251
Accordingly Mitchell sought to manage the Chancellor’s expectations downwards, advising also to 
give some consideration to what measures could be taken to prevent a future build-up of the 
balances.252
Callaghan wrote to Ford on 16 December to express his strong preference for the safety net facility 
being worked out in Basle. While not discounting the appeal of a funding approach, he argued it 
would take too long to organise to be of any help. Ford’s advisor Scowcroft suggested he make clear 
to the US Treasury the nature of his personal commitment to Callaghan and the need for a quick 
solution on sterling.253 In his reply to Callaghan on the 19th, Ford reported that Yeo would attend the 
Paris meeting with a spirit of “sympathy, understanding and flexibility,” while also highlighting the 
political pressures he himself was under to deal with the problem in a comprehensive and 
sustainable manner.254
The moderation of British expectations and relaxation of American hostility to the scheme ensured 
progress when the two sides met in Paris on 20 December. Holmes from the Fed claimed that to 
receive congressional approval, the safety net would need conditionality linked to the IMF drawing. 
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Eligibility to draw on the IMF standby would be sufficient during its two-year duration, after which 
the US would require a certificate from the IMF that stated the Fund’s approval of the United 
Kingdom’s policies. While there was a “general sympathy” with the American’s ideas, the consensus 
following discussion was that, being a central bank facility, it could not depend on IMF conditions. 
Moreover, since the safety net was in part designed to provide liquidity for Britain’s foreign currency 
bonds, any formal disqualification of Britain’s right to draw would jeopardise the success of them. 
Therefore, while no formal link to the IMF would be included, it was suggested British performance 
under its Letter of Intent and regular consultations would enable the BIS to form its own 
independent judgement on whether further drawings were permissible. This was a similar type of 
loose conditionality (based on judgement of individuals rather than objective criteria and hence 
amenable to greater personal diplomacy) that had characterised borrowing from the Fund post 
devaluation.  
In the afternoon discussion turned to the mechanics of the safety net. While the Europeans were in 
favour of covering both official and private balances, the Americans were adamant that it would 
apply only to official ones. This meant less money would be required, with the Americans pitching 
$2bn, finding agreement from French and Germans who accepted American insistence on excluding 
private balances. The Americans accepted a drawdown period of 3 years but argued a repayment 
period of 10 was too long.255 Reporting back on the meeting, Healey advised Callaghan that they may 
have to revise downwards their expectations in terms of size and coverage but would be able to 
mitigate demands for meaningful conditions with regards to future accruals.256
A report was produced on the sterling facility to be considered by the Governors at a meeting in 
Basle in January. Progress was now swift and despite some technicalities regarding the dollar bonds 
that needed to be resolved, the Treasury was optimistic that agreement could be reached on a $2bn 
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facility for the official balances with only “fairly broad brushes of intent” on preventing future 
accruals. Yeo continued to push complicated ideas on conditionality at a working lunch between the 
German, American and British treasuries but his ideas were not taken seriously as they were 
expected to “wither on the vine when [he] does – or even before.”257
To finalise these details McMahon of the Bank of England and Mitchell of the Treasury travelled to 
Washington for a meeting with Burns and Yeo on 6 January. Yeo gave the impression that he had 
softened on the question of conditionality and role of the IMF but remained committed to phasing 
out sterling. 258 The next day they agreed the form of a paper to be presented by Burns at a Basle 
meeting. The Americans pushed for a target figure of private balances but the British successfully 
resisted any firm undertakings towards this end, believing it might jeopardise London’s status as a 
financial centre.259
While Callaghan was disappointed with the size and scope of the facility being discussed, the 
Treasury felt that $3.5bn was the maximum that could be hoped for and the most likely outcome 
was pushing the Americans up from $2 to $2.5bn. The Treasury was prepared to accept having 
drawings linked to the conditionality of the IMF standby over the two years that was in operation 
while resisting tight conditionality for later years, particularly when the draw down period had 
passed and when the United Kingdom was making any repayments due.260 Together with Mitchell 
from the Treasury, McMahon spent the 7th January negotiating with Yeo and Burns on a paper the 
latter would present in Basle on the coming weekend. According to the Treasury report, the British 
delegation spent a lot of time dissuading Yeo from linking the Basle facility to IMF conditionality, as 
per Callaghan’s instructions. While the final paper stated that the IMF Managing Director would 
review the progress of reducing sterling’s reserve role, performance on this was to be assessed by 
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the “vague criterion of ‘reasonable efforts to meet the undertakings’.”261 Although the paper 
proposed the British would become ineligible to draw upon the BIS facility if in the judgement of the 
Managing Director Britain was not making reasonable progress in reducing sterling’s reserve role, at 
the Basle meeting on 9 January Richardson did not permit a definition of the exact level of working 
balances to be targeted, nor that the IMF executive board should have oversight of progress, only 
the Managing Director himself.262 The final deal accepted that eligibility to draw would be linked to 
drawing on the IMF standby, as well as a commitment to exercise restraint with respect to future 
increases in private sterling balances.263
Under the terms of the deal, participating central banks would make available a $3bn credit via the 
BIS that could be drawn upon to stabilise sterling if the official sterling balances fell below $2.165bn, 
a base level set from the 8 December and Britain’s reserves fell below $6.75bn. 264 This credit would 
be available for seven years.265 As part of the deal Britain was committed to running down official 
balances to a working level, and to prevent them building up again. Conditionality to draw was 
linked at American insistence to the IMF’s Managing Director agreeing the UK was making 
reasonable progress towards this end. A foreign currency bond offer would facilitate those who 
wanted to switch out of sterling.266
The announcement of the Basle facility resulted in a strong positive reaction in both the press and 
the markets. There was a common recognition that the Basle facility, and more importantly, the 
commitment to run down the sterling balances to the level of working balances, constituted a 
historical moment. As the Financial Times commented, the deal provided an opportunity to 
complete what had been the nominal objective of British policy at least since the Rippon 
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commitment in 1971: ending sterling’s reserve role. According to the FT “there is now a potentially 
happy ending to what has been an increasingly disgraceful story.”267 There was positive comment on 
the deal in both Europe and America, with the Treasury noting the conditionality attached to the 
deal attracted relatively little attention.268 As part of the deal to facilitate a rundown of the balances, 
Britain made available a foreign currency bond offer, of which no more than 75% was to be in 
dollars. According to Treasury estimates in February, the current level of sterling balances was 
around £1bn above working levels, which meant it was envisaged selling £500m of bonds.269
However visits to major sterling holders in the Middle East revealed despite a general sympathy 
towards the plight of sterling, holders viewed the current strengthening of the currency as an 
opportunity to recoup some of their losses over the previous year and therefore expected a 
generous terms on the bond to be induced to switch.270
The result of the combined IMF and BIS deals appeared to transform the plight of the British 
economy, at least from an external perspective. The UK drew on the IMF standby three times, but 
after the third drawing in August 1977 began repaying the IMF.271 As short-term reserves had surged 
from $5bn to $20bn in 1977, finishing the decade at $30bn, Britain was unable to draw upon the 
Third Group Arrangement, as short-term reserves remained far too high above the trigger points. 
However, as sterling’s short-term assets finally outweighed short term liabilities, the sterling 
overhang was resolved.272 In the end it was the endorsement of the international community, 
mediated via the IMF and BIS, as well as British commitment to ending sterling’s reserve role that 
transformed market sentiment regarding the sterling balances.  
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6.12 Epilogue November 1978 
By the end of 1978, the sterling balance that had so haunted policymakers for the past 10 years had 
largely ceased to be a problem. Significantly however, discussions within the Treasury and between 
Callaghan, Healey and the Bank reveal the extent to which the sterling balances and wider concerns 
about external constraints continued to haunt Labour even following the overwhelming 
endorsement of markets that occurred at the beginning of 1977. As Healey reminded Callaghan in 
November 1978, a key issue remained IMF conditionality. Participating central banks had insisted 
that Britain would only be able to draw on the facility if it maintained access to the IMF standby. 
Since the standby was only for two years while the Basle facility could be extended to a third, it had 
been made clear that some other form of conditionality would have to be substituted for the “IMF’s 
seal of good housekeeping for our domestic policies.”273
To secure an extension of the facility therefore would require either asking for an extension of the 
IMF standby, or asking central banks for some alternative form of conditionality, accepting that this 
would most likely result in them asking the IMF for help, as they had in 1976 when the Managing 
Director was asked to supervise Britain’s sterling balance policy. Healey advised  
I do not believe that this would be a viable course given the general political 
difficulties of justifying IMF conditions to the Labour party.274
The combined advice of the Treasury and Bank was therefore that the facility should be allowed to 
lapse as continuing it would involve, in one way or another, re-subjecting Britain to the IMF’s 
conditionality. Following disagreement with the Fund in May over performance criteria for 78/79 
(during which the Fund had let things slide based on the expectation that there would no further 
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drawings or extension of the standby), a substantive re-negotiation raised the possibility of further 
conflict over the appropriate policy mix. 275
Callaghan readily agreed that the facility could therefore lapse but then asked whether there was 
now any prospect of reducing sterling’s reserve currency role, noting there was much talk of this in 
1976 but not much progress in the past two years to reduce the sterling balances held abroad by 
central banks.276 In response the Governor of the Bank of England was reportedly “very indignant” at 
Callaghan’s suggestion that nothing had been done, writing personally to advise that the fall in 
sterling’s share of world reserves suggested it had “ceased to have any significant role as a reserve 
currency.”277 Within the Treasury and Bank of England the view was that there had been significant 
success in reducing sterling’s reserve role. The foreign currency bond offer in April 1977 allowed 
holders to purchase bonds denominated in dollars, Deutschmarks, Swiss francs or yen, with over 
£390m subscribed. It had also been made clear in official announcements that foreign holdings of 
sterling should be kept to working balances, with the Treasury monitoring upward movements in 
balances held and taking the matter up with the country involved. The conclusion was that the fall in 
the sterling balances from £2.1bn in mid-December 1976 to £1.8bn in October 1978 during a time 
when world reserves had grown rapidly meant that official balances did not now exceed working 
balances.278 Healey concluded:  
I think it would be wrong to give the impression that we cannot walk without this 
crutch and have no confidence in our own ability to apply sound policies to the 
management of the economy. 
The overhang resolved, Labour had maintained its commitment to the principles of embedded 
liberalism, preserving domestic policy autonomy within a stable trading network.  
275 TNA T381/99 “The Basle Safety Net and the IMF Standby” 3 November 1978 
276 TNA T381/99 “The Basle Safety Net for the Sterling Balances” 10 November 1978 
277 TNA T381/99 “Letter from DH to M Barrat” 24 November 78; TNA T381/99 “Letter from George Richardson 
to the Prime Minister” n.d.  
278 TNA T381/99 “Official Sterling Balances” 24 November 1978 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The thesis has examined the evolution of foreign economic policy between sterling’s devaluation in 
1967 and the final resolution of its reserve role in 1977. Despite the continuous concern of policy to 
find a resolution to the sterling overhang, paradoxically this period witnessed a renewed 
accumulation in the level of the balances, reversing the decline that had precipitated devaluation. 
Notwithstanding commitments made as part of Britain’s third EEC application in 1972, only in 1976 
as part of the IMF crisis did running down sterling’s reserve role finally become the objective of 
policy. Foreign currency bond offers and the 1977 Basle deal succeeded where other support 
packages had failed, running down foreign holdings of sterling to working balances, while short term 
assets built up to the extent that the overhang was finally resolved. 
This process has been explained through a constructivist approach to monetary relations.  The 
constitution of the external constraint faced by Britain as a result of the sterling overhang was 
interpreted through the prism of Britain’s commitment to the post-war principles of embedded 
liberalism. Securing stability in external exchange and autonomy for domestic expansion assumed 
priority, prior to 1976, of resolving the sterling overhang. The impact of the overhang on domestic 
expansion was instead moderated through a continuous process of negotiation, leveraging Britain’s 
commitments to the wider monetary system to secure international support for sterling.  
The thesis has traced the process of policy formation and economic diplomacy as the Treasury and 
political leaders responded to shifts in the international monetary system and engaged with 
processes of reform to improve the terms of Britain’s interaction with the global economy. 
Immediately following devaluation, resolution of the sterling balances was interpreted through the 
prism of defending and reforming Bretton Woods. The external constraint was accordingly 
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constituted by Britain’s adherence to system’s provision of adjustment, liquidity and confidence. 
While successful in stabilising and reforming Bretton Woods in the short run, defence of the post-
devaluation parity involved submitting to rigid constraints. Britain was required to assume higher 
external debt and restrict public spending more than would have been the case in the absence of 
these commitments. Inducements encouraging holders to maintain their sterling balances proved so 
attractive they facilitated the beginning of the renewed accumulation that had to be resolved in 
1976.  
The constraint was therefore determined by the ideological commitment to the principles of 
embedded liberalism that was embodied in the Bretton Woods system. This was justified based on 
the fear that a collapse in the system would herald a return to the political and economic conflict of 
the interwar period, combine with hopes that general reform to the role of reserve currencies would 
resolve the issue of sterling. Narration of sterling crises as implying a systemic threat to Bretton 
Woods secured support for sterling to maintain Britain’s commitments during this period of 
adjustment.  
The thesis argues that a significant shift in this approach occurred with the Nixon Shock of 1971. 
American unilateralism and the undermining of Bretton Woods meant expansion of domestic policy 
autonomy now took priority over stabilising the international monetary system. With adjustment 
now flexible in response to floating the rate in 1972, international borrowing, domestic 
retrenchment and use of the reserves were considered less appropriate responses to a current 
account deficit. Despite the Rippon commitment to run down sterling’s reserve role as part of the 
process of joining the EEC, no measures were taken to do so. Instead the configuration of the 
external constraint was predicated on domestic expansion. The exchange rate guarantees of the 
1968 Basle deal were extended to stabilise confidence in the balances. While policy continued to be 
based on the search for a long term resolution of the sterling overhang, as demonstrated by Heath’s 
attempts to use an acceleration of European monetary union to pool assets and liabilities, his refusal 
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to accept any renewed commitments for sterling indicates the interest of securing autonomy for 
domestic expansion took priority over running down the balances.  
This policy continued in the initial response to the 1973 oil crisis. Labour encouraged a fresh 
accumulation of sterling balances among newly enriched oil producers between 1974 and 75, while 
also drawing heavily on international capital markets in order to maintain output and demand in 
response to the expansion of oil related current account deficits. Growing ideological and economic 
divergence between Britain and America undermined the source of support that the Anglo-American 
relationship had traditionally provided. America wished to bring down the oil price and viewed 
Britain’s ability to defer adjustment through borrowing directly from oil producers and via low 
conditionality sources of IMF funding as undermining their strategy for a common front among 
consuming states. Meanwhile the culmination of the process of international monetary reform in a 
more flexible, fiat system that financed their wider political and security objectives allowed them to 
contain sterling crises more effectively than in the past.  
This set the scene for the 1976 crisis, in which the US attempted to use IMF conditionality to secure 
greater adjustment on British economic policies in line with its Treasury’s neo-liberal prescriptions. 
In response Callaghan narrated the source of the crisis as stemming from the sterling balances, 
arguing that even following agreement with the IMF, diversification could overwhelm Britain’s 
resources. This resulted in a fierce dispute with the US Treasury, which believed the problem of the 
sterling balances would be resolved with the correct domestic policies.  
While Callaghan was forced to concede coming to terms with the Fund was a prerequisite for any 
additional support, facing down opposition in his own party calling for radical left-wing solutions, he 
also proved adept in threatening the collapse of negotiations if American support was not 
forthcoming. In return for a commitment to prevent any future accumulations and in combination 
with the offer of foreign currency bonds, the result was an overwhelming market endorsement in 
sterling, the resolution of the overhang and the reduction of balances to working amounts. The true 
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significance of the crisis, the thesis argues, was that for the first-time commitment to end sterling’s 
reserve role took priority in policy.  
As a work of economic diplomacy, the thesis captures the British side in detail, but responses from 
foreign counterparts are mediated through the British archives. As such a limitation of the thesis is 
how British assessments of crises were themselves interpreted in the foreign centres of financial 
support upon which sterling depended. While the thesis has traced the evolution of British policy in 
response to the shifting parameters of international monetary relations, it is harder to see how 
these parameters were themselves shifted by British policy choices.  
With regards to the crucial American source of support this challenge has been mitigated to some 
extent by the resources available digitally via the Foreign Relations of the United States series. 
Analysis of this source has provided some illumination of the policy of the US in response to its own 
international monetary objectives. There is a substantial amount of material in these archives 
detailing the response of the US administration to successive sterling crises. However, there are 
some key areas in which the priority America attached to consideration of sterling’s needs in 
deciding policy is less clear. More detailed archival investigation of the process of policy formation 
would reveal how seriously America took the British protectionist threats and the danger these 
posed to the international monetary system (a common theme of relations from 1967 to 1977) and 
the priority these had in America’s assessment of crises and their response. While the Nixon Shock 
revealed the British assumption that sterling and the dollar had shared identities was misplaced, it is 
unclear whether the Americans ever felt this way and if so, how this affected their attitudes towards 
Bretton Woods under Johnson. Similarly, Ford’s decision to throw his support behind the 1977 Basle 
deal, over the objections of his senior Treasury advisors, could use further investigation to 
understand his motivation within the context of his own objectives. Nevertheless, the true 
significance is clear enough from the British archives, namely the importance Callaghan attached to 
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coming to a further deal on the sterling balances and the final resolution of the sterling overhang 
that followed securing American backing.  
While the thesis has re-interpreted the post-devaluation period, the years following the IMF crisis 
would be an interesting extension of the processes examined here. Britain’s role in the co-ordinated 
expansion of German, Japanese and American economies of 1977 would be a suitable topic for 
analysis, given this was the policy Britain had been urging on them since the oil shock. While the 
overhang was resolved almost immediately following announcement of the 1977 deal, reducing 
holdings of sterling to working balances was a longer affair, requiring an ongoing process of 
economic diplomacy between the Bank of England and counterparts abroad. This could also be an 
interesting extension of the thesis to understand how this commitment to preventing a renewed 
accumulation of the balances imposed a constraint on policy and impacted the final years of the 
Labour government.  
The overall conclusion of the thesis is that external constraints faced by states are not solely the 
consequence of economic criteria such as balance of payments deficits but are constituted according 
to ideologically informed commitments to wider political objectives. The continued existence of the 
sterling balances into 1976 reflected the use made by British policymakers in prioritising domestic 
autonomy and external stability over commitments that would reduce the level of foreign holdings 
of sterling.  The external constraint was in a process of continual re-negotiation via economic 
diplomacy in response to both material changes in the structure of international monetary relations 
and ideological change, notably in the crucial American source of support.  
The ability of states to pursue autonomous policies within a framework of multilateral trade and 
investment characterised by global capital flows is held to act as a constraint on domestic policy 
autonomy. In its simplest form, this overlooks the extent to which global capital markets are 
themselves the product of state power, ultimately dependent on them for enforcement while 
250 
shaped by political decisions regarding regulation, both domestic and international.1 Moreover, 
empirical evidence casts doubt on the implication that in a world of global capital flows, a ‘race to 
the bottom’ ensues, in which policy space is constrained to choices markets find acceptable. Instead, 
capital retains a prominent ‘home bias’, while regulation varies according to the domestic 
institutional context.2
The thesis has argued the existence of shared normative commitments to stability in external 
exchange and domestic policy autonomy provided the basis for cooperation and support for weak 
currencies like sterling that allowed them to survive periods of weak market confidence without 
resorting to excessive austerity or protectionist measures. While the global capital flows are today 
on a much greater scale than those states contended with under Bretton Woods, there is evidence 
that political commitments are of continued significance in shaping the direction and scale of capital 
flows. The ability of Greece prior to the 2008 financial crisis to draw on global capital markets in 
order to pursue policies aimed at raising living standards indicates the extent to which markets are 
influenced by political considerations, such as Greece’s membership of the Euro. The constitution of 
Greece’s external deficits, both before and after the crisis, were determined by the of membership 
of the currency union. This political commitment by Greece to the Euro resulted in an uncompetitive 
exchange rate, an expansion of external deficits and a resulting dependence on capital markets.3 On 
the other hand, intra-European deficits are constituted under this arrangement as mere accounting 
identities, the so-called Target 2 balances, rather than real demands for Greek resources.4 Austerity 
following the crisis has raised the complaint that domestic autonomy is being sacrificed to market 
opinion, something British leaders in the 1960s would have found familiar. However this is the result 
of the continued commitment to the Eurozone which requires internal deflation rather than external 
1 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill “Markets Beyond Politics? The State and the Internationalisation of Financial 
Markets” European Journal of Political Research Vol. 19 (2/3) pp. 199 - 202 
2 Ben Clift Comparative Political Economy pp. 119-120 
3 Martin Wolf The Shifts and the Shocks What We’ve Learned and What Have Still to Learn from the Financial 
Crisis (London: Penguin, 2014) pp 179 - 181 
4 Hans – Werner Sinn The Euro Trap On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets and Beliefs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) pp. 183 - 185 
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adjustment through devaluation.5 Under this configuration of its external constraint, Greece is 
reliant on international sources of support to negotiate the impact. Unlike Britain in the 1970s, 
Greece has failed in its attempt to seize control of the narrative of the crisis, notably in its 2015 
referendum on the terms of the Euro bail out which attempted to position the moral authority of a 
democratic mandate as superior to the terms of Greece’s creditors. Ideological differences between 
the left-wing Greek government of Syriza and the conservative German CDU proved unbridgeable, 
with the Germans demanding a commitment to austerity as the price of support required to stay in 
the Eurozone.6
Political commitments therefore shape the external constraints economies are submitted to and the 
availability and conditionality of support required to manage them. This is most dramatically 
revealed at times of crisis. Crises such as the Nixon Shock and OPEC crisis indicate the extent to 
which political decisions with wider geopolitical and security objectives can re-configure the external 
constraint. The strength of relationships with international sources of support thus proves essential 
in states’ ability to negotiate this constraint. Despite different interpretations of the crisis in 1976, 
the Anglo-American relationship proved strong enough for Britain to be able to secure the additional 
support it deemed necessary. 
The economic implications of Brexit are unclear at the time of writing, but likely to involve a 
reconfiguration of external constraint. Although the sterling balance problem no longer exists in the 
same form (as Britain’s external liabilities now taking the form of equity or long-term debt rather 
than short term Treasury bills), Britain’s seemingly perpetual current account deficits reveal a 
continuing dependence on external support for its standard of living. The radical reinterpretation of 
Britain’s political commitments and relationships can be expected, like Heath’s first abortive attempt 
5 Ibid p135 
6 Adam Tooze Crashed How A Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (London: Allen Lane, 2018) p530 
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to engage with Europe on a monetary level, to result in isolation from international sources of 
support while at the same time making them more necessary. 7
7 The Economist 15 October 2016 
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